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The Law School Critique in Historical 
Perspective 
A. Benjamin Spencer* 
Abstract 
Contemporary critiques of legal education abound. This arises 
from what can be described as a perfect storm: the confluence of 
softness in the legal employment market, the skyrocketing costs of 
law school, and the unwillingness of clients and law firms to 
continue subsidizing the further training of lawyers who failed to 
learn how to practice in law school. As legal jobs become 
increasingly scarce and salaries stagnate, the value proposition of 
law school is rightly being questioned from all directions. 
Although numerous valid criticisms have been put forth, some 
seem to be untethered from a full appreciation for how the current 
model of legal education developed. Indeed, a historical 
perspective on legal education is sorely missing from this debate, 
as many of the criticisms merely echo charges that have been 
lodged against legal education for well over a century, but do not 
draw lessons from how those former critiques ultimately failed to 
deliver fundamental change. This Article reviews the historical 
development of legal education in America, including the critiques 
and reforrns made along the way, to gain insight that will inform 
our own efforts to make law schools better at preparing lawyers for 
practice. 
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Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law; Chair, Virginia 
State Bar Section on the Education of Lawyers. Copyright© 2012 A. Benjamin 
Spencer. This Article was written during my time as a Visiting Professor at the 
University of Virginia School of Law, which I would like to thank for its 
generous grant assistance that enabled this research and for the wonderful 
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I. A Perfect Storm 
"The training received by American lawyers to-day has thus 
become a curious complex. It cannot be understood unless its 
main features, and the causes that have produced them, are 
presented in their historical sequence." 
-Alfred Zantzinger Reed, 1921 1 
Legal education is under attack.2 The value of a law degree is 
being questioned3 given the deterioration of the traditional legal 
job market4 and the substantial and growing size of the student 
1. ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PuBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN 
ENGLAND AND CANADA, Bulletin No. 15, at 4 (1921) [hereinafter REED REPORT]. 
2. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Russell D. Mangas, First Thing We Do, 
Let's Kill All the Law Schools, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020463220457712844330685389 
0.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing that state bar associations should 
work with undergraduate colleges to offer law majors that entitle graduates to 
take the bar exam, thus removing the need for expensive law schools, lowering 
legal fees, and increasing the supply of lawyers) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Martha Nell, 12 More Law Schools Sued Over Reporting 
of Law Grad Employment and Salary Stats, AB.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2012, 5:39 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/l2_more_law_schools_sued_in_consume 
r-fraud_class_action_re_reported_law/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (reporting on 
lawsuits filed by former law students alleging that schools had falsely 
advertised post-graduation employment prospects) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
3. See, e.g., Regrets? Yes. And Money Was the Root of Them All, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 20, 2010, 12:22 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/regrets­
theyve-had-a-few-dozen/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2012} (quoting one commenter, 
when asked about a big financial decision they would reverse, who said, 
"Simple: I would never go to law school. What a complete waste of time and 
money") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Careared, 
Comment to id., (Oct. 21, 2010, 9:13 AM) 
I regret law school, but more specifically I regret not fully considering 
the debt I would be facing after law school and weighing that against 
the prospect of committing my 20s to paying off that debt. Finding out 
I had chosen the wrong profession for me was bad enough, but being 
trapped in that career for many years just to break even was worse. 
4. Jobs in the legal services area are disappearing; between September 
2010 and September 2011, there was a loss of 3,200 jobs in this sector. See News 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation News Release, Table 
B-1 (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ 
empsit_10072011.htm. As of June 2011, of 2010 graduates whose employment 
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loan debt of recent graduates.5 Further, law schools are being 
charged with failing to prepare their graduates adequately for 
practice.6 Thus, we have what appears to be a perfect storm7 in 
status was known, only 68.4% had jobs requiring bar passage, with only 6 4% 
overall being full-time legal positions. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n for Law 
Placement (NALP), Class of 2010 Graduates Saddled with Falling Average 
Starting Salaries as Private Practice Jobs Erode 3 (July 7, 2011), available at 
http://www. nalp .org/uploads/PressReleases/Classof201 OStartingSalary Findings 
PressRelease.pdf (providing a summary of the employment status of Class 2010 
law students). 
5. See William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School 
Bubble, 98 AB.A. J. 30, 30 (2012) ("In 2010, 85 percent of law graduates from 
ABA-accredited schools boasted an average debt load of $98,500 .... "). Student 
loan repayment burdens are worse for students graduating from law schools 
placed at the lower tiers of the U.S. News rankings, as they tend to have median 
annual income well below graduates of higher ranked schools. See NALP FOUND. 
FOR L. CAREER RES. & EDU C. & AM. B. FOUND., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A 
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 42 (200 4) [hereinafter NALP, AFTER THE JD] 
(providing an in-depth study of the legal profession, including demographics, 
work satisfaction, compensation, professional mobility, and legal education). 
6. See, e.g., William R. Rakes, Conclaves on Legal Education: Catalyst for 
Improvement of the Profession, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1119, 1119 (1997) ("The 
practicing bar is demanding that law schools provide more training to prepare 
graduates to hit the ground running when they enter practice."); John Caher, 
N. Y. State Bar Asks ABA to Support 'Practice Ready' Law School Education, 
LAW.COM (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=12025095 
95910&slreturn=l (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) ("Legal education should have 
more of an emphasis on making sure graduates are ready to practice law .... It 
is something that has been de-emphasized, and it shows. Our research and our 
own experience show that graduates are less prepared to practice law.") (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); David Segal, What They Don't 
Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, 
https:/ /www .nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-la w-school-associates-learn­
to-be-la wyers.html? _r=l &pagewanted=all (last visited Sept. 11, 2012) ("What 
they did not get, for all that time and money, was much practical training. Law 
schools have long emphasized the theoretical over the useful .... ") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Throughout this Article, I will use the 
phrase "prepared for practice " or "practice-readiness " to refer to students who 
have sufficient mastery of the specialized knowledge, skills, and values of the 
legal profession to serve as competent attorneys and counselors without 
supervision. Thus, practice-readiness is not simply about having the technical 
skills required for practice but also about having a solid understanding of legal 
doctrine, acute analytical abilities, and an understanding of the ethical 
framework within which lawyers must operate. 
7. David Thomson uses this phrase to describe the current situation in 
legal education in which changes in the legal market, dissatisfaction with law 
schools, and a new generation of students with more technological savvy are 
combining to make this a critical moment for change. See DAVID I. C. THOMSON, 
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legal education: Law school graduates are under-employed, over­
indebted, and under-prepared for practice. 
As the economic downturn has forced legal service providers 
to deliver services with leaner staffs8 or outsourced resources, 9 
technology has developed to the point that fewer attorneys are 
needed to complete many legal tasks than was the case in the 
past.1° For example, artificial intelligence has advanced such that 
computerized document review has become faster, cheaper, and of 
a higher quality than traditional human review. 11 This means 
that many lost legal jobs, related to discovery work or other legal 
tasks, may not be coming back.12 Additionally, law firms and 
LAW SCHOOL2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE 11 (2009). 
8. See The Layoff List, THE AM. LAWYER, http://www.americanlawyer. 
com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=l20242564 7706&THE_LA YOFF _LIST&slreturn=20 
120726205814 (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (providing links to news stories about 
layoffs at law firms across the country) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
9. See Karen Sloan, Elite Firms Seem to Have Lost Their Appetites, NAT'L 
LAW J. (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 
1202543428334&slreturn=l (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) ("Some of that more 
routine legal work that used to be handled by a lot of associates is now being 
done by contract attorneys or outside providers.") (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); THOMSON, supra note 7, at 16 ("Many corporations send 
routine legal work to large shops of relatively low-paid attorneys in India. Law 
firms are doing it too-in a recent study, 80 percent of the largest firms 
admitted to having outsourced projects."). 
iO. See Joe Dysart, A New View of Review: Predictive Coding Vows to Cut 
E-Discovery Drudgery, AB.A J. (Oct. 1, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.aba 
journal.com/magazine/article/a_new _ view _of_review _predictive_coding_ vows_to 
_cut_e-discovery_drudgery (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (noting the development 
of efficient computer software that is capable of conducting document review) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
11. See, e.g., id. ("Research has shown that, under the best circumstances, 
manual review will identify about 70 percent of the responsive documents in a 
large data collection. Some technology-assisted approaches have been shown to 
perform at least as well as that, if not better, at far less cost."). 
12. See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE 
OF LEGAL SERVICES 2 (2008) 
I argue that the market is increasingly unlikely to tolerate expensive 
lawyers for tasks (guiding, advising, drafting, researching, problem­
solving, and more) that can equally or better be discharged by less 
expert people, supported by sophisticated systems and processes. It 
follows, I say, that the jobs of many traditional lawyers will be 
substantially eroded and often eliminated. 
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corporate law departments have recognized that there are some 
legal tasks that do not necessarily require the same level of 
training or expertise to complete.13 Thus, some firms have 
established differentiated career tracks that create nonpartner­
track staff attorneys who receive lower compensation for 
completing more routine and less demanding legal tasks. 14 
Corporate law departments have kept more work in-house with 
their employees15 or used low-paid contract attorneys to do 
routine legal work. 16 Two commentators cited statistics predicting 
that the paucity of legal jobs will be stark going forward, as the 
American Bar Association (ABA)-approved law schools will be 
producing roughly 45,000 graduates annually to fill only 25,000 
lawyer positions.17 
13. See Rama Lakshmi, U.S. Legal Work Booms in India, WASH. POST, May 
11, 2008, at A20 (noting that in 2008, the legal outsourcing industry had grown 
"about 60 percent annually" for the past three years because corporate firms 
outsource work spurred by the passage of e-discovery laws). 
14. See Catherine Rampell, At Well-Paying Law Firms, a Low-Paid Corner, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/business/ 
24lawyers.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (describing "two­
tier" systems in which "permanent associates" earn less than half the pay of 
traditional associates to do routine legal work as employees of major law firms) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law review). 
15. One corporate general counsel reports, "[i]t's simply a situation where, 
for the most part, law firms have priced themselves out of a whole bunch of 
work I used to have them do . . .. If work is going to repeat at all, I'll bring the 
expertise in-house. My in-house teams have simply gotten much bigger, and my 
outside counsel use has gone down . . . .  " Jay Pinkert, Straight Talk from 
General Counsels on How to Win Their Business, SHA'ITERBOX (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.shatterbox.biz/2012/02/straight-talk-from-general-counsels-on-how­
to-win-their-business/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (quoting Eric Whitaker, 
General Counsel of Tesla Motors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
16. See Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What's A First-Year Lawyer 
Worth?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2011, at Bl ("Of course, the more menial tasks still 
need to get done. But many corporate legal departments are either farming 
them to their own employees or giving them to so-called contract attorneys, 
lower-cost outside lawyers who work independently from the large law-firm 
ecosystem."). 
17. Stanley Fish, Bad News for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012, 
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/the-bad-news-law­
schools/# (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Matt Leichter, Clever Plans to Reform Legal Education Won't 
Make Legal Services Any Cheaper, AMLAw DAILY (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:04 PM), 
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This bursting of the legal job market bubble has laid bare 
two major deficiencies in legal education. First, its costs have 
risen to levels that could only be sustained as long as cheap 
student loans and high-paying legal jobs were available, 
conditions that are now eroding. 18 Second, the Great Recession 
has led clients and thus law firms to have less capacity to 
subsidize the on-the-job training of law graduates19 that they had 
been expected to provide, 20 revealing deficiencies in the ability of 
http:// amla wdaily. typepad.com/amla wdaily/2012/01/clever-plans-to-reform-legal­
ed uca tion-won t-make-legal-services-any-cheaper.html (last visited Sept. 10, 
2012) (criticizing suggestions for reform of the legal education system that rest 
on the assumption that contraction in the legal market is due to the increasing 
price of legal education, and noting that "actual" employment statistics project a 
"shallow" legal market in 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
18. See Nancy M. Jackson, Student Loans Becoming Scarce, Fox Bus. 
(Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2011/09/20/ 
student-loans-becoming-scarce/print (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (" [T]he ·money 
to boost the Pell Grant program was raised by making cuts to the federal 
student loan program, eliminating the interest subsidy on loans to graduate 
students for loans after July 1, 2012, and eliminating the Education 
Department's Direct Loan Program repayment incentives.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
19. See Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the 
Twenty-First Century, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1649, 1659 ("Law partners who have to 
spend more time tending to their books of business have less time for building 
the firm's value through activities like training younger lawyers. Also, increased 
competition reduces firms' freedom to bill training time to clients.");· see also 
Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 16 (citing a survey reporting that more than 20% 
of responding in-house legal departments refuse to pay for the work of first- or 
second-year attorneys); id. (quoting the general counsel of a company as saying 
''Training someone on putting together an asset-purchase agreement shouldn't 
be done on our nickel"); THOMSON, supra note 7, at 18 ("[F]irms are less and less 
interested in taking on this role . . . .  [W]ith annual salaries for new attorneys 
ballooning in some cities to $150,000 and more, firms tend understandably to be 
less patient with new associates who need significant training before they are 
truly useful.") . 
20. See Carrie Hempel & Carroll Seron, An Innovative Approach to Legal 
Education and the Founding of the University of California, Irvine School of 
Law, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
JUSTICE 169 (Scott L. Cummings, ed., 2011), available at https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1851702& ("For the better part of the 
twentieth century, there has been an informal division of labor between law 
schools, which are in the business of credentialing knowledge, and first 
employers responsible for passing on the skills of day-to-day practice."). 
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law schools to adequately prepare a sufficient number of their 
students to handle legal matters for clients. 21 
But this latter critique is not a new development; over the 
past 130 years we have heard from many sources22 that law 
schools are not truly fulfilling their obligation to prepare students 
for legal practice. 23 This would strike many outside the profession 
as odd since-as Judge Richard Posner once suggested and as 
most would assume-the ''basic focus" of law schools should be 
"the training of practicing lawyers."24 This is far from a truism, in 
21. See, e.g., N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 38 (2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
THE FuTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION] ("Too many law students and recent 
graduates are not as well prepared for the profession as they might be."). 
22. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, 
LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 191-92 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT] ("In the 
standard model [of law schools], in which cognitive apprenticeship . . .  
dominates, the other practical and ethical-social apprenticeships are . . .  judged 
as adjuncts to the first."); AM. B. Ass'N SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO 
THE B., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: 
NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; AM. B. Ass'N SEC. 
OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE B. , REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979) 
[hereinafter CRAMTON REPORT]; REED REPORT, supra note 1. 
23. Long ago, Albert Harno, in his 1953 study on legal education in 
America, noted the criticisms that were leveled at law schools, which, he wrote, 
"all can be grouped under one heading, that the schools do not adequately 
prepare students for the tasks they will have to perform in the practice." ALBERT 
J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 137 (1953); see also 
MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 ("[S]urveys understandably indicate that 
practicing lawyers believe that their law school training left them deficient in 
skills that they were forced to acquire after graduation."); CRAMTON REPORT, 
supra note 22, at 8 ("Chief Justice Burger and others have spoken, in recent 
years, of a· serious problem of 'incompetency' among those lawyers trying cases 
before the federal courts and among the trial bar generally."). 
24. Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE 
L.J. 1113, 1129 (1981); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Ideal Law School for 
the 21st Century, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 20 (2011) (" [L]aw schools exist 
preeminently for training students to be lawyers . . . .  "). Harno defined the 
mission of legal education as the production of "well-trained and capable 
lawyers-lawyers who are skilled in legal procedures, who are versatile in the 
tasks of the law, who have an understanding and a vision of the purposes and 
mission of the law, and who are guided by a sense of moral responsibility." 
HARNO, supra note 23, at 164. 
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light of the perspective expressed by many that law schools 
should be primarily scholarly institutions in which the law can be 
studied and understood as an academic and intellectual pursuit 
rather than professional schools that provide vocational 
training. 25 To be sure, there is ground to allow both 
perspectives;26 a law school must train lawyers but also can be "a 
25. The late Charles E. Clark, Second Circuit Judge, former Yale Law 
School Dean, and father of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was a harsh 
critic of efforts to involve law schools in vocational training in practical legal 
skills: 
I regard the repetitive attempts to coerce law schools into offering so­
called practical training as at best curiously nai'.ve, and in general at 
odds with sound concepts of legal education. Such attempts might be 
dismissed as a comparatively harmless· and not unusual professional 
baiting of the schools except that law deans and professors are 
acutely attuned to professional criticism and hence may be led to 
waste their substance in  doing what they cannot do effectively and 
what if they could would not be pedagogically worth while . . . .  I shall 
argue that law school training is now effectively efficient . . .  that 
there is no real basis for the criticism implicit in this pressure for 
practical training; that the latter is limited, partial and fragmentary 
at best; and that the present-day legal education in problem analysis 
and exposition and in thorough documentation of sources is much 
more important and valuable, as well as more within the practical 
competence of the schools. 
Charles E. Clark, "Practical" Legal Training an Illusion, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 423, 
423 (1951); see also Robert S. Summers, Fuller on Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 8, 9 (1984) ("Some legal educators today hold that training of 
practitioners is at most a secondary function of law schools. Rather, the primary 
function is to create and disseminate new knowledge and understanding about 
law."). 
26. See Thomas Swan, Report of Thomas W. Swan, Dean, to the President 
and Fellows of Yale University, in REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING PROVOST 
AND SECRETARY OF YALE UNIVERSITY AND OF THE DEANS AND DIRECTORS OF ITS 
SEVERAL SCHOOLS AND DEPARTMENTS FOR THE ACADEMIC YEAR, 1919-1920, at 393 
(1920), available at http://books.google.com/books/reader?id=RrNJAAAAYAAJ& 
printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PP7 ("A university law school has 
two functions. It aims by the case method of instruction to train its students so 
that they may become successful practitioners in their chosen profession. It 
aims also or at least it should aim, though too few schools have recognized this 
obligation, to aid in improving the law . . . .  "); see also LON L. FuLLER ET AL., 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE 
HARVARD LAw SCHOOL 4 (1947) (noting that the two purposes of training lawyers 
and promoting understanding and improvement of the law "are so closely 
related that it is unrewarding to discuss which is primary and which is 
secondary''). 
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centre [sic] of research, criticism, and contribution to the better 
understanding of the laws" with the goal of improving the law.27 
It is for each school to determine the extent to which it is 
committed to the latter goal; however, it should be the aim of all 
to be effective at achieving the former.28 
Unfortunately, the law school of today is not optimally 
designed to prepare students for practice. The focus across most 
of the three years of law school is on teaching legal doctrine, 29 
using principally a method of limited effectiveness, 30 with too few 
students being thoroughly instructed in the practice skills and 
core competencies needed to be a successful lawyer.31 These 
27. Cecil A. Wright, The University Law Schools, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 409, 412 
(1950). 
28. The ABA Standards require that "a law school . . . maintain an 
educational program that prepares its students for admission to the bar, and 
effective and responsible participation in the legal profession." AM. B. Ass'N, 
2012-2013 STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 
Standard 301(a) (2012) [hereinafter 2012-2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF 
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS], available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/ 
2012_2013_aba_standards_and_rules.authcheckdam. pdf. 
29. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 (noting the concentration of 
courses on legal doctrine throughout all three years of law school). 
30. Critiques of the Socratic case method abound. See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY ET 
AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 112 (2007) ("[T]he Socratic dialogue 
and case method leaves students confused, teachers often use it poorly, and it 
contributes to a hostile, competitive classroom environment that is 
psychologically harmful to a significant percentage of students."); id. at 97-104 
(cataloging criticisms of the Socratic method); HARNO, supra note 23, at 138-39 
("One of [the] limitations [of the case method] is the fact that after the first year 
of law study, there is a distinct lag of interest in the reading of cases on the part 
of law students. The method by that time has lost much of its sparkle."). The 
Socratic case-dialogue method will be discussed in greater detail in Part 111.B 
below. 
31. See, e.g., David E. Van Zandt, Foundational Competencies, 61 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2009) ("[N]o school has addressed the core competencies that 
it takes to be an effective lawyer in a variety of organizations over a multi-job 
career."). In fact, the practical skills training and experiential learning 
opportunities that many law schools offer tend to be elective and are taken up in 
earnest by a minority of law students overall, when compared with the 
extensive doctrinal instruction all law students receive. NALP FOUND., 2010 
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS 6-
7 (2011) [hereinafter NALP, 2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL 
LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS], · available at http://www.nalp. 
org/may201 lresearch_ exp_learning?s=201 Osurveyofla wschoolexperientiallearning 
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defects have their origins in the innovations of Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, the late nineteenth century Dean of the 
Harvard Law School who envisioned law as a scientific discipline 
that should be taught by full-time academics using the case­
dialog method more so than as a craft to be learned by 
apprentices studying at the feet of experienced practitioners. 32 
Much has changed in law schools since Langdell's time, but to a 
remarkable degree, much is still fundamentally the same. 
Appreciating both the legal education system to which Langdell 
was responding and the nature and rationale of Langdell's 
various reforms is useful in permitting us to think critically about 
the basic design of law schools today, especially as we consider 
how that model should change in response to contemporary 
challenges. 
But why should we care? Members of the bar are rightly 
giving their attention to this issue, but there are likely some 
academics who would scoff at the notion that one should concern 
oneself with this question or that any real problem exists. 
Whether there is a problem, no one should seriously doubt.33 Nor 
should anyone doubt whether it is for legal academics to devote 
our attention to this matter; maintaining the quality of the legal 
education system is vital to any effort to improve the law and the 
administration of justice. 34 Furthermore, in an environment 
opportunitiesandbenefits (showing 30.2% of survey respondents had participated 
in at least one legal clinic, 36.2% of respondents had taken part in an 
externship, and 40% of respondents had taken three or more practice skills 
courses). 
32. See infra Part ILE (discussing Dean Langdell's teaching philosophy 
towards the law). 
33. Of course, there are those who doubt there is a problem. See, e.g., 
Steven Harper, The Law School Quandary, AMLAw DAILY (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http ://amla wdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/0 lithe-law-school-quandary .html 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) ("If the vast majority of students are happy with the 
law school experience and changing it won't improve their job prospects, 
perhaps the legal academy and its critics should consider focusing attention 
elsewhere.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
34. William G. Hammond et. al., Report of the Committee on Legal 
Education, 14 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 320-21 (1891) [hereinafter Hammond et. al., 14 
AM. BARAsS'N REP.] 
No lesson has been more clearly taught by the history of our science 
from the beginning than that, wherever the law has been best 
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where legal jobs are more difficult to attain and the costs and 
debt associated with legal education are on the rise, allowing the 
quality of legal education to erode through indifference is a 
disservice to the students we serve. 
Taking the need for reform of some kind to be necessary, the 
first step in the reform process should be a thorough 
consideration of what brought us to this point and why our 
schools take the approach to legal training that they do. Why is 
law school designed the way that it is today, as a three-year 
program led by scholars removed from practice focusing on 
doctrinal legal instruction? What efforts have already been made 
to move legal education away from that model and why have 
those efforts failed at achieving any fundamental alteration of 
how we deliver legal education? What criticisms have been lodged 
against legal education in the past and what insights might we 
gain from them for our time? And what suggestions for reform 
have been made but ignored that could offer ideas whose time 
may now be ripe? Part II of this Article will plumb some of the 
history of legal education in this country, while Part III traverses 
the long line of critiques that have been leveled at legal 
education. Part IV explores the state of legal education today, 
with Part V featuring a discussion of the lessons to be learned 
from this history for contemporary reform efforts. 
II. From Blackstone to Langdell 
The system of legal education that we have today is the 
product of an evolutionary process in which subsequent 
approaches reflect efforts to build on and improve what has come 
before. This means that law school, as it exists today, is an 
artifact of its past, with a structure and tradition that is rooted in 
history more so than being founded on rational design. As a 
result, although many innovations characterize the modern 
approach to law school, these adjustments tend to be more 
administered and most truly worthy of its high mission, its votaries 
have been most careful of the education of students and in the 
statement of its principles, so that such students could thoroughly 
master them. 
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superstructure than substitute, supplementing traditional law 
school education rather than supplanting it.35 As I will argue, 
however, real and lasting change in legal education requires 
fundamental rethinking rather than accretive reform. Getting 
beyond evolution to a revolution in how we educate lawyers, 
however, requires that we first understand the history that has 
brought us to where we are. Thus, in this Part and the next, we 
will review the historical development of formal legal education 
to its present form to understand the "why'' behind the current 
system, to identify some of the roots of its shortcomings, and to 
inform our current critique with some of the wisdom and insights 
from the past. 
A. Private Reading and Office Apprenticeships 
'Why disgust and discourage a young man by telling him he 
must break into his profession through such a wall as this?" 
-Daniel Webster, 185836 
Pre-Revolutionary lawyers in America imported the English 
common law and with it the rudiments of the English approach to 
training aspiring lawyers for practice. 37 This consisted of the 
office apprenticeship, in which an aspirant was assigned the 
reading of classic common law texts of varying utility,38 and 
35. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 76 ("[T]oday's trend is to 
supplement rather than replace the inherited reliance on this venerable case­
dialogue teaching in the first phase of doctrinal instruction."). 
36. 1 DANIEL WEBSTER, Biographical Memoir, in THE WORKS OF DANIEL 
WEBSTER xiii, xxvii (11th ed. 1858) (reflecting on his legal training as an office 
apprentice, during which he was tasked with reading obscure commentaries on 
the English common law by Sir Edward Coke). 
37. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 27 ("In America, . . . legal education until 
well past the middle of the 1800's followed the English pattern."). 
38. Joseph Story has commented on this phase of his legal preparation, 
writing that he was told to read Coke on Littleton during his apprenticeship, 
which he described as "intricate, crabbed, and obsolete learning." JOSEPH STORY, 
Autobiography, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 1, 19 (1852). 
Story went on to state, "I took [Coke on Littleton] up, and after trying it day 
after day with very little success, I sat myself down and wept bitterly" but that 
"[w]hen I had completed the reading of this most formidable work, I felt that I 
breathed a purer air, and that I had acquired a new power." Id. at 20. Daniel 
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placed "at the desk of some skilful [sic] attorney[,] in order to 
initiate them early in all the depths of practice, and render them 
more dexterous in the mechanical part of business."39 Such 
preparation was sufficient to become an attorney given the 
weakness of--or even the absence of-regulations setting forth 
requirements to practice law during late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries.4° For example, James Flint, an Indiana 
attorney, wrote in 1819, "Blackstone's Commentaries are 
considered the great medium of instruction. The young man who 
has carefully read these, and who has for a short time written for 
a practicing attorney, is admitted to the bar."41 
The apprenticeship approach to legal education left much to 
be desired.42 As Blackstone pointed out in his famous 
Commentaries in remarking on the office apprenticeship: 
[A] lawyer thus educated to the bar, in subservience to 
attorneys and solicitors, will find he has begun at the wrong 
end. If practice be the whole he is taught, practice must also be 
the whole he will ever know: if he be uninstructed in the 
Webster, who similarly was assigned Coke on Littleton as an apprentice, 
remarked, "A boy of twenty, with no previous knowledge of such subjects, cannot 
understand Coke. It is folly to set him upon such an author." WEBSTER, supra 
note 36, at xxvii. 
39. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32; see also Roscoe Pound, The 
Law School and the Professional Tradition, 24 MICH. L. REV. 156, 158 (1925) 
("[T]raditional ideals of the common-law books and the professional tradition 
brought over from England by pre-Revolutionary lawyers [were] handed down 
from lawyer to lawyer in the apprentice training of the old-time law office."). 
40. Harno describes the early practice regulations as requiring a number of 
years of preparation, which did not mean formal legal education at the time, 
with New Jersey requiring an examination. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 33. 
41. Michael H. Harris, The Frontier Lawyer's Library: Southern Indiana, 
1800-1850, As a Test Case, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 239, 241 (1972). 
42. The MacCrate Report aptly describes the deficits of the system when it 
states: 
The experienced attorney received cheap labor in exchange for the 
use of his library, but provided the apprentice with very little in the 
way of actual legal training. Often, experienced attorneys were too 
busy practicing law to spend time with their apprentices. There was 
no guarantee that a skilled practitioner was an adequate teacher. 
Many apprentices spent their time tediously copying documents for 
their masters, not studying legal tenets. 
MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 104 (citations omitted). 
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elements and first principles upon which the rule of practice is 
founded, the least variation from established precedents will 
totally distract and bewilder him. 43 
To that critique, Blackstone added that the apprenticeship model 
would fail to yield lawyers who could comprehend "arguments 
drawn a priori, from the spirit of the laws and the natural 
foundations of justice," and would never attract "a gentleman of 
distinction or learning'' to the bar, leaving it "wholly inO the 
hands of obscure or illiterate men."44 Much later, Roscoe Pound 
would criticize the apprenticeship model on different grounds: 
that it was ill suited for preparing lawyers in an increasingly 
urbanized and industrialized America.45 In Pound's view, the 
growing complexity of the economic and social structure that 
came with industrialization "call [ed] for a deeper and wider 
training of lawyers than the training in rules of thumb and in 
procedure which was afforded by the law office."46 As another 
twentieth century commentator noted, "That the study of law 
through mediums of that sort would produce lawyers of limited 
knowledge and perspective is not a subject for wonder."47 
This is not to say that the office apprenticeship system 
lacked its advantages. Pound identified certain benefits that were 
lost with the passage of the apprenticeship approach to academic 
instruction, including the "handing down of professional 
traditions from lawyer to lawyer" and "that the law student in his 
formative days came in contact immediately with the leaders of 
the bar": 
By daily contact he absorbed from them certain traditions, 
certain ideals of the things that are done and are not done by 
good lawyers, and a certain feeling as to what was incumbent 
on him as a member of the profession. We cannot transmit 
43. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *32. 
44. Id. 
45. See Pound, supra note 39, at 159 (describing how industrialization of 
society shifted the role of lawyers from "the great trial lawyer" to "the steward of 
the leaders of industry" and thus necessitated knowledge of business as well as 
law, something that could not be provided solely through the apprenticeship 
model). 
46. Id. 
47. HARNO, supra note 23, at 19-20. 
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these things with like efficacy by any system of formal 
instruction. 48 
Ultimately, however, this approach was not enough; it 
focused on lawyering as a craft with undue attention to the need 
for lawyers to have a fuller understanding of the law and the 
ability to engage in more sophisticated legal analysis in a society 
of increasing legal complexity. 
B. Professorships in Law 
Returning to Blackstone's time, his proposed solution to the 
deficits of apprenticeship training was to make academic 
instruction in the law a prerequisite to office-based training. In 
his words, "The inconveniences [associated with the 
apprenticeship model] can never be effectually prevented, but by 
making academical [sic] education a previous step to the 
profession of the common law, and at the same time making the 
rudiments of the law a part of academical [sic] education."49 The 
creation of professorships in law early in the history of our 
country within universities was an effort to respond to 
Blackstone's suggestion and to his example as a professor in law 
at Oxford.50 The first such professorship was established in 1779 
48. Pound, supra note 39, at 160; see also Michael Burrage, From Practice 
to School-Based Professional Education: Patterns of Conflict and 
Accommodation in England, France, and the United States, in THE EUROPEAN 
AND AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SINCE 1800, at 142 (Sheldon Rothblatt & Bjorn 
Wittrock eds., 1993) ("[P]rofessional schools often displaced or discredited 
alternative practice-based forms of professional education. There are, therefore, 
opportunity costs and another side of its history, the side of the losers, of the 
viable, traditional institutions directly under the control of practising [sic] 
professionals."). 
49. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *32. 
50. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 23 ("One immediate effect traceable to 
Blackstone's influence was the establishment of chairs of law in several 
American colleges and universities.") ;  see also Pound, supra note 39, at 160 
("One might say with truth, even if somewhat paradoxically, that American 
legal education begins with Blackstone's professorship at Oxford."); James 
Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV. 169, 170 
(1895) (describing how "Blackstone's example was immediately followed here [in 
the United States]" at William and Mary College, Harvard College, and 
Litchfield Law School). 
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at William and Mary and filled by George Wythe. 51 Aided greatly 
by Blackstone's Commentaries--which taught early American 
lawyers "the continuity, the unity, and the reason of the Common 
Law"5L-figures such as St. George Tucker at William and Mary 
and James Kent at Columbia College taught in the Blackstone 
tradition and were pioneers in matters of legal scholarship.53 
These professors were expositors and systematizers of the law, 
who lectured on legal history, the broad principles that served as 
the foundation for the law, and the jurisprudence of the day in 
various subject areas.54 Several of these law professorships were 
established at various American colleges during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.55 However, legal 
51. HARNO, supra note 23, at 23. 
52. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 177 (1911) 
[hereinafter WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR] . 
53. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 23-26. St. George Tucker based his 
lectures on Blackstone's Commentaries, supplemented with his own notes on 
American law. Id. at 23. His notes became the basis for an annotated edition of 
Blackstone. Id. James Kent also based his lectures on Blackstone and used his 
lectures as the foundation for his own Commentaries on American Law. Id. at 
25. 
54. To receive the Royall Professorship in law at Harvard College, the 
incumbent was required to deliver certain lectures, including: 
[T]he theory of law in its most comprehensive sense; the principles 
and practical operation of the Constitution and Government of the 
United States . . .  ; an explanation of the principles of the Common 
Law of England, the mode of its introduction into this country, and 
the sources and reasons of its obligation therein; also the various 
modifications by usage, judicial decision, and Statute; and, generally, 
those topics connected with law as a science which will best lead the 
minds of students to such inquiries and researches as will qualify 
them to become useful and distinguished supporters of our free 
system of government, as well as able and honorable advocates of the 
rights of the citizen. 
1 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL 
CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 298 (1908) [hereinafter 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL] (quoting the statutes of the Royall Professorship); see 
also id. at 301 (quoting Isaac Parker as saying that ''law is a comprehensive 
system of human wisdom " and, thus, a "science . . .  worthy to be taught"). 
55. Other professorships established during this period include the Royall 
Professorship of law filled in 1815 at Harvard College, a professorship of law at 
the College of Philadelphia in 1790, a professorship of law at Yale College in 
1801, a professorship of law at the University of Maryland in 1816, and a chair 
of Law and Politics at the University of Virginia in 1826. HARN0, supra note 23, 
1966 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 949 (2012) 
education in universities under professors of law was conceived of 
as "a broad foundation for the further education of prospective 
lawyers,"56 not as a substitute for training to become a practicing 
lawyer.57 Thus, aspirants to a career as a lawyer remained 
obliged to pursue an office apprenticeship to be admitted to the 
bar,58 establishing a distinction between academic legal education 
in colleges and training for practice in law offices.59 
C. The Litchfield Law School 
These law professorships did not immediately lead to the 
development of schools of law within universities as had been 
hoped.60 Indeed, the first established law school, the Litchfield 
at 23-24, 37-38. 
56. Id. at 27. 
57. See MARIAN CECILIA MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LITCHFIELD LAW 
SCHOOL 59 (Oceana 1986) ("None of these professorships, as the record clearly 
shows, attempted to offer a complete technical education for law students."); see 
also Pound, supra note 39, at 160 ("But their lectures were not and were not 
meant to be professional training in law."). 
58. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 27 ("The educational route to the practice 
of law was then, as it was to be for some time yet to come, through office 
apprenticeships, and those who attended these lectures were not relieved from 
traveling that route."); see also REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 45 ("The special 
obstacle in northern states [to university based legal education], during these 
early years, was the still prevailing requirement of a period of clerkship."). 
Admissions requirements in Virginia during this time were reported to have 
been weaker than those found in the northern states. See id. at 44 ("In 
[Virginia] . . .  the requirements for admission to the bar were already so weak 
that William and Mary's law department had no difficulty in securing its start 
at once."). 
59. This distinction held for the training of barristers in England at this 
time, as law professors at Oxford and Cambridge had no hand in their training, 
which was managed by the Inns of Court-the practitioner "clubs" that oversaw 
student barristers during their pupilage. See Burrage, supra note 48, at 144-45 
("Oxford and Cambridge professors of law never sought to challenge the Inns' 
control of the education of the common lawyers. They gave lectures on Roman 
law, international law, jurisprudence, and constitutional history but hardly 
referred to the law used by practising [sic] English lawyers."). 
60. See JAMES BARR AMES, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in LECTURES 
ON LEGAL HISTORY 354, 359 (1913) ("The hopes that may have been entertained 
of developing schools of law out of these professorships were in the main doomed 
to disappointment."). 
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Law School in Connecticut, was independent of the university 
system and arose as an expansion from office apprenticeships in 
the law office of Tapping Reeve. 61 This became possible once state 
bar admissions authorities abandoned efforts to limit the number 
of apprentices that could study under an attorney at any given 
time.62 The course of instruction offered by Reeve at Litchfield 
covered all of Anglo-American private law with no special 
attention given to the law of any one state or to areas of public 
law.63 The weekly Saturday examinations were three hours in 
length and mainly oral, consisting of "a thorough investigation of 
the principles of each rule [of law], and not merely of such 
questions as can be answered from memory without any exercise 
of the judgement [sic] . . . .  "64 
An alumnus of the school, James Gould, would later become 
an associate of Reeve and subsequently shared in the lecturing 
responsibilities at the school.65 He restructured the curriculum to 
include topics such as master and servant, bailments, and real 
property.66 It is worth noting that Gould discouraged the reading 
of cases as the primary means of legal instruction, remarking: 
I always dissuade them from reading reports in course, until 
they have acquired a pretty thorough knowledge of the outline 
61. HARNO, supra note 23, at 29. 
62. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 45 (''What saved the situation . . . 
was the fact that attempts to limit the number of clerks who might study under 
one attorney were soon abandoned. This paved the way for the thoroughly 
natural development of a private attorney's law office into a private class or 
school .. .. "). 
63. MCKENNA, supra note 57, at 63, 65-66. 
64. Id. at 85 (quoting CATALOGUE OF THE LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL 5 (photo. 
reprint) (1900)). 
65. Id. at 93. 
66. Id. at 64, 108. Other sub jects included municipal law, baron and feme 
(husband and wife), parent and child, guardian and ward, executors and 
administrators, sheriffs and gaolers Gailors), contracts, fraudulent conveyances, 
inns and innkeepers, covenant broken, action of debt, action of account, notice of 
request, assumpsit, defenses to actions, private wrongs, evidence, systems of 
pleading, new trials, bills of exceptions, writs of error, practice in Connecticut, 
bills of exchange and promissory notes, insurance, charter parties, joint owners 
of vessels, partnership, stoppage in transitu, sailors' contracts, powers of 
chancery, criminal law, estates upon condition, modes of acquiring estates, 
devises, title by deed, and actions for injuries to things real. Id. at 64. 
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of the science by studying each principal [subject] separately; 
being fully convinced that reading in the former mode is of 
little comparative profit in an early stage of legal studies. 67 
Although the life of this school was only from 1784 to 1833, it 
had a remarkable record of producing illustrious graduates.68 Its 
other legacy was to take legal education some degree beyond the 
office apprenticeship with a more systematic approach to 
instruction in law, though still occurring nominally in a law office 
setting. 69 Other independent schools, though less notable than 
Litchfield, were in existence during this time as well. 70 In these 
schools, we see the attempt to wed academic education and 
practical training in one setting-the law office rather than the 
university. This approach, however, would not last. 
D. University Law Schools 
Some of the early holders of law professorships in 
universities were able to achieve the development of entire law 
schools within their institutions. Chief Justice Isaac Parker, the 
first holder of the Royall Professorship in law at Harvard and the 
leader of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, was keen 
for Harvard to found a graduate school to instruct aspiring 
lawyers in the law before entering "into the office of a counselor 
to obtain a knowledge of practice."71 Harvard Law School was 
67. Id. at 184. 
68. A compendium of ,alumni by Samuel H. Fisher reports twenty-eight 
U.S. Senators, 101 members of Congress, thirty-four state supreme court 
justices, fourteen governors of states and ten lieutenant governors, three U.S. 
vice presidents, three U.S. Supreme Court Justices, and six members of the 
Cabinet. HARNO, supra note 23, at 31. 
69. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 133 ("The significance of this group 
of school in our educational development is that they served temporarily to 
bridge the gap between the students who wished systematized instruction in the 
law and the colleges that were not yet prepared to give it."). 
70. Charles Warren mentions some of these private schools in Virginia, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. See WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR, supra note 52, at 364-65. 
71. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 
302. 
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founded in 1817, adding Asahel Stearns as a professor.72 
Although Yale's first professor of law, Elizur Goodrich, ended his 
nine-year tenure in 1810 without founding a law school there, the 
head of a private law school in New Haven, Judge David Daggett, 
was appointed to succeed Goodrich in 1826, bringing his private 
law school into the College as Yale Law School.73 Several other 
universities soon followed and established law schools, but Harno 
reports that "[t]hese were not distinguished schools" and "not one 
that was in operation contemporaneously with the Litchfield 
School enjoyed at that time the favorable reputation of that 
School."74 
More university law schools were founded throughout the 
nineteenth century, bringing the number to thirty-one by 1870.75 
The schools were not offering the three-year law degree of today 
but rather offered one- to two-year courses of study consisting of 
lectures and readings of treatises in the areas of law considered 
important at the time: constitutional law, American 
jurisprudence, English common law, equity, pleading, evidence, 
bailments, insurance, bills and notes, partnerships, domestic 
relations, conflict of laws, sales, and real property.76 Liberal 
education in other topics such as history, philosophy, ethics, and 
the law of nature, although viewed as important in the effort to 
produce lawyers of professional excellence,77 was presumed to 
have been obtained elsewhere.78 As Harno points out, this 
presumption was a fallacious one, given that none of the law 
72. Id. at 307. 
73. See WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR, supra note 52, at 364; 
see also HARNO, supra note 23, at 38. 
7 4. HARNO, supra note 23, at 38. 
75. Id. at 51. 
76. 2 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 218 
(1908). 
77. See JOSEPH STORY, The Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 529 (1852) ("It is by such 
studies, and such accomplishments, that the means are to be prepared for 
excellence in the highest order of the profession."). 
78. See id. at 536 ("[T]he course of the academical [sic] instruction in this 
University already provided for . . . the subjects of ethics, natural law, and 
theology, [which were] assigned to other professors."). 
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schools established by 1870 required a college education as a 
prerequisite to admission. 79 
Notwithstanding the development of formalized legal 
education within the university, the office apprenticeship 
remained the common method of preparing for a career as a 
lawyer.80 Indeed, Justice Story-upon being inaugurated into the 
Dane Professorship at Harvard Law School in 1829--<:onfessed, 
after describing all that would be required to prepare a lawyer for 
practice, that "[l]ittle, indeed, of what has been sketched out in 
this discourse, can be attained by any academical [sic] instruction 
during the usual period assigned for the preparatory studies for 
the bar . . . .  What we propose is no more than . . .  something to 
assist the student in the first steps of his studies . . . .  "81 This 
reflected the continuing sense that academic legal instruction 
was only preparatory for and supplemental to apprenticeship 
learning of the legal craft in law offices.82 Further, such limited 
training was sufficient preparation for the small-scale, local 
practices that were typical of the profession at the time.83 
The advances in the formalization of legal education 
described above were not accompanied by similar advances in the 
standards for bar admission. To the contrary, as university-based 
law school education enhanced the intellectual abilities of 
aspirants to law office apprenticeships, bar admissions standards 
79. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 51. Harvard Law School did not require a 
previous college degree as a prerequisite to admission until 1894, when it 
announced such a requirement for the class that would enter in 1896. Id. at 82-
83. 
80. See id. at 39, 52; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 
241 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that by the 1840s, "[f]or most people, the path to 
practice still went through a clerkship at a lawyer's office"). 
81. STORY, The Value and Importance of Legal Studies, supra note 77, at 
532. 
82. See Burrage, supra note 48, at 152 ("American universities . . .  provided 
law lectures merely as a part of a liberal education as part of the education of a 
gentleman."). 
83. See Harry J. Lambeth, Practicing Law in 1878, 64 AB.A. J. 1014, 
1015-23 (1978) ("Imagine a business world of virtually no telephones[,] . . .  [n]o 
typewriters[,] . . . [n]o automobiles[, and] . . .  [n]o uniform organized system for 
legal research . . . .  Instead it was a world of circuit-riding lawyers and store-
front, walk-up law offices with brass spittoons, pot-bellied stoves, and overhead 
gaslights . . . .  "). 
THE LAW SCHOOL CRITIQUE 1971 
languished and waned under the influence of Jacksonian 
democratic ideology.84 Under this philosophy, screening 
mechanisms and educational prerequisites were distrusted as 
obstacles that made law practice accessible only to elites. 85 The 
practicing bar thus remained hostile to formal legal education, 
declining to refine bar admissions requirements to include such 
education as a prerequisite to being licensed to practice.86 This 
is a skepticism that endured until the late nineteenth century, 
when the ABA first adopted a resolution calling for each state to 
require three years of study in law school before applying to sit 
for the bar examination.87 Still, in the early twentieth century, 
one finds bar examinations that bore little connection to the 
84. See Richard P. Cole, Orthodox and Heresy: The Nineteenth Century 
History of the Rule of Law Reconsidered, 32 IND. L. REV. 1335, 1365 (1999) , 
('Within the context of the democratic and anti-monopolistic ideology of the 
Jacksonian period . . . [p]rofessional legal education markedly declined. 
Local bar associations no longer set standards of admission for law practice and 
legislative statutes seemed to make it easier to become a lawyer." (citing DAVID 
RAY PAKE, HERETI CS IN THE TEMPLE: AMERI CANS WHO REJE CT THE NATION'S 
LEGAL FAITH (1998))). Jacksonian philosophy also impacted the process by which 
judges were selected, leading many states to move toward an elected rather 
than appointed judiciary. See Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United 
States: A Special Report, 64 JUDI CATURE 176, 176 (1980) ("People resented the 
fact that property owners controlled the judiciary. They were determined to end 
this privilege of the upper class and to ensure the popular sovereignty we 
describe as Jacksonian Democracy."). 
85. See I-IARNO, supra note 23, at 39 ("It was a pe1·iod in American history 
that exalted the rights and powers of the common man . . . .  [T]his creed seemed 
to hold that all male citizens had the inherent right to practice law."). 
86. See id. at 40, 78-79 ("A substantial part of the practicing bar was 
unconvinced, if not distrustful, of the benefits that might flow to a lawyer 
through either a university or law school training. This unbelief .  . . stifled 
efforts to establish educational requirements for admission to the schools and to 
the bar."). 
87. Transactions of the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association, 20 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 31-33 (1897). The language of the adopted 
resolution was as follows: 
Resolved, That the American Bar Association approves the 
lengthening of the course of instruction in law schools to a period of 
three years, and that it expresses the hope that as soon as practicable 
a rule may be adopted in each State which will require candidates for 
admission to the bar to study law for three years before applying for 
admission. 
Id. at 31. 
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lessons from law school or the needed abilities of a practicing 
attorney.88 
Thus, from the time of Blackstone through the 
establishment of university law schools, we can see that 
formalized legal education was focused on instruction in the 
English common law and modern American legal doctrine as a 
foundation for subsequent training in practical skills after law 
school under the tutelage of practicing attorneys.89 No effort was 
made to attend to the preparatory education students needed 
before taking up legal studies in universities, nor was any effort 
made at the university level to train students in practical legal 
skills. 90 Academic legal instruction was not developed or 
designed to serve as a substitute for apprenticeship training in 
the practical skills of legal practice.91 Rather, it was a response 
to the sentiment reflected by Blackstone that an office 
apprenticeship by itself was not enough.92 In this context, 
academic legal education and subsequent practical training 
through apprenticeships were necessary partners in the effort to 
prepare well-qualified lawyers for practice. It makes sense, 
then, that with the background understanding that academic 
and practical training worked in tandem, academic legal 
education gave no attention to practical skills, focusing purely 
on instruction in legal principles and doctrines. What remained 
to be refined was the method to be used for such instruction and 
the character of those who would be principally called to deliver 
it. 
88. See I. Maurice Wormser, The Results of a Comparative Study of the 
Examination Questions Framed by State Boards of Bar Examiners, 24 YALE L.J. 
34, 34 (1914). 
89. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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E. Langdell and the Modern American Law School 
"I entered upon the duties of my present position . . .  with a 
settled conviction that law could only be taught or learned 
effectively by means of cases in some form." 
-Christopher Columbus Langdell, 187193 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, who became the Dane 
Professor and Dean at the Harvard Law School in 1870,94 was a 
pivotal figure in the history of legal education in this country. 
During his time at Harvard Law School, he ushered in several 
innovations that characterize the modern American law school 
today. 
1. The Case Method 
The most well-known and enduring innovation Langdell 
introduced was the instruction of students in legal doctrine 
through the study of written opinions in decided judicial cases­
the case method. Up to this point, the method of legal instruction 
in law schools was a combination of the lecture method and the 
text method, meaning students read texts that related and 
summarized particular bodies of law, and professors lectured on 
that material in class.95 As Theodore W. Dwight, Dean of the 
Columbia College Law School in New York, explained the 
method, "The student is assigned daily a certain portion of an 
approved text-book for his reading prior to listening to 
expositions of the subject involved . . . .  [H]e is asked questions 
upon the topic . . . .  Pertinent illustrations are resorted to . . . .  "96 
93. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS, at v (Legal Classics Library ed. 1 983) (1871). 
94. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note ' 54, at 
359-60. Warren described Langdell as "a young man of no legal reputation , . .  
a man of no national fame, and a lawyer who had had substantially no court 
practice." Id. at 360. 
95. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 7-8, 12 (1914). 
96. Theodore W. Dwight, Columbia College Law School, New York, 1 
GREEN BAG 141, 145 (1889). 
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Such an approach did not jibe with Langdell's view of the 
law; he firmly believed that law was an inductive science and 
that the best preparation for a career as a lawyer was to study 
and master its fundamental principles, not through second-hand 
accounts but right from the source: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or 
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to 
apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever­
tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true 
lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the 
business of every earnest student of law. Each of these 
doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees . . .  
in many cases through centuries. This growth is to be traced in 
the main through a series of cases; and much the shortest and 
best, if not the only way of mastering doctrine effectually is by 
studying the cases in which it is embodied.97 
In these remarks, one can see two important strains of 
thought that would have a tremendous impact on the 
development of law school education. First, Langdell's 
understanding of what it means to be a lawyer-reflected in his 
comment that "mastery'' of "certain principles or doctrines . . .  is 
what constitutes a true lawyer"98-gives rise to his view that the 
best preparation for practice was to study legal rules-principles 
and doctrines-rather than learning the skills of legal practice­
law as mere "handicraft."99 Second, Langdell's understanding of 
the law-that it was a science whose study would be most 
effective when focused on examining the sources of legal 
principles and doctrines-leads to his determination that 
reported cases must be studied rather than summary expositions 
of the law contained in texts and treatises. 100 In other words, 
97. LANGDELL, supra note 93, at vi. 
98. Id. 
99. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW S CHOOL, supra note 54, at 
374. 
100. REDLI CH, supra" note 95, at 15; see also 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE 
HARVARD LAW S CHOOL, supra note 54, at 423 ("The Case System then proceeds 
on the theory that law is a science and as a science should be studied in the 
original sources, and that the original sources are the adjudged cases, and not 
the opinions of text writers based on the adjudged cases. "); id. at 421 ("[T]he 
student must look upon law as a science consisting of a body of principles to be 
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Langdell believed that law was a form of natural science in that it 
consisted of a coherent system of rules derived from general 
principles that could only be discerned through the study of 
observable phenomena-the judicial opinions in which the 
principles were manifested. 101 These views of the law and of 
lawyering supported and furthered the move away from 
practitioner-based apprenticeship in favor of formal instruction 
by full-time, legal scholars. 102 
2. The Cloistered Law Professor 
Indeed, the conversion of the professoriate into cloistered 
academics, rather than experienced practitioners, was Langdell's 
next innovation. With law school being characterized by a 
curriculum focused on doctrinal study, Langdell remarked that 
"[w]hat qualifies a person, therefore, to teach law is not 
experience in the work of a lawyer's office, not experience in 
dealing with men, not experience in the trial or argument of 
causes-not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in 
learning law . . . .  "103 As a result, Langdell took the bold step in 
the fall of 1873 of hiring an assistant professor who had only 
graduated from law school two years prior and whose experience 
was limited to serving as an instructor in French, German, and 
found in the ad judged cases, the cases being to him what the specimen is to the 
geologist. " (quoting WILLIAM A. KEENER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
QUASI CONTRA CTS, Preface (1888))). 
101. See Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method and What to 
Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 632-33 (2007) ("Since Langdell saw this 
methodology as a means of discerning general, ob jectively identifiable principles 
of law, he really seemed to believe that his approach was natural science 
itself. "). 
102. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 ("[L]egal positivists . . . 
viewed the law as . . .  a set of rules and techniques rather than a craft of 
interpretation and adaptation . . . .  All this spelled the eclipse of traditional 
forms of practitioner-directed apprenticeship by academic instruction given by 
scholar-teachers. "). 
103. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 5 4, at 361 
(quoting a speech made by Dean Langdell at the dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association on November 5, 1886). 
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history at Harvard College-James Barr Ames. 104 Prior to that 
time, Harvard's law professors had been drawn primarily from 
the practicing bar. 105 As Harvard President Eliot explained, 
however, the idea of hiring young, inexperienced persons to teach 
law was borrowed from the law schools of Continental Europe: 
Those schools have selected young men of mark who have 
shown a genius for law and a desire for the life of a teacher, 
and . . . made them Professors, at an age so early that the 
whole vigor of their youth and prime could be thrown into 
teaching and authorship. 106 
President Eliot went on to predict, quite presciently, that this 
innovation would take hold and fundamentally change the legal 
academic profession: 
Professor Langdell early advocated the appointment, as 
teachers of law, of young men who had had no experience 
whatever in the active profession . . . .  Now that experiment . . .  
has not only been extended in our own Law School with perfect 
success but it has been adopted by various other law schools 
throughout the country . . . . In due course . . . there will be 
produced in this country a body of men learned in the law who 
have never been on the bench or at the Bar, but who 
nevertheless hold position of great weight and influence as 
teachers of law, as expounders, systematizers and historians. 
This, I venture to predict, is one of the most far reaching 
changes in the organization of the profession that has ever 
been made in our country. 107 
Eliot rejected the analogy to medical school training, in which 
practitioners are acknowledged to be the best instructors of 
clinical training, by insisting-as did Langdell-that "law is to be 
learned almost exclusively from the books in which its principles 
and precedents are recorded, digested, and explained," and, thus, 
" [t]he law library, and not the court or the law office, is the real 
analogue of the hospital."108 With this vision, the career, legal 
104. Id. at 388 (stating that the appointment was an "experiment" and an 
"important innovation" for the law school). 
105. See id. 
106. Id. at 388-89. 
107. Id. at 389. 
108. Id. at 391-92. 
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professoriate was born, purely academic m character and 
divorced from the practicing bar. 
3. The Socratic Method 
A critical companion to the case method was another 
Langdellian innovation: the instructional approach used to 
discuss the cases with students in class known as the Socratic 
method. Langdell conducted his own courses using this method, 
having a student analyze the facts and the law in each case, 
followed by a series of questions designed to reveal the legal 
principles to be found therein. 109 In addition to learning legal 
doctrine, Langdell's disciples and subsequent adherents have 
rightly noted that the case-dialogue method was also designed to 
train students to develop the analytical abilities of a lawyer: "The 
student is challenged to reconcile discrepancies, to explain 
conflicts, to pick up the tangled threads of thought where they 
are left by the decisions and put them in order."1 10 By employing 
the dialogue approach to the exploration of cases, the idea was 
that the case method would not only facilitate the scientific 
discovery of legal principles from their sources, but it also would 
contribute to the development of students' ability to engage m 
legal reasoning, analysis, and synthesis. m 
109. REDLTCH, supra note 95, at 12. Redlich described the method as: 
Id. 
Teacher and pupils . . . work[ing] together unremittingly to extract 
from the single cases and from the combination or contrasting of 
cases their entire legal content, so that in the end those principles of 
that particular branch of the law which control the entire mass of 
related cases are made clear. 
110. HARNO, supra note 23, at 137-38 (quoting the Preliminary Statement of 
the Committee on Legal Education of the Harvard Law School); see also 1 
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 421 ("The 
student is required to analyze each case, discriminate between the relevant and 
irrelevant, between the actual and possible grounds of decision. And after 
having thus discussed a case, he is prepared and required to deal with it in its 
relation to other cases." (quoting WILLIAM A. KEENER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON 
THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS, Preface (1888))). 
111. See William A Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 17 
AM. B. Ass'N REP. 4 73, 482 (1894) (''While the student's reasoning powers are 
being thus constantly developed, and while he is gaining the power of analysis 
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The case-dialogue method of instruction was seen as an 
application of the scientific method to the study of law at a time 
when American colleges were moving away from a classical 
approach to higher education toward methods reflected in the 
modern study of science. 112 Langdell recognized this trend and 
the need to conform the study of law to it in order to retain its 
place within the university: "If law be not a science, a university 
will best consult its own dignity in declining to teach it. If it be 
not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be 
learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices it."1 13 
Langdell's contemporary, Harvard Law School Professor William 
Keener, was more explicit in drawing the connection when he 
wrote, "[I]f [law] is not a science it has no place in the curriculum 
of a university."114 
4. Other Reforms 
Langdell was also responsible for several other major reforms 
that transformed university-based legal education to the model 
we know today. In 1871, the course of study at the Harvard Law 
School was extended from eighteen months to two years, a change 
prompted by the realization that the case method required a 
longer period of time to be successful than eighteen months could 
allow. 115 Strict examinations were introduced as prerequisites to 
proceeding to the next year of study and to receiving the 
degree. 116 These changes, along with the introduction of the case 
and synthesis, he is also gaining the other object of legal education, namely, 
knowledge of what the law actually is."). 
112. See REDLICH, supra note 95, at 16 (describing how "the old, strictly 
classical ideal of college instruction in America" was "yielding in favor of a new 
theory of education" that was based predominantly on the study of the natural 
sciences). 
113. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 
374. 
114. Keener, supra note 111, at 475. 
115. See 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 
379 ("Firm in his belief that law was a science, to be taught and learned as such, 
Langdell was equally convinced that no student could receive a proper legal 
education in so short a period as eighteen months."). 
116. See id. at 380, 397 (noting that students "shall have passed satisfactory 
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method, were initially controversial among the practicing bar, 
leading to a decline in enrollments compared with the previous 
decade. 117 In 1875, an admissions examination was instituted and 
required of all applicants, beginning in 1877, who lacked prior 
collegiate education. 1 18 Finally, for the 1877-1878 academic year, 
Langdell extended the course of study to three years. 1 19 Rather 
than result in a reduction of enrollment, however, these latter 
two changes were followed by an increase in both the size and 
quality of the law school's student body. 120 
5. Spreading the Langdellian Model 
By the early part of the twentieth century, formalized 
university-based legal education was well established and highly 
developed compared with the system of legal education in other 
common law countries. 121 These law schools were increasingly 
Langdellian;  although Langdell ended his tenure as Dean of the 
Harvard Law School in 1895, this case method approach to legal 
examinations at the end of each year" and that "the whole tone of the School 
changed from laxity to strictness"). 
117. See id. at 382, 386 ("[T]here was much criticism and even bitter 
opposition among lawyers . . .  over the new Case System employed by Professor 
Langdell. Undoubtedly this kept many students from entering the School."). 
118. See id. at 394-95, 399 (noting that in 1875, the school established an 
admission exam applicable "to all candidates for the of the School who are not 
already Bachelors of Arts, Science, or Philosophy''). 
119. Id. at 399. 
120. See id. at 400 ("[T]he prediction . . . that the establishment of an 
examination, together with an extension of the course of study from two years to 
three years, would cause an immediate and material diminution of our 
numbers, had not thus far been verified."). 
121. REDLICH, supra note 95, 5-6. In comparing the advancement of the 
American legal education system to other common law countries, Redlich noted: 
[T]he existing American system of legal education has hardly a rival 
worth mentioning in the entire great jurisdiction of the English 
common law. Neither in England itself, nor in the great English 
colonies, has systematic instruction in law achieved a development so 
intensive and at the same time so comprehensive as in the United 
States. 
Id. Redlich also reports that in 1914 there were more than 150 American law 
schools, with over 20,000 students. Id. at 7 n. l. 
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education was continued by his successor, James Barr Ames. 122 
When William Keener-who had been a Harvard professor under 
Langdell-joined Columbia's faculty in 1890, he brought the case 
method with him. 123 By 1906, the Langdell method had spread to 
law schools at Chicago, Northwestern, Cincinnati, Stanford, 
Wisconsin, Hastings, and Tulane-among others. 124 Yale had 
been an early holdout, preferring a method of instruction that 
involved lectures and recitations. 125 By 1913, however, the 
Langdell method dominated the classes in all three years at Yale; 
in 1916 a Harvard Law School graduate-Thomas Swan-was 
appointed as Yale's dean. 126 While much of this expansion was 
due to the direct transmission of the method by Harvard 
professors and graduates, who were its adherents, this 
"Harvardization" of American law schools was also motivated by 
the desire of prestige: "[O]nce elite law schools had decided to 
approve of the system, those aspiring to be considered elite 
rapidly followed."127 No doubt the financial benefits of the method 
were an attraction as well; because it could be used with classes 
of large size, larger tuition-paying student bodies could be 
supported with relatively few professors. 128 Regardless of the 
122. See Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association of 
American Law Schools, 31 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 1010, 1025 (1907) ("[W]e believe 
that men who are trained, by examining the opinions of the greatest judges . . .  
are in a better position to know what legal reasoning is and are more likely to 
possess the power of solving legal problems . . . .  "). 
123. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S, at 60 (1983). Stevens reports that other faculty members, 
including Theodore Dwight, opposed the case method and resigned beginning in 
1891. Id. This defection gave birth to The New York Law School. Id. at 75 n.21. 
124. See id. at 60-61, 64 ("[B]y 1907, that number [of schools that had 
accepted the case method] had risen to over thirty."). 
125. See FREDERICK C. HICKS, YALE LAW SCHOOL, 1869-1894, at 28--35 (1937) 
("The traditional scheme of instruction was adhered to. It consisted chiefly of 
recitations on required reading supplemented by lectures and moot court 
work."). 
126. STEVENS, supra note 123, at 62. 
127. Id. at 63. 
128. See id. ("The vast success of Langdell's method enabled the 
establishment of the large-size class . . . . Any educational program or 
innovation that allowed one man to teach even more students was not 
unwelcome to university administrators. The 'Harvard method of instruction' 
meant that law schools could be self-supporting."). 
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reasons, the Langdellian model of legal education ultimately took 
hold and spread through law schools across the nation. 129 
It is worth noting that the rise of the Langdellian law school 
coincided with-and was doubtless aided by-the rise of the 
organized bar. Up through 1870, law practice varied greatly 
across the country but was largely characterized by practitioners 
who were not formally organized as a group with clear standards 
for preparation and admission.130 Local bar groups began 
organizing in cities such as New York and Chicago during the 
1870s; in 1878, the American Bar Association (ABA) was founded 
for a mixture of reasons, including improving legal education and 
standards for admission to the bar. 131 As the twentieth century 
arrived and progressed, the rise of corporations, administrative 
law, and business and banking regulation certainly made the 
practice of law more complex, changes that challenged the 
traditional, informal approach of reading for the bar. 132 It is in 
this context that formalized legal education and the ABA's push 
for the same must, at least in part, be understood. 
129. The model of university-based legal education did not catch on, 
however, in England. The University of London repeatedly tried to wrest the 
legal education of barristers from the Inns of Court during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, to no avail. See Burrage, supra note 48, at 145 
(noting that between 1884 and 1904 the University of London "made four 
separate proposals to establish a school of law jointly with the Inns " but that 
"the Inns remained unconvinced and re jected all proposals"). This resistance of 
the practicing bar to formalized, university-based legal education held up until 
the mid-twentieth century. Id. at 145-46. There was more success in moving the 
education of English solicitors into the University in the first half of the 
twentieth century, but that ended with a severance between the universities 
and the solicitor's professional association, the Law Society, in 1952, when all 
solicitors-in-training were withdrawn from the universities. See id. at 147 ("The 
universities paid little heed to the [Law Society's] criticisms, and in 1952 the 
Law Society therefore carried out its oft-repeated threat and withdrew all of its 
students from the universities."). 
130. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERI CAN LAW: THE LAW 
MAKERS 285-86 (1950) (discussing the formative history of bar associations in 
America). 
131. Id. at 286-87. 
132. See id. at 308 ("Before [the 1870s] lawyers could educate one another to 
a large extent . . . . Before then the intricate web of administi:ative regulation 
had not been woven. After the '70s, the printed sources of the law became a 
flood . . .  and the reach of government vastly expanded. "). 
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III. Over a Century of Critique and Reform 
"Our law schools, as usually conducted, offer nothing. Most of 
them do not, in their plan of study, seem ever to recognize the 
need." 
-ABA Committee on Legal Education, 1890133 
Although the Langdellian model of legal education became 
dominant and widely accepted in the early part of the twentieth 
century, it was not without its contemporary critics. Indeed, since 
the advent of the Langdellian law school, there has been a steady 
stream of critiques of legal education, each of which have had 
varying degrees of success in encouraging legal education reform. 
Sadly, however, when one canvases the various assessments of 
formal legal education over the past 130 years, it is remarkable 
how consistent the criticisms are and how persistent the 
Langdellian model has been in the face of these critiques. 
A. Early ABA Reports 
An early appraisal of the American law schools, at the time of 
Langdell, came from the ABA's Committee on Legal Education 
and Admission to the Bar in 1879: 
But it is difficult to deny that there are American [law schools] 
not deserving of commendation. Institutions where the course 
is unjustifiably limited and circumscribed; where the term of 
study is evidently too brief for useful purposes; where students 
continue to be invited, when they are unfit by reason of 
deficient education and want of contact with liberal studies, to 
wrestle with the difficulties of the law; where, in a way 
unworthy of the cause of legal learning, a spirit of competition 
to attract greater numbers than are to be found in other 
establishments, is allowed to obtain control; where 
examinations, which are such only in name, take the place of a 
searching scrutiny of the student's acquirements; where there 
is no connection with any influence, except that of a faculty 
insufficient to meet the demands of a progressive time; where 
133. William G. Hammond et al., Report on the Committee of Legal 
Education, 13 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 330 (1890) [hereinafter Hammond et. al., 13 
AM. BAR AsS'N REP.]. 
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there are no exercises sufficiently serious to try and develop 
the abilities the student may have; and where degrees are 
thrown away on the undeserving and the ignorant. 134 
Although this critique was contemporaneous with Langdell's 
reforms at Harvard, they cannot truly be said to reflect on 
Langdell's Harvard because at that point in time, Langdell's 
model had yet to spread to other law schools.135 Thus, the law 
schools being critiqued were largely those of the kind that 
preceded Langdell, including the kind that Harvard had been 
prior to the implementation of his reforms. Indeed, one can view 
Langdell's reforms as responsive in substance to many of the 
charges of the 1879 report: Langdell lengthened the period of 
study from eighteen months to three years, he implemented an 
undergraduate education requirement for admitted law students, 
he strengthened the examinations used to determine students' 
qualifications to advance and obtain the degree, and he sought to 
strengthen the faculty by moving towards full-time academics 
rather than practitioners who had less time to dedicate to the job 
of teaching law students. 136 
In the eyes of the ABA Committee on Legal Education, 
however, little had changed in law schools generally by 1890, 
when it identified the defects of law schools as including the 
"constant temptation to attract more students and to graduate a 
large class by allowing all to get through who can 'cram up' for a 
not very rigid examination, which tests nothing but a mere 
recollection of the written letter of the law."137 The Committee 
went on to observe that "all [law schools] suffer from the want of 
a proper standard of true legal education, a definite plan of the 
134. Carleton Hunt, Report of the Committee on Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar, 2 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 219 (1879) [hereinafter Hunt, 2 AM. 
BAR Ass'N REP.]. It should also be noted that the Committee was critical of the 
failure of law schools to give instruction in Roman Civil Law, the law of nations, 
admiralty and maritime law, and comparative jurisprudence. Id. at 220-28. 
135. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 60-64 (discussing the growth of 
Langdell's method of instruction in the late nineteenth century). 
136. See supra Part ILE (providing an overview of Langdell's reforms to the 
legal education system of America). 
137. Hammond et. al. ,  13 AM. BAR Ass'N REP., supra note 133, at 329. 
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entire course."138 In its most damning critique, the ABA 
committee concluded its observations with the following analysis: 
The defects of the present method may be summed up, we 
think, in one very familiar antithesis: they do not educate, 
they only instruct. They aim only to heap up in the student's 
mind a great mass of legal "points"-rules, definitions, etc.­
but they do not fashion these into a system, nor even do they 
give him the faculty of constructing for himself such a system. 
The mutual influences of different rules, the construction of 
legal relations and institutions, the processes by which the law 
is constantly developing and assuming new phases, are 
neglected, or, rather, positively ignored. He is supplied with an 
abundance of crude material, but not taught to use it. In office 
study, the daily participation in actual business gave the 
student at least some empiric training. He learned to use his 
acquisitions as an apprentice learns to use the tools of his 
trade . . . . The process was a rude and imperfect one, very 
uncertain in its results and exceedingly wasteful of time and 
labor, but for two or three centuries it has been the way in 
which English and American lawyers have been instituted, 
and it will not, perhaps cannot, be abandoned without 
something better is [sic] offered in its place. Our law schools, 
as usually conducted, offer nothing. Most of them do not, in 
their plan of study, seem ever to recognize the need. It is 
fortunate for them and for their pupils alike that the training 
thus omitted may be supplied in the early years of practice, at 
least to a very considerable extent. 139 
We see in this critique charges that could be leveled against 
law school education today. An instruction in legal "rules" 
dominates; a comprehensive legal education that synthesizes 
different areas of the law, teaches how to establish and maintain 
legal relationships or entities, and studies the processes­
legislative, administrative, collaborative, and judicial-by which 
the law and legal relations are shaped is still "neglected" or 
"ignored" in law schools today. The charge that the student "is 
supplied with an abundance of crude material, but not taught to 
use it" is as true today as it was then at those schools that do not 
require extensive practical skills training or experience before 
graduation. Indeed, it can still be said of some law faculty that 
138. Id. at 330. 
139. Id. 
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they do not "seem ever to recognize the need" to off er training 
that approximates what students miss by not going through an 
apprenticeship experience. The key difference between now and 
then is that the saving grace for the Committee-"that the 
training thus omitted may be supplied in the early years of 
practice"-no longer accurately characterizes the opportunities 
facing most law school graduates today, given the increasing 
unwillingness of legal employers to foot the costs of basic training 
for new lawyers and the reality that many law graduates do not 
obtain work with employers who have the time, ability, or 
resources to support such training. 
In the year following this report, 1891, the Committee again 
issued a report highly critical of the program of legal education at 
most law schools, this time focusing on the schools' emphasis on 
rules over principles and on rote memorization rather than 
reflection and analytical thinking: 
The only method of teaching that deserves entire reprobation 
is that which encourages or even permits the student to make 
the entire course a mere exercise of memory, without reflection 
or judgment; not beginning with the fundamental notions or 
principles by which all his reasoning is to be conducted in 
actual practice, but laying up rule after rule, decision after 
decision, as if they were to constitute the fund of knowledge 
upon which he had only to draw during his after life. 
Absurd as this method is to anyone who knows the daily work 
of an active practitioner, there is a fatal tendency toward it in 
much of the school routine . . . .  No amount of text-book 
learning, no familiarity even with the cases will avail him, if 
he cannot reason from one set of facts to another by the use of 
the exact terms in which the law sums up its principles. 140 
This would appear to be a more direct attack on the Langdellian 
case method, 141 though the larger point of the 1891 and 1890 
critiques was the overemphasis of doctrine at the expense of 
1 40. Hammond et. al., 1 4  AM. BAR AsS'N REP., supra note 3 4, at 332-33. 
1 41. Such direct attacks continued in the 1892 report of the Committee, in 
which it faulted the case method for focusing on disputes rather than settled 
doctrines, training a student to be a "gladiator " more so than a counselor who 
can "advise a client when he is safe from litigation." William G. Hammond et al., 
Report of the Committee of Legal Education, 15 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 341 (1892). 
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conveying fundamental and enduring legal principles, an 
understanding of the larger system formed by the law and the 
reason underlying it, and the ability to use such knowledge in 
practice. 
Another common thread running through each of these 
critiques was the insufficiency of the modes of assessment, which 
simply required the memorization and regurgitation of rules. Not 
surprisingly, bar examination questions of the early twentieth 
century-not long after these ABA appraisals of law schools­
were similarly narrow in their approach to assessment, posing 
such questions as "How must a partnership exist?" and "Name 
the twelve maxims of Equity."142 Today, law schools remain 
focused on doctrinal instruction and summative assessments that 
test substantive knowledge and analytical abilities rather than 
the full range of skills needed by the active practitioner. Bar 
exams similarly remain oriented primarily towards doctrinal 
knowledge and analytical ability rather than practical 
com petence. 143 
Through the remainder of the nineteenth century and into 
the early twentieth century, the Committee on Legal Education 
continued to monitor and recommend improvements to legal 
education. By 1912, the Committee's view of law school education 
had become more favorable, highlighting what it viewed as 
1 42. Wormser, supra note 88, at 3 4  (providing a critique of bar examination 
questions of the early twentieth century). Wormser, in his critique, questions: 
What kind of nonsense, what order of foolishness is it, that impels us 
lawyers to agree that the vital necessity for the law-student is his 
acquisition of the power of logical analysis and thoughtful 
discrimination in handling legal propositions, and at the same time, 
leads us to furnish many a bar examination paper calculated to test 
little more than his memory . .. ? 
Id. ; see also Gordon Hickey, After 100 Years, Bar Examiners Still Protecting the 
Public, 60 VA. LAw. 18, 18 (2012) (reporting questions from the first Virginia bar 
exam, including ''What is a freehold estate?" and ''What is the distinction 
between a vested and a contingent remainder?"). 
1 43. See, e.g., Va. Bd. of B. Examiners, Rules-Section L· Examinations (Aug. 
2012), http://www.vbbe.state.va.us/pdf/VBBERules.pdf (noting that each 
examination consists of two parts, an essay part that tests the applicant's 
knowledge in twenty-two substantive law areas, and a multistate exam that 
tests knowledge in six substantive law areas). 
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several advances in legal education that had occurred up to that 
time: 
1. The recognition of the superiority of the law school over the 
office preparation for the Bar. 
2. The recognition of a definite period of legal study upon the 
completion of which, and not before, the applicant can apply 
for admission to the Bar. 
3. The lengthening of the law school course of study to three 
years. 
4. The changed method of law instruction which has 
substituted in so many of the law schools of the country the 
study of law through cases, either as an exclusive system, or in 
combination with the use of text-books, in lieu of the old 
system of lectures, or of lectures and text-books. 
5. The development of a class of law teachers who are 
withdrawn from law practice, and whose vocation it is to teach 
law.144 
Here we see the lauding of the case method of instruction as well 
as an approval of a full-time professoriate removed from the 
practice of law. 145 Not wanting to rest on these laurels, however, 
the Committee, in 1913, asked the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching to undertake an investigation of legal 
education in the United States, one that would be similar to the 
Foundation's Flexner Report on medical education146 that devised 
144. Henry Rogers et al., Report of the Committee on Legal Education and 
Admission to the Bar, 35 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 602-04 (1912). 
145. It should be noted that this statement did not reflect an endorsement of 
a law professoriate wholly lacking in any practice experience. To the contrary, 
the Committee expressly indicated that "[i]t is desirable that law teachers, while 
withdrawn from practice, should have had actual experience at the Bar." Id. at 
604. 
146. See ABRAHAM Fl..EXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
CANADA: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
TEACHING, BULLETIN No. 4 (1910), available at http://www.carnegiefoundation. 
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and recommended major changes to medical training that were 
adopted and characterize medical education today. 147 The 
Carnegie Foundation obliged, and the products of that request 
were the 1914 Redlich Report and the 1921 Reed Report. 
B. The Redlich and Reed Reports on Legal Education 
For nearly a century, the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching has studied legal education and issued 
various reports and bulletins on the topic. The first of these, a 
report on the case method in American law schools, was 
published in 1914. 148 This topic was chosen because of the 
controversy surrounding the method; 149 although legal instruction 
at Harvard Law School had come to be characterized by the case­
dialogue method under Langdell, the law professoriate and the 
practicing bar was not universally convinced of its efficacy. 150 The 
Carnegie Foundation sought to shed light on this debate by 
enlisting a law professor from Austria-Josef Redlich-to visit 
American law schools and study the method from an impartial 
point of view. 151 
After spending two months visiting ten law schools-four of 
which did not employ the case method-Redlich generally 
concluded that the case method was meritorious, with a few 
caveats. 152 Redlich quibbled with Langdell's claim that law was 
org/sites/defa ult/files/elibrary/Carnegie_Flexner_Report. pelf (providing the 
foundation's recommendations for changes to physician training). 
147. See MOLLY COOK ET AL., EDUCATING PHYSICIANS: A CALL FOR REFORM OF 
MEDICAL SCHOOL AND RESIDENCY 1 (2010) ("Implementation of [Flexner's] 
blueprint has brought medical education to a high level of excellence."). 
148. See REDLICH, supra note 95. 
149. See id. at v ("At the outset of this study, one question quickly presented 
itself which involved fundamental ideas as to methods of instruction. Teachers 
of law in the United States .. . divided into two rather distinct groups in their 
attitude toward what has come to be known as the Case Method."). 
150. See id. at v-vi (describing two distinct groups holding differing opinions 
on case method instruction); see also 2 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 496-518 (providing numerous contemporary 
commentaries of case method instruction). 
151. See REDLICH, supra note 95, at vi. 
152. See id. at viii (describing the virtues and drawbacks of the case method 
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an inductive science for which the study of cases, as original 
sources, was well suited by pointing out that scientific inquiry is 
certainly not limited to inductive methods153 and that legal 
reasoning in any given case is actually deductive rather than 
inductive: 
The judge who, in the individual case, decides according to the 
common law, applies . . . to the state of facts then before him, 
one of these already existing norms . . . and pronounces . . .  
only the rule or norm applicable to the specific case. His 
intellectual activity in this is, therefore, essentially deductive; 
for by deduction we mean the application of an already 
existing general rule to the particular case. 154 
Redlich also distinguished legal science from the physical 
sciences by noting that the law does not consist of naturally 
observable facts, but rather of the products of human will 
directed at ordering and guiding human behavior, making law 
more of an "intellectual science" or "normative science."155 That 
said, Redlich did find that the case method was valuable in that it 
exposed students to mastery both of the content of the law and of 
the analytical methods lawyers must employ to make use of the 
law as practicing attorneys. 156 
system used in American law schools). 
153. See id. at 55 ("Prominent though experimental and inductive methods 
are in the sciences which serve physical research, we press a generalization 
much too far when we make of the inductive method the sole criterion of 
scientific intellectual activity."). 
154. Id. at 56-57. 
155. See id. at 56 
The science of law does not work, then, with physical facts, but with 
the products of the human will, which has been directed to the 
ordering and guidance of the individual and social life of 
humanity . . . .  [L]egal science cannot deal with law in the sense of 
the physical investigator, but only with law in the sense of definite 
norms, willed by men, and intended to guide and limit the business of 
men. 
156. See id. at 59 
[O]n the ground that it is that method of instruction which is entirely 
suited to the established character of the common law, to independent 
intellectual assimilation of positive law from its sources, and to the 
highest development of the ability to think logically and 
systematically-on these grounds the case method must indeed be 
recognized as the scientific method of investigation and instruction in 
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Redlich's general endorsement of the method was coupled 
with a caveat and a critique. The caveat was that the case 
method was appropriate for the study of Anglo-American law 
because such law-at that time-was largely unwritten, common 
law. 157 With common law being case law, studying cases made 
sense, compared with the task of judges in civil law countries of 
finding the applicable rules and statutes that govern the facts at 
hand. 158 Although the common law may have been prevalent 
during Langdell's time in the late nineteenth century, in the 
twenty-first century other sources of law--constitutional, 
statutory, regulatory, and negotiated-dominate the legal 
landscape, making it relevant to wonder whether the common 
law-based case method legitimately retains its purchase. 159 
Redlich's critique of the method was as follows: 
It is characteristic of the case method that where it has 
thoroughly established itself, legal education has assumed the 
form of instruction almost exclusively through analysis of 
separate cases. The result of this is that the students never 
obtain a general picture of the law as a whole . . . .  160 
His prescription for remedying this defect was to create an 
introductory law school course: 
[I]n American university law schools the students ought to be 
given an introductory lecture course, which should present, so 
to speak, 'Institutes' of the common law. Every department 
into which the American law is divided, whether as common 
the common law. 
157. See id. at 35 ("[T]he fundamental reason for this success [of the case 
method] is to be found in the present condition of American law, and within this 
especially in the unshaken authority of the common law."). 
158. See id. at 36-37 
To the Englishman and the American . . .  the law appears rather as 
the single case of law . . . conducted by the regular judge, and 
depending only upon his 'finding of the law.' The task of the European 
judge is to find which of the rules and principles of law that are 
contained in the system of law governs the state of facts in question. 
159. See Rubin, supra note 101, at 619 ("To the extent that a national law 
school wants to teach the consensus view among state jurisdictions, it should be 
teaching the typical or model provisions of state statutes and regulations, not 
the common law."). 
160. REDLICH, supra note 95, at 41. 
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law or equity, employs certain common elementary ideas and 
fundamental legal concepts, which the student ought to be 
made to understand before he is introduced into the difficult 
analysis of cases. 161 
This is sound advice even today, given the fact that pre-legal 
education does not offer such an overview. 162 Pre-legal education 
is not formally connected with law school training in any way, 163 
meaning that students learn little about the legal profession and 
law school before deciding to become a lawyer,164 and are not 
guaranteed to have had any training or learning preparatory for 
the study of law. 165 Indeed, American law schools typically offer a 
161. Id. at 42. 
162. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 127 ("Many of the problems of legal 
education owe their being to deficiencies in the pre-legal period."). 
163. See Preparing for Law School, AM. B. Ass'N, http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/pre_law.html (last visited Nov. 14, 
2012) ("The ABA does not recommend any undergraduate majors or group of 
courses to prepare for a legal education. Students are admitted to law school 
from almost every academic discipline.") (on file with Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
164. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 228 ("Prospective law 
students generally are not knowledgeable about the profession . . . .  "). 
165. See Arthur T. Vanderbilt, A Report on Prelegal Education, 25 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 199, 209-10 (1950) 
It is no secret that our law school authorities generally are far from 
satisfied with the intellectual attainments of their incoming 
students . . . .  To be specific, no instructor in any class in any law 
school can make a reference to Plato or Aristotle, to the Bible or 
Shakespeare, to the Federalist or even the Constitution itself with 
any real assurance that he will be understood . . . . Now even an 
allusion by a law school instructor to Adam Smith or Karl Marx is as 
likely as not to be lost, notwithstanding the preoccupation of our age 
with problems of economics . . . . [There is a] well-nigh universal 
criticism respecting the inability of law students to think straight and 
to write and speak in clear, forceful, attractive English. Almost 
everyone who discusses law school students--or even, it must be 
added, young law school graduates-has an unkind word to say about 
their lack of adequate powers of oral and written expression in their 
native tongue. Such criticism, on analysis, generally relates as much 
to defects in thinking as to faults of expression. 
The 1980 report of the Special Committee on the Study of Legal Education of 
the ABA recommended that undergraduates should be urged to master 
advanced writing skills and effective oral communication, adding that prelaw 
courses should provide "a basic understanding of accounting, economics, 
psychology, and of historical and contemporary social and political processes." 
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course of the kind proposed by Redlich to their foreign LL.M. 
students only, 166 presumably under the assumption that 
American law students pursuing a J.D. would not benefit from 
this type of overview. 
The Carnegie Foundation followed up the Redlich Report 
with a more comprehensive report on legal education authored by 
Alfred Zantzinger Reed and published in 1921.167 Right from the 
outset, the tenor of the Reed Report was less laudatory of law 
schools, as it began by bluntly proclaiming, "Our contemporary 
American system of legal education . . .  is generally recognized to 
be defective in many respects."168 As Reed traced the movement of 
legal education from the office to the school, he lamented the 
concomitant loss of practical training: 
[W]e are in a fair way of losing entirely the practical training 
secured under a practitioner, that was once assumed to be the 
only logical means of preparing students in Anglo-American 
law. Even its remnants are not usually regarded by the law 
schools as worth preserving, now that they have virtually 
preempted the entire field of legal education. Moot courts . . .  
and "practice courses" are among the devices by which they 
AM. B. Ass'N SPECIAL COMM. FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUC., LAW SCHOOLS AND 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION 
104 (1980). 
166. See, e.g., Course Descriptions, PENN STATE L., http://law.psu.edu/ 
academics/jd/course_descriptions (last visited Sep. 14, 2012) (describing the 
LL.M. course, Introduction to the U.S. Legal System, as "introduc[ing] the 
United States court system, the role of the Constitution . . . and other 
foundation[al] materials in United States law. The goal is to introduce students 
to distinctive aspects and/or fundamental principles in U.S. law'') (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Introduction to the U.S. Legal System, 
FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://law.fordham.edu/llm-program/27293.htm (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2012) (''Welcome to the Introduction to the U.S. Legal System. 
As you know, this course is required for all students who do not hold a degree 
from a U.S. law school.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For 
Redlich's recommendations, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. 
167. REED REPORT, supra note 1. See also STEVENS, supra note 123, at 112-
13 (describing the Carnegie Foundation funding both the Reed and Redlich 
reports). Reed published a further report on legal education funded by the 
Carnegie Foundation in 1928. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW 
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, BULLETIN No. 21 (1928) 
[hereinafter REED REPORT II] . 
168. REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
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conceal from themselves and others the necessarily theoretical 
character of their instruction.169 
This neglect of the practical was, for Reed, unconscionable: "The 
failure of modern American law school to make any adequate 
provision in its curriculum for practical training constitutes a 
remarkable educational anomaly."170 
Reed's concern over the absence of practical training came in 
the context of a declining presence of law office apprenticeship 
training as supplementary to formal academic legal training. As 
early as the late nineteenth century, the ABA was urging that 
law school be accepted as a substitute for law office training 
rather than its mere predicate.171 By 1895, law school study and 
clerkship training had come to be regarded as interchangeable, 
rather than indispensable, in legal education, though no state bar 
admissions authorities were requiring law school at that time. 172 
And by Reed's time, four states were requiring formal legal 
education at law school, and in almost all of the remaining 
jurisdictions, "law school and law office training had become 
alternatives."173 In a context in which apprenticeship training 
had become optional, it is little wonder that Reed found fault with 
law school's failure to attend to practical instruction. 
Another major strain of Reed's critique was of what he 
referred to as "the theory of a unitary bar, whose attainments are 
to be tested by uniform examinations."174 This theory held that 
rather than having different kinds of lawyers, who were 
differently qualified to handle different matters, our political 
169. Id. at 48. 
170. Id. at 281. 
1 71. See Transactions of the Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the American 
Bar Association, 42 AM. BAR Ass'N REP. 28-30 (1919) (adopting a resolution that 
"time spent in any chartered and properly conducted law school ought to be 
counted in any state as equivalent to the same time in an attorney's office in 
such state . . . .  "). 
172. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 95 ("[T]ime spent in law school came to 
be counted as time spent in a law office, as states gradually increased (or 
restored) the requirement for some kind of apprenticeship or clerkship. Yet no 
state required attendance at law school . . . .  "). 
173. See id. at 174 (noting that by 1930 only West Virginia, Colorado, 
Kentucky, and Wyoming required at least one or more years of legal education). 
174. REED REPORT, supra note l, at 57. 
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philosophy abjured distinctions and ranks among lawyers, 
resulting in the "American 'attorney and counselor-at-law,' 
privileged to practice all branches of his profession in all courts 
equally."175 The unitary bar theory, in Reed's view, obscured the 
real distinctions between the law schools, mainly the divide 
between the full-time national law schools and the local law or 
part-time law schools, which "differ[ed] vastly from one another 
in type of law studied, in methods of instruction, and in the 
amount of actual work represented by their degree."176 The 
problem here was that the unitary ideal forced each type of law 
school to compete with the other, to the detriment of each: 
"Coming, however, into direct competition with one another 
under the accepted dogma of a unitary bar, each affects 
injuriously the other's development."177 Further, the notion of a 
unitary bar was at odds with the needs of the increasingly 
pluralistic society that was 1920s America. 178 
In Reed's estimation, the three types of emerging law 
schools-full-time national, full-time local, and part-time 
evening-represented different approaches to legal education 
that should be encouraged and strengthened rather than 
homogenized or suppressed: 
Each has seen clearly that if all American lawyers were 
educated in accordance with the other's plans, we should be in 
a bad way . . . .  If [some] thought . . .  had been expended upon 
175. See id. at 39-40 (describing the transformation of the legal profession 
as moving "as a whole into an officially undifferentiated and, as it were, 
flattened-out profession"). 
1 76. Id. at 63. 
177. Id. at 64. Reed posited that "the night schools are damaged by the 
obligation placed upon them to cover the same curriculum as the day schools." 
Id. at 57. The full-time schools "are so fearful of losing students to [the night 
schools], that they hesitate to raise their own entrance requirements to the level 
that they really believe in." Id. at 58. Bar examiners, eager not to favor 
graduates of one type of school over the other, "are obliged to limit the scope of 
their enquiries to those elements that any law school, offering the standardized 
curriculum, must provide-something that even the more poorly trained of the 
night school students can pass, at least with the aid of special coaching . . . .  " Id. 
at 59. 
178. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 113 (describing Reed's view of a 
pluralistic 1920s America as "st[anding] out sharply against the formal theory of 
a unified bar"). 
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the problem of dividing the bar along lines that can be 
justified . . .  we should hardly have been in so bad a situation 
as we are now, when the schools are . . .  wrangling for 
possession of a field too large for any of them to cover in its 
entirety. The scholarly law school dean properly seeks to build 
up a "nursery for judges" that will make American law what 
American law ought to be. The practitioner bar examiner, with 
his satellite schools, properly seeks to prepare students for the 
immediate practice of the law as it is. The night school 
authorities, finally, see most clearly that the interests not only 
of the individual but of the community demand that 
participation in the making and administration of the law 
shall be kept accessible to Lincoln's plain people. All these are 
worthy ideals. Taken together, they roughly embrace the 
service that the public expects from its law schools as a whole. 
But no single institution, pursuing its special aim, can attain 
both the others as well.179 
By permitting this differentiation to thrive, Reed estimated that 
schools would be able to focus on what they each did best, 
producing graduates who were well-suited for the kind of 
lawyering that was the focus of their respective schools. 180 
The ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar, which in 1919 superseded the abolished Committee on Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar, 181 received an early draft of 
the Reed Report in 1920 and did not like what it saw. 182 It 
promptly formed a special committee chaired by Elihu Root, 
which met in March and May of 1921 and was tasked with 
developing its own recommendations for improving legal 
education. 183 Regarding Reed's suggestion that the diversity in 
179. REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 417-18. 
180. See id. at 417-19 ("[T]he independent development of each type of law 
school will naturally result in a considerable variation in the kind of 
professional work for which its products are especially fitted."). 
181. Constitution and By-Laws of the American Bar Association, 42 AM. B. 
Ass'N REP. 121-31 (1919). 
182. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 115-16 ("Reed's suggestion in his first 
report that the most democratic, egalitarian, and American solution would be a 
differentiated bar, with differing types of law schools . . .  managed to offend both 
his ABA and AALS audiences."). 
183. See Report of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, 44 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 
679-88 (1921) [hereinafter Special Committee Report, 44 AM. BAR Ass'N REP.] 
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types of law schools should be encouraged, the Root Report stated 
as follows: 
Turning first, then, to a consideration of what a lawyer's 
training should be, we meet the suggestion that there must be 
different kinds of training to produce different kinds of 
lawyers. 
With this position we do not agree. In spite of the diversity of 
human relations with respect to which the work of lawyers is 
done, the intellectual requisites are in all cases substantially 
the same. 184 
The Root committee's view was that differentiating among law 
schools meant tolerating law schools of lesser quality: "Nor can 
there be tolerated a recognized distinction between good and poor 
legal education. There should be no distinction . . . .  [W]e cannot 
favor the continuation of a class of incompetent practitioners."185 
Uniformity was to be preferred, which the special committee went 
about pursuing by recommending that all bar applicants be 
required to have graduated from a law school complying with 
prescribed standards, that they be required to have completed at 
least two years of study in college, and that the course of full-time 
study of law be three years. 186 
The Root committee acknowledged the need for afternoon 
and evening law schools to accommodate the student who had to 
work to support himself and his family; however, it rejected the 
idea that such schools should be operated with what it viewed as 
lower educational standards. 187 Finally, the Root committee 
(describing the proceedings of the special committee chaired by Elihu Reed in 
March and May of 1921 to the full Section on Legal Education and Admissions 
to the Bar). 
184. Id. at 681. 
185. Id. at 681-82. 
186. See id. at 683-85 (spelling out the special committee's 
recommendations for uniformity). 
187. Id. at 685. Specifically, the special committee noted: 
Id. 
But in recognizing the necessity for afternoon and evening schools we 
do not recognize the propriety of permitting such schools to operate 
with low educational standards . . . .  On the contrary, the democratic 
necessity for afternoon and evening schools compels a lifting of these 
schools to the highest standards which they can be expected to reach. 
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recommended that "a law school shall not be deemed competent 
to educate students for the bar unless it provides an adequate 
library available for their use" and that a school ''have among its 
teachers a sufficient number giving their entire time to the 
school."188 These requirements, of course, would prove to be more 
burdensome to night schools and local, practice-connected schools 
that might lack sufficient funds to maintain a complete law 
library and whose instructors were principally practitioners who 
devoted most of their time to law practice during the day. These 
requirements all meant to homogenize law schools around 
standards that tilted in favor of the national, full-time law 
schools, to the detriment of night schools and other alternative 
types of law schools that might have otherwise been able to 
develop, the latter being schools that non-elites and working class 
individuals were more likely to be able to attend.1 89 
One can hardly quarrel with the notion that there should not 
be law schools that expressly aspire to lower educational 
standards or knowingly produce a class of incompetent 
practitioners. But that is a straw man and as such was not the 
proposition furthered by Reed in his report.190 Rather, the idea 
was that the variation among types of law schools should be 
recognized in a way that permits each to focus on their respective 
strengths in service of various segments of the public and bar. 191 
Reed did not know what such a regime would look like in its 
188. Id. at 685-86. 
189. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS), whose membership 
consisted of the elite law schools, similarly opposed the idea of a differentiated 
bar or the perpetuation of a separate, lower class of law schools. See STEVENS, 
supra note 123, at 116 (describing the membership of the AALS and referring to 
the 1921 presidential address by Yale's Arthur Corbin to the AALS that 
"reject[ed] any concept of a differentiated bar"). 
190. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 55-56 (describing the development of 
different institutions to serve those who can devote all their time to legal 
education while addressing "the democratic desire to extend the privileges of 
education to the many"). 
191. See id. at 56-57 ("If law school graduates enjoyed different privileges in 
the practice of law, corresponding to the differences in educational effort 
between full-time and part-time work, the two types instead of rivaling would 
supplement one another. Each could develop independently along the lines 
indicated by its own special aim."). 
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particulars, 192 but it is likely that he would endorse moves from 
some quarters today to get the ABA to amend its approval 
standards to allow creative flexibility among the law schools; that 
is, efforts such as those that relax the tenure requirement in 
favor of alternative means of giving faculty security of position 193 
might permit some schools, for example, to build a faculty of 
practitioners who practice during the day and teach only at 
night. 194 Relaxing other standards--such as the full-time faculty 
and library requirements or the limitations on distance 
192. See id. at 419 
The more scholarly institutions may in time be glad to lighten their 
own burden by throwing upon schools of other types responsibility for 
certain portions of this broad field. Conveyancing, probate practice, 
criminal law and trial work are examples of topics that seem 
particularly appropriate for the relatively superficial schools. All this 
is mere guesswork, however. It is not even certain that a rigorous 
functional division of the bar will ever develop. The dividing line 
between the different types of lawyers may be determined by the 
economic status of the client rather than by the nature of the 
professional service rendered. The general principle of a 
differentiated profession is something that we already have, and 
could not abolish if we would. The particular principle of a 
functionally divided bar is something that we may or may not be able 
eventually to introduce, as one means for making the general 
principle work better. 
193. See ABA STANDARDS AND INTERPRETATIONS ON FACULTY, Standard 405 
(Discussion Draft 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/20ll_build/legal_education/committees/standards_review_docume 
nts/july201lmeeting/2011071 l_ch_ 4_faculty _terms_and_conditions_july _10_201 
l_discussion_draft.authcheckdam.pdf (presenting two alternative proposals that 
relax or eliminate the requirement of faculty tenure); see also Mark Hansen, 
ABA Committee Considers Changes in Terms and Conditions of Law School 
Employment Policies, AB.A. J. (Jul. 11, 2011, 7:34 PM), http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/article/aba_committee_considers_changes_in_terms_and_cond 
itions_of_law_school/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campai 
gn=ABA+Journal+Daily+News&utm_content=Netvibes (last visited Aug. 31, 
2012) (discussing ABA Standards Review Committee proposals to permit law 
schools that do not offer tenure to demonstrate alternative sufficient means of 
providing security of position) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
194. See, e.g., BIRMINGHAM SCH. OF L., http://www.bsol.com/ (last visited Aug. 
24, 2012) (describing a non-ABA-accredited school taught by practicing lawyers 
and judges whose graduates may sit for the Alabama bar exam) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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education195-might similarly free law schools to deliver an 
education sufficient to serve a different segment of the bar than 
might a graduate of a national full-time law school. 
The challenge would be on the licensing side; state licensing 
authorities would be responsible for determining whether 
graduates of all law schools were prepared to practice, something 
most bar exams, as structured at the time, largely failed to do. 196 
Beyond making bar exams a better judge of practice-readiness 
and legal competence, 197 one could imagine a differentiated bar 
with various levels of licensure. Such a system would not have to 
mimic the barrister-solicitor distinction of England precisely, 198 
but that model at least could be an example of where to start the 
thought process. Alternatively, phased licensure could be 
195. Current ABA Standards limit the credit that students may receive 
through distance education to four hours in any term and twelve hours overall. 
2012-2013, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS, supra note 28, Standard 306(d). The Standards Review Committee 
considered revising this standard, but only to permit fifteen hours total of 
distance education to count towards the J.D. degree. See AM. B. Ass'N SECTION 
OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, Standard 311(±), (Proposed 
Draft 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Proposed Draft], available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/20ll_build/legal_education/committ 
ees/standards_review _documents/jan2012/20111222_standards_chapters_l_to_ 7 
_post_novl l .authcheckdam.pdf. Currently, there is one completely online law 
school, The Concord School of Law, which is ineligible for ABA approval due to 
Standard 306. However, one of its graduates did successfully petition the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for permission to sit for that state's bar 
exam, which he passed. See Kristina Horton Flaherty, Court Win for Online Law 
School Grad, CAL. B. J. (Jan. 2009), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/Archive.aspx? 
articleld=94802&categoryld=94651&month=l&year=2009 (last visited Aug. 31, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
196. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 59 ("The actual situation is that 
neither the tests of the state nor those of the law schools serve to prevent 
incompetents from flooding the profession."). 
197. See, e.g. , ALI-ABA CONTINUING PROF. EDUC. & Ass'N OF CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUC., EQUIPPING OUR LAWYERS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CRITICAL 
ISSUES SUMMIT 8 (2010), available at http://www.equippingourlawyers. 
org/documents/final_report.pdf ("Regulatory authorities should consider 
restructuring one-time bar examinations into phased examinations over time, 
linked in part to attainment of legal practice skills, with some parts of the 
examination occurring as early as in the law school years."). 
198. See MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & CHRISTOPHER 
0SAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 546-49 (2d ed., 1994) (describing the 
distinction between English barristers and solicitors). 
2000 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949 (2012) 
considered, with probationary or apprenticeship periods 
preceding full admission, as is currently the approach in 
Canada. 199 Whatever the specifics might be, revising the ABA 
standards in a way that permits flexibility while ensuring that 
basic levels of quality are maintained-in tandem with improved 
state bar admissions standards-seems to be the ideal that Reed 
was endorsing and would seem to be a way to free law schools to 
pursue their respective strengths without having to devote 
resources toward compliance with standards that do not truly 
speak to their core mission and the segment of the bar they serve. 
But this was not to be; the Section rebuffed the Reed Report's 
recommendation to permit the development of fundamentally 
different types of law schools in favor of a unitary set of 
standards that required all law schools to aspire toward and 
satisfy its vision of what was required to make a law school 
educationally sound. 200 There was notable opposition to the 
199. See Articling Program: What You Need to Know, L. Soc'y OF UPPER CAN. 
(May 2012), http://www.lsuc.on.ca/ArticlingNeedtoKnowinfo/ (last visited Aug. 
24, 2012) (describing the ten-month articling program in the Canadian licensing 
process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
200. See Special Committee Report, 44 AM. BAR Ass'N REP., supra note 183, 
at 683. The committee noted that: 
To require a law-school education without setting standards for the 
law schools would be worse than useless. Any man or group of men 
professing to teach law to students may be said to be conducting a 
law school, no matter how inferior may be the abilities of the 
students, the nature of the instruction or the physical facilities of the 
plant ... . We, therefore, propose not only that a law school education 
shall be required, but that such education must be obtained in a 
school complying with certain prescribed standards. 
Id. ;  see also Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar, 46 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 678 (1923). The Council came to the following 
conclusion: 
Id. 
[T]hat a school, to be in the approved list, must comply as to all of its 
students. Some schools or some institutions conduct classes both for 
full time and part time students. Some of these have arranged to 
comply with the standards of the American Bar Association or 
announced that they will in the near future comply with such 
standards as to their full time students, but have not arranged to so 
comply as to their part time students. The Council has concluded that 
such schools cannot be placed on the approved list. 
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standards proposed by the Section; Dean Edward T. Lee of the 
John Marshall Law School of Chicago argued: 
The effect of the adoption of the recommendations would be to 
place the control of legal education through the country in the 
hands of the deans of a few large day law schools who have the 
fate of law teachers in their hands. It would close the 
profession of the law to all save the leisure class of youth with 
means sufficient to obtain college and law school 
training . . . .  201 
Nonetheless, the ABA approved the Section's recommendations at 
its 1921 meeting202 and they were subsequently approved by the 
Conference of Bar Association Delegates held in Washington, 
D.C. in 1922.203 
C. Twentieth Century Critiques and Reforms 
"[I]s it not plain that, without giving up entirely the case-book 
system or the growing and valuable alliance with the so-called 
social sciences, the law schools should once more get in 
intimate contact with what clients need and with what courts 
and lawyers actually do?" 
-.Jerome Frank, 1933204 
The ABA's determination to impose its unitary vision of law 
schools based on the Langdell model-three years of full-time 
study (or its equivalent if part-time), centered around large 
physical libraries, and classes taught by full-time faculty 
members removed from the practice of law-was a victory for the 
full-time national law schools that furthered the Harvardization 
of legal education.205 It was not long, however, before another 
201. Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar, 44 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 668 (1921) (discussing the report of the Special 
Committee). 
202. See Transactions of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American 
Bar Association, 44 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 37-4 7 (1921). 
203. See Proceedings of the Special Conference on Legal Education, 45 AM. B. 
Ass'N REP. 482-84, 582 (1922). 
204. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 
907, 913 (1933-1934) [hereinafter Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?] . 
205. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 410 ("The path indicated by 
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major threat to the Langdellian model for the study of law in the 
first half of the twentieth century reared its head. This challenge 
came from what came to be referred to as the legal Realists, who 
challenged "the Langdellian notion of law as an exact science, 
based on the objectivity of black-letter rules."206 Instead, the 
Realists posited that the operation of the law in the real world 
was less coherent and objective than Langdell's scientific vision of 
the law suggested.207 With law as a value-laden process more so 
than a neutral and consistent body of enduring principles, 
Langdell's belief in cases as the vehicle for learning legal doctrine 
and in the mastery of doctrine and principles as the route to 
becoming a good lawyer became subject to doubt. 208 
In 1933, Jerome Frank reflected the Realists' view in his 
withering critique of the Langdellian case method: 
Ostensibly, the students were to study cases. But they did not 
and they do not study cases. They do not even study the 
printed records of cases (although that would be little enough), 
let alone cases as living processes. Their attention is restricted 
to judicial opinions. But an opinion is not a decision. A decision 
is a specific judgment, or order or decree entered after a trial 
of a specific lawsuit between specific litigants. There are a 
multitude of factors which [sic] induce a jury to return a 
verdict, or a judge to enter a decree. Of those numerous 
factors, but few are set forth in judicial opinions. And those 
factors, not expressed in the opinions, frequently are the most 
important in the real causal explanation of the decisions.209 
Harvard . . .  has been followed by all the schools. Their main activities are 
devoted to instruction in the relatively narrow . . .  field of the judge-made 
technical law."); see also id. at 411-12 (describing innovations in legal education 
emanating from Harvard that took hold, including the focus on "national" law, 
introduction of the case method, and imposition of the requirement of 
preliminary college training before entering law school). For a fuller account of 
the standardization movement by the ABA and the AALS, see STEVENS, supra 
note 123, at 205-13. 
206. STEVENS, supra note 123, at 1 56. 
207. See id. ("The Realists went a long way toward killing the idea of 'the 
system' altogether. All legal logic came under suspicion, American law became 
increasingly purposive, increasingly secularized, and increasingly atomized."). 
208. See id. at 156-57 ("This change inevitably caused the predictive value 
of doctrine to be seriously questioned."). 
209. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 910. 
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From the Realist perspective, the law in books-particularly 
books limited to reports of appellate opinions-was not the sum 
total of what constituted the law nor even the best source for 
understanding law or legal practice.21° Frank argued for the 
study of complete case files-not simply appellate opinions-and 
for study of the work of lawyers in practice and the work of the 
courts: 
[T]he study of cases . . . should be based to a very marked 
extent on reading and analysis of complete records of cases­
beginning with the filing of the first papers, through the trial 
in the trial court and to and through the upper courts. Six 
months properly spent on one or two elaborate court records, 
including the briefs (and supplemented by reading of text-books 
as well as upper court opinions) will teach a student more than 
two years spent on going through twenty of the case-books now 
in use.211 
Karl Llewellyn, during his time at Columbia Law School, raised 
similar points, suggesting the case approach used in business 
schools as a way of improving on the Langdellian case method. 212 
Another Realist critique was of the abstract focus and dearth 
of practical training that characterized law schools. Fred Rodell 
210. See Jerome Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19 
A.B.A. J. 723, 726 (1933) [hereinafter Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal 
Education?] (noting the advantages of studying case files over court opinions). 
Frank noted: 
The law student should learn, while in school, the art of legal 
practice. And to that end, the law schools should boldly, not slyly and 
evasively, repudiate the false dogmas of Langdell . . . .  They must 
decide not to exclude, as did Langdell, but to include the "methods of 
learning law by work in the lawyer's office and attendance upon the 
proceedings of courts of justice . . . .  " They must repudiate the absurd 
notions that the heart of a law school is its library . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted) 
211. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 916. 
212. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215 (1948-1949) ("Consider, for example, the possibility of 
building up our so-called cases out beyond the judicial opinion into something 
resembling the completeness of the cases gathered for the Harvard Business 
School."). For an exposure to the Harvard Business School case method, see The 
Case Method at HBS, HARVARD Bus. SCH., http://www.hbs.edu/teaching/inside­
hbs/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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of Yale found fault with the focus on abstractions rather than on 
practical legal problem-solving when he wrote, "[T]hus, law 
school courses, since they are cut out of the pseudo-science of 
Law, inevitably focus on generalities and abstractions rather 
than on the solution of specific problems."213 In 1928, Alfred Reed 
of the Carnegie Foundation commented on the need for more 
practical instruction in his second report on legal education in 
which he faulted the law schools for their failure to provide 
students with practical experience: 
[A]ll the activities of the school are necessarily conducted 
under artificial conditions. The hurly-burly of actual practice 
is systemized for the student in a manner that it never is when 
an authentic client begins to tell him his woes. This 
systemization is indispensable as a means of ensuring him 
adequate resources of information and of developed reasoning 
power upon which to draw. But there still remains the task of 
marshaling these resources, of focusing his scattered 
acquisitions upon the unlabeled and multifarious collection of 
facts and aims with which he will be called upon to deal. 
Skilled ability to do this is what distinguishes the lawyer from 
the legal scholar, the expert practitioner from the man who 
knows, or who is qualified to ascertain, the law.214 
Reed favored further experimentation with legal clinics 
associated with law schools as a way of ameliorating this 
condition.215 Jerome Frank suggested the same only a few years 
later.216 
These points were well taken; however, they did not lead to a 
wholesale overhaul of legal education away from the Langdellian 
model. Instead, law schools responded by supplementing their 
curricula with practice courses in the form of legal clinics.217 By 
213. FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! 207 (1939). 
214. REED REPORT II, supra note 167, at 215. 
215. See id. at 216-21 ("If by this method lawyers who enter the legal 
profession through the law schools can acquire even a small amount of that 
practical experience which they now so sadly lack, the plan is certainly worth 
putting into operation."). 
216. See Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 917 
("Suppose, however, that there were in each law school a legal clinic or 
dispensary."). 
217. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 214-16 ("Of all aspects of the renewed 
interest in skills, the particular interest in the skills embraced in the concept of 
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1951, there were twenty-eight clinics maintained by law schools, 
independent legal aid societies, or public defender offices.218 The 
movement grew stronger over the next two decades, resulting in 
clinical programs at nearly half of the law schools in the country 
by the early 197Os.219 
Although the rise of clinical legal education was a major 
innovation in how law schools prepared their students for 
practice, very little change in the law school program had 
occurred overall.220 Indeed, criticism of the legal profession 
persisted in the 1970s, a critique that extended to law schools as 
the near exclusive route to practice. 221 As the second and third 
years of law school had become largely elective and focused on 
courses not necessarily oriented towards practice, bar admissions 
authorities began considering imposiq.g practice course 
requirements as prerequisites to admission.222 In 1971, the AALS 
issued the report of its Curriculum Study Project-known as the 
Carrington Report-which called for a curriculum that 
emphasized practice-oriented courses in the first year.223 A 1972 
clinical legal education was to prove the most important."). Other reforms were 
implemented during the post-World War II period as well, including the 
introduction of elective courses, seminar courses, introductory law courses, 
writing programs, small group discussions, reduced class sizes, and the like. See 
id. at 211-14 ("[T]here had been a realization that there were important skills 
other than those inculcated by the case method . . . .  Discussions of curricular 
reform increasingly centered on skills such as negotiation, drafting, and 
counseling-legal skills that had had no place in the Langdellian scheme of 
things."). 
2 18. STEVENS, supra note 123, at 215. 
219. Id. at 216. 
220. See id. at 232 ("[B]y the mid-1960s . . .  [t]here had been much talk of 
change, but little change had occurred."). Readers should consult Stevens's book 
on the history of legal education for a much more complete account of what 
transpired in legal education during this time period. 
221. See id. at 232-38 ("Increasingly, the leaders of the bar expressed 
concern that the law schools were not living up to their expectations . . .. The 
bar was irritated by an apparent reluctance on the part of leading schools to be 
concerned with those skills that the profession regarded as important . . .. "). 
222. See id. at 238-39 (discussing the Second Circuit's proposal to require 
that applicants have taken evidence, civil procedure, criminal procedure, 
professional responsibility, and trial advocacy); see also id. at 239-40 (discussing 
efforts of other jurisdictions to impose law school course prerequisites to bar 
admission). 
223. See Paul D. Carrington, Ass'n Am. L. Schs., Training for the Public 
2006 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1949 (2012) 
report sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher 
Education noted the encouraging expansion in clinical legal 
education but cautioned that proper supervision and instruction 
were required to make real life experiences edifying and 
educationally sound, and doubted whether clinical education 
ultimately could be "the solution" to the host of ills that plagued 
legal education given its costs.224 
In 1979, the ABA entered the dialogue by publishing the 
report of its Task Force on Lawyer Competency entitled The Role 
of Law Schools, in which it observed, "Law schools, have not . . .  
undertaken to provide such comprehensive training that 
individuals emerge upon graduation as fully competent ready-to­
practice lawyers."225 The Task Force then emphasized the need 
for improvement in the following areas: 
(a) developing some of the fundamental skills underemphasized 
by traditional legal education; (b) shaping attitudes, values, and 
work habits critical to the individual's ability to translate 
knowledge and relevant skills into adequate professional 
performance; and (c) providing integrated learning experiences 
focused on particular fields of lawyer practice, including but not 
limited to trial practice.226 
Toward that end, the Task Force recommended that law schools 
provide instruction in fundamental skills critical to lawyer 
competence: effective writing, oral communication skills, fact­
gathering, interviewing, counseling, and negotiation skills.227 It 
went on to recommend teaching these fundamental lawyer skills 
in small classes, that schedules be adjusted to "provide [the] 
opportunity for periods of intensive instruction in fundamental 
Professions of the Law: 1971, Part One, Section II (1971), reprinted in HERBERT 
L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A REPORT 
PREPARED FOR THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION 93, 1 10-17 
(1972) [hereinafter CARRINGTON REPORT] (including, among others, a course 
entitled legal advocacy to be completed in the first year of law school where 
"[e]mphasis is placed on the need to develop and use professional skills"). 
224. See PACKER & EHRLICH, supra note 223, at 42-43, 46 ("We prefer to 
think that the path of improvement lies in experimentation with many modest 
ideas, one of which is clinical education."). 
225. CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 22, at 11. 
226. Id. at 14. 
227. Id. at 3. 
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lawyer skills," that law schools encourage more cooperative law 
student work, and that "law schools should make more extensive 
instructional use of experienced and able lawyers and judges."228 
Also noteworthy was its recommendation that law schools 
"develop and use more comprehensive methods of measuring law 
student performance than the typical end-of-the-term 
examination" and that "[s]tudents should be given detailed 
critiques of their performance."229 Finally, with respect to the 
academic program, the Task Force urged law schools to "seek to 
achieve greater coherence in their curriculum," noting that "the 
three-year program should build in a structured way."230 
Notwithstanding these recommendations, when a proposal to 
require that law schools offer practical skills instruction as a 
condition of accreditation was presented to the ABA by the 
Council of the Section on Legal Education, the ABA softened the 
proposal by limiting it to an interpretative paragraph calling for 
skills training rather than an approval standard mandating such 
training. 231 
More than a decade later, legal education still was perceived 
as inadequately preparing students for practice, as little had 
changed in how law schools educated their students.232 The ABA 
spoke to this concern in a 1992 report known as the MacCrate 
Report. 233 The MacCrate Report outlined a series of skills and 
values that were deemed to be essential for competent 
representation, and then recommended that law schools offer 
courses that effectively instruct students in those areas.234 The 
fundamental lawyering skills outlined included problem solving, 
228. Id. at 4. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. STEVENS, supra note 123, at 240, 257 nn.88-89. 
232. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 93 ("[T]hese efforts failed to change 
the standard pattern of law school education."). 
233. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 22. 
234. See id. at 330-34 (identifying three characteristics of effective 
lawyering skills teaching including: the "development of concepts and theories 
underlying the skills and values being taught; opportunity for students to 
perform lawyering tasks with appropriate feedback and self-evaluation; [and] 
reflective evaluation of the students' performance by a qualified assessor"). 
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legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual 
investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation, knowledge 
of litigation and ADR procedures, law-practice management, and 
the ability to recognize and resolve ethical dilemmas.235 The four 
values suggested by the report were the provision of competent 
representation, striving to promote justice, fairness, and 
morality, striving to improve the profession, and professional self­
development. 236 The report also explored the state of skills 
instruction offered in law schools at the time, finding that a 
majority of law graduates had only one or no professional skills 
courses beyond basic legal research and writing courses, trial 
advocacy, or moot court experiences.237 The report found that 
clinical programs were generally available to only thirty percent 
of law students at schools where such courses were offered, with 
skills training courses occupying only nine percent of the total 
instructional time at law schools.238 
An important perspective offered by the MacCrate Report 
was the importance of the entire legal educational continuum­
pre-law, law school, bar admissions, and continuing legal 
education-and it addressed the need for improvements to occur 
at each stage.239 Ultimately, the report concluded that greater 
attention should be paid to "the linkage between the several 
phases of lawyers' education" if the gaps in professional legal 
education are to be filled.240 Although the report spawned some 
efforts to increase skills instruction in law schools, such training 
has remained peripheral to legal education241 and no grand effort 
235. Id. at 13�0. 
236. Id. at 140-41. 
237. Id. at 240. 
238. Id. at 240-41. 
239. See id. at 3-8 (''The skills and values of the competent lawyer are 
developed along a continuum that starts before law school, reaches its most 
formative and intensive stage during the law school experience, and continues 
throughout a lawyer's professional career."). 
240. Id. at 320-21. The report proposed the creation of a national institute 
to attend to this coordination. Id. 
241. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 94 ("[S]kills training will 
continue to face an uphill battle unless it is linked with an accepted theory of 
lawyering that could provide a bridge between theory and practice and perhaps 
establish a rationale for more systemic continuing education beyond law 
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to coordinate the various phases of legal education has 
materialized. 
D. Contemporary Critiques 
In 2007, a group of researchers compiled a report entitled 
Best Practices for Legal Education (Best Practices) that began by 
echoing the MacCrate Report's charge that multiple stages along 
the legal education continuum had substantial room for 
improvement.242 Specifically, the report noted that law graduates 
"are not sufficiently competent to provide legal services to clients 
or even to perform the work expected of them in large firms" and 
that survey after survey has reported a decline in lawyer 
professionalism.243 However, the true focus of Best Practices was 
on how law schools could better design and deliver a curriculum 
that prepared students for practice. 244 As the MacCrate Report 
had done a decade before, Best Practices spoke of the need for 
skills and values training by calling for "context-based education" 
as the means for giving students the problem-solving 
opportunities they need to become competent and effective legal 
practitioners.245 The report also dug into what is wrong with 
traditional law school teaching and assessment methods, 
proposing the use of a diversity of approaches that are connected 
with developing competent and thoughtful practitioners. 246 
school."). 
242. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 11-36 (noting a compelling need 
to improve legal education because, among other reasons: the licensing process 
is not protecting the public, and because law schools are not fully committed to 
preparing their students for bar exams or practice). 
243. Id. 
244. See id. at 8-9 ("Law schools should organize their curriculums to 
develop knowledge, skills, and values progressively; integrate the teaching of 
theory, doctrine, and practice; and teach professionalism pervasively throughout 
all three years of law school."). 
245. See id. at 141 ("Legal education would be more effective if law teachers 
used context-based education throughout the curriculum."). 
246. See id. at 207-63 (noting that "many teachers use the case method 
exclusively even when other methods of instruction would accomplish their 
educational objectives more effectively," and that "the end-of-the-semester essay 
exam is an inadequate method for assessing student learning .. . [that] is 
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Overall, the report's core concern was that law schools should 
recognize the broad array of skills and attributes that successful 
lawyers need to have beyond legal knowledge and analytical 
ability and incorporate courses and methods that attend to those 
competencies. 247 
Following closely on the heels of the Best Practices report in 
2007 was another major critique of legal education, a report of 
the Carnegie Foundation entitled Educating Lawyers: 
Preparation for the Profession of Law (Carnegie Report).248 The 
report was the product of a two-year study that included an 
extensive literature review, consultation with the AALS and the 
Law School Admissions Council, and site visits to a 
representative sample of sixteen American and Canadian law 
schools, including public and private schools, more selective and 
less selective schools, freestanding schools, and schools that 
served certain ethnic minority groups. 249 A central premise of the 
Carnegie Report is that the education of professionals is a 
complex and unique enterprise that cannot simply focus on the 
transmission of expert knowledge, but must also focus on 
instilling the specialized skills, standards, judgment, and values 
that define practice in a profession. 250 The challenge for 
professional education is to weave the various components of 
professional training into a whole that attends to the interests of 
educators, practitioners, and the public to be served by the 
profession. 251 
According to the Carnegie Report, this has been the singular 
challenge of legal education, as its modern linkage with the 
research university has stood in tension with the historical 
neither valid, nor reliable, nor fair"). 
247. See id. at 7-10 ("While law schools help students acquire some of the 
essential skills and knowledge required for law practice, most law schools are 
not committed to preparing students for practice . . . . [M]ost law school 
graduates are not as prepared for law practice as they could be and should be."). 
248. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22. 
249. Id. at 15-16. 
250. See id. at 3-4 (noting that professional schools "are perhaps the sole 
site where the professions' standards of good work set the agenda for learning''). 
251. See id. at 4 ("This is a complex educational process . . .  and its value 
depends, in large part, on how well the several aspects of professional training 
are understood and woven into a whole."). 
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connection between the community of practitioners and young 
legal apprentices.252 The university connection has made legal 
education predominately academic in character, focusing on 
teaching and studying law as a science, "put[ting] a premium on 
formal knowledge, abstracted from context."253 This positivist 
orientation-which, as we have seen, characterized the views of 
Langdell254-led to a view that the traditions of practice-such as 
craft, judgment, and professional responsibility-were too 
subjective and uncritical, a perspective that "undermined the 
academic legitimacy of practical knowledge" and "spelled the 
eclipse of traditional forms of practitioner-directed apprenticeship 
by academic instruction given by scholar-teachers."255 
The triumph of the academy in legal education has resulted 
in a focus on training in legal knowledge and legal analysis 
rather than on learning to practice.256 Complete professional 
education, however, must be defined by "three apprenticeships" 
that the Carnegie Report authors describe: the cognitive 
apprenticeship focused on expert knowledge and modes of 
thinking; the apprenticeship of practice, which trains students in 
"the forms of expert practice shared by competent practitioners;" 
and the apprenticeship of identity and purpose, which "introduces 
students to the purposes and attitudes that are guided by the 
values for which the professional community is responsible."257 To 
be successful in their goal of educating lawyers, law schools must 
"initiate learners into all three apprenticeships."258 
Unfortunately, law schools focus heavily on the cognitive 
252. See id. ("[L]aw schools are hybrid institutions. One parent is the 
historic community of practitioners, deeply immersed in the common law and 
carrying on traditions of craft, judgment, and public responsibility. The other 
heritage is that of the modem research university."). 
253. Id. at 4-5. 
254. See supra Part II.E (summarizing Langdell's theory of American legal 
education). 
255. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4-5. 
256. See id. at 6-7 ("In its quest for academic respectability, legal education 
would come to emphasize legal knowledge and reasoning at the expense of 
attention to practice skills, while the relations of legal activity to morality and 
public responsibility received even less direct attention in the curriculum."). 
257. Id. at 28. 
258. Id. 
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apprenticeship: "For many students, neither practical skills nor 
reflection on professional responsibility figure significantly in 
their legal education. The academic setting clearly tilts the 
balance toward the cognitive and intellectual."259 The Carnegie 
Report contrasts this tilt in legal education with the laboratory 
experience that characterizes engineering education260 and the 
extensive clinical work that is the hallmark of medical 
education. 261 
The academic focus of professional legal education has 
resulted in a shift in teaching methods, away from 
"apprenticeship, with its intimate pedagogy of modeling and 
coaching, toward reliance on the methods of academic instruction, 
with its emphasis on classroom teaching and learning."262 
Further, the Carnegie Report notes that the "signature pedagogy" 
of law school-the Socratic case-dialogue method-leads to two 
major weaknesses of typical law school education: "[T]he casual 
attention that most law schools give to teaching students how to 
use legal thinking in the complexity of actual law practice" and 
"law schools' failure to complement the focus on skill in legal 
analysis with effective support for developing the ethical and 
social dimensions of the profession."263 These weaknesses 
"prolong and reinforce the habits of thinking like a student rather 
than an apprentice practitioner"264 and leave students with an 
259. Id. at 79. 
260. Although engineering education does include lab work, the Carnegie 
Foundation-in a separate report-has critiqued engineering programs for how 
labs are poorly designed and integrated into a curriculum that remains 
dominated by formal knowledge and analysis. SHERI D. SHEPPARD ET AL., 
EDUCATING ENGINEERS: DESIGNING FOR THE FUTURE OF THE FIELD 16, 7 4 (2009). 
261. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 79-81 ("The distinguishing 
feature of medical training . .. is that most of it is carried out in settings of 
actual patient care. The consequence is to provide medicine a real advantage, 
compared to engineering or law, for integrating its forms of apprenticeship."). 
Clinical clerkships in medical education are a legacy of the Flexner Report, a 
product of the Carnegie Foundation. See Comm ET AL., supra note 147, at 13, 82 
("The third year [of medical school], dedicated to patient care and investigation 
of clinical problems presented by hospitalized patients, is a legacy of the 
Flexnerian reforms .. . .  "). 
262. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25. 
263. Id. at 188. 
264. Id. 
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underdeveloped sense of professional judgment and 
responsibility. 265 
Although there have been successful efforts in recent decades 
to expand practice-oriented education and apprenticeship 
learning methods in law schools, these experiences tend to be 
disconnected from the main curriculum, meaning that the three 
critical elements of legal professionalism-"conceptual 
knowledge, skill, and moral discernment"266-remain artificially 
distinct and, thus, are insufficiently transmitted to novice 
professionals: 
[T]he threefold movement between law as doctrine and 
precedent (the focus of the case-dialogue classroom) to 
attention to performance skills (the aim of the apprenticeship 
of practice) and then to responsible engagement with solving 
clients' legal problems-a back-and-forth cycle of action and 
reflection-also characterizes most legal practice.  The 
separation of these phases into distinct areas of the 
curriculum, or as separate apprenticeships, is always an 
artificial "decomposition" of practice. The pedagogical cycle is 
not completed unless these segregated domains are 
reconnected. 267 
Ultimately, it is these deficits-insufficient education in the skills 
and values of professional legal practice, an overuse of the 
academic case-dialogue method of instruction, and the poor 
integration of practical and professionalism instruction into the 
dominant cognitive curriculum-that are contemporary legal 
education's greatest weaknesses. 
Recent studies and practitioner surveys reflect the sense that 
the Langdellian law school is insufficiently connected with the 
realities of modern practice. The NALP's After the JD: First 
Results of a National Study of Legal Careers Survey reports only 
265. See id. ("[L]ack of attention to practice and the weakness of concern 
with professional responsibility-are the unintended consequences of reliance 
on a single, heavily academic pedagogy to provide the crucial initiation into 
legal education."); see also id. at 140 ("Insofar as law schools choose not to place 
ethical-social values within the inner circle . . . legal education may 
inadvertently contribute to the demoralization of the legal profession and its 
loss of a moral compass .... "). 
266. Id. at 12. 
267. Id. at 124. 
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moderate satisfaction with the level of practice preparedness that 
law graduates received in law school: 
When [survey respondents were] asked to reflect on their legal 
education, however, most were not especially enthusiastic 
about the specific role of their law schools in the transition to 
practice. On the question of whether law school prepared them 
well for their legal careers, the median response is exactly in 
the middle (neither agree nor disagree). Respondents tended to 
agree-but not strongly-with the proposition that law school 
teaching is too theoretical and unconcerned with real-life 
practice. They also evinced a desire for more practical training 
in their assessment of the most helpful law school courses. 
Both clinical and legal writing courses received higher ratings 
than more conventional law school offerings. Most helpful in 
the transition to practice, however, was experience working 
during law school summers and during the year.268 
Respondents to the Law School Survey of Student Engagement 
(LSSSE Survey) corroborate these findings, showing that " [f]orty 
percent of law students felt that their legal education had so far 
contributed only some or very little to their acquisition of job- or 
work-related knowledge and skills."269 
Respondents to the LSSSE Survey also indicated that the 
Carnegie Report's assessment regarding the insufficient 
professionalism and ethical training in law schools has some 
validity: "[O]nly half of students reported that law school 
prepared them well . . .  to deal with ethical dilemmas that may 
arise as part of law practice."27° Further, survey results showed 
that clinical participation and pro bono work was correlated with 
a higher degree of preparation in the areas of "understanding the 
needs of future clients, working cooperatively with colleagues as 
part of a legal team, serving the public good through their 
profession, and understanding professional values that will serve 
them in their legal careers."271 With only a third of law students 
268. NALP, AFTER THE JD, supra note 5, at 79. 
269. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, 201 1  ANNUAL SURVEY 
RESULTS, NAVIGATING LAW SCHOOL: PATHS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 9 (20 1 1). 
270. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY 
RESULTS, STUDENT ENGAGEMENT IN LAW SCHOOL: IN CLASS AND BEYOND 8 (2010). 
271. Id. 
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engaging in clinical work during law school,272 these lessons are 
not being fully diffused across all matriculants. Recent surveys of 
corporate general counsels confirm the unsatisfactory state of 
lawyer professionalism;273 a majority of those surveyed reported 
being dissatisfied with outside counsel because of a failure to 
keep the client adequately informed, non-responsiveness to client 
interests, making decisions without client authorization, and the 
failure to give clear advice. 274 
We see, then, that the critique of legal education has a long 
pedigree, traversing the twentieth century and enduring through 
the present day. Indeed, the nature of the critique has been 
remarkably consistent, focusing on the poor connection between 
traditional legal education and legal practice. 
IV. The Current State of Legal Education 
"[T]he [law] schools . .  . must be brought into a closer 
sympathy and contact with the profession than is now to be 
found . . . .  It is unjust to students, and a fraud on the public, 
to recommend them as practitioners until they reach some 
creditable degree at least of skill and knowledge." 
-ABA Comm. on Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, 1879275 
Has contemporary legal education moved beyond this 
history? Although still fundamentally consonant with the 
272. See NALP, 2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS, supra note 31, at 6 (showing 30.2% of survey 
respondents had participated in at least one legal clinic). 
273. See, e.g., CoMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ILL. SUPREME COURT, SURVEY ON 
PROFESSIONALISM 26 (2007), available at http://www.ilsccp.org/pdfs/surveyon 
professionalism_final.pdf (showing that corporate and in-house counsel reported 
encountering unprofessional behavior from lawyers). 
274. See Clark D. Cunningham & W. Lee Burge, What Do Clients Want from 
their Lawyers? 8 (Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Working 
Paper No. 2010-04) (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://law.gsu.edu/ 
ccunningham/PDF/WhatClients Want-13Oct09.pdf (reporting unfavorable 
results pertaining to lawyer professionalism (citing BTI CONSULTING, How 
CLIENTS HIRE, FIRE AND SPEND: LANDING THE WORLD'S BEST CLIENTS (2007), 
available at http://www.bticonsulting.com/PDFs/HireFireSpend_2007 _Executive 
Summary.pd{)). 
275. Hunt, 2 AM. BAR Ass'N REP., supra note 134, at 219. 
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Langdellian model, law schools have reformed in many ways 
since Langdell's time. Professors have varied their teaching 
methods in ways that build on or depart from the case method. 
Law schools have pursued and implemented many of the reforms 
suggested in the reports reviewed above, offering basic legal 
research and writing training in the first year,276 requiring upper­
level extensive writing experiences277 in line with the current 
ABA Standards, 278 and ensuring that students have some 
opportunity to experience small class sizes279 and group work 
with other students.280 The relevance of other disciplines to the 
study of law has been recognized and incorporated into the 
curriculum through the introduction of interdisciplinary subjects 
276. See, e.g., Climenko Fellowship and First-Year Legal Research and 
Writing Program, HARVARD LAW SCH. (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.law.harvard. 
edu/academics/degrees/jd/fylrwp/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) ("The First-Year 
Legal Research and Writing Program (LRW) is a series of sequenced, 
interrelated exercises introducing students to the way lawyers conduct legal 
research, analyze and frame legal positions, and present their work in writing 
and in oral argument.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
277. See, e.g., JD Writing Requirement, COLUMBIA L. SCH., http://www. 
law.columbia.edu/academics/registrar/writing (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) 
(describing the details of its J.D. writing requirement) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Writing Requirement, NYU SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academicservices/degreerequirements/jdprogram/writ 
ingrequirements/index.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("In order to graduate, a 
student must produce an original analytic paper of substantial length 
(ordinarily at least 10,000 words in length and undergoes a comment and draft 
process) under the supervision of a faculty member who may augment these 
requirements.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
278. See 2012-2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR 
APPROVAL OF LAw SCHOOLS, supra note 28, Standard 302(a) (requiring "at least 
one rigorous writing experience in the first year and at least one additional 
rigorous writing experience after the first year"). 
279. The Cramton Report noted that some upper-level class sizes are small 
"simply because they furnish instruction relevant to a less heavily chosen career 
alternative or are less frequently elected for other reasons" and added that 
"[t]he instruction can be, but typically is not, significantly different in nature 
and method from that furnished in large classes." CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 
22, at 23. 
280. See, e.g., Judith Romero, Stanford Law School Advances New Model for 
Legal Education, SLS NEWS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/news 
feed/2012/02/13/stanford-law-school-advances-new-model-for-legal-education/ (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("The law school has developed a range of sophisticated 
team-oriented, problem-solving courses . .. .  ") (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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or the infusion of such learning into traditional law courses.281 
The clinical legal training movement has successfully imported 
live-client practice experiences into the law school framework, 282 
affording students the opportunity to opt for such an 
experience.283 And, increasingly, law schools are offering practical 
skills training courses that teach students the skills they will 
need to have to practice law.284 Indeed, curricular reform is the 
order of the day, as schools rush to outdo each other in adjusting 
their programs in various ways to improve their ability to 
produce practice-capable graduates. 
Although these contemporary reforms are appropriate moves 
in the right direction that will yield results on the margins, to 
this point, they have not resulted in a wholesale change in the 
practice-readiness of American law school graduates, a failing 
that was reflected and explored in the 2007 Carnegie Report and 
281. See, e.g., First-Year Curriculum, Academics, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. Sett. 
OF L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/jd/llplan.html (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2012) (describing "the graduation requirement that every student take 
at least one course offering an interdisciplinary perspective on law and the legal 
system") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
282. See, e.g., Clinics-Lawyering and Learning in the New World, NYU 
S CH. OF L., http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/clinics/index.htm (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2012) (describing its clinical program supported by 15 clinical faculty 
and 35 clinics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
283. Harvard Law School has recently expanded its clinical courses and 
faculty. See Elana Kagan, The Harvard Law School Revisited, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 
475, 480 (2008) ("Over the past five years, we've hired eight new clinical faculty 
members, and the number of students enrolling in clinical work has more than 
doubled."). Washington and Lee University School of Law is an example of a 
school that has broadly embraced extensive experiential learning as a 
requirement for all of its students. See Washington and Lee School of Law 
Announces Dramatic Third Year Reform, WASHINGTON & LEE SCH. OF L. (Mar. 
10, 2008), http://www.law.wlu.edu/news/storydetail.asp?id=376 (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Dramatic Third Year Reform] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Northeastern University School of Law 
requires its students to work full time in live-client settings in alternate 
quarters during the second and third years of law school. See Cooperative Legal 
Education Program, NORTHEASTERN UNIV. S CH. OF L., http://www.north 
eastern.edu/law/co-op/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
284. See, e.�., Dramatic Third Year Reform, supra note 283 ("Traditional 
classroom instruction will be replaced by practice simulations, real-client 
interactions and the development of law practice skills."). 
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other recent studies. 285 Indeed, the numerous shortcomings of the 
American model of legal education have been documented 
extensively: Law school does not routinely provide training in 
many of the practice skill areas-such as drafting, counseling, 
planning, client development, and client management-needed to 
be a successful practitioner;286 only a tiny percentage of law 
schools require clinical training and the majority of students 
graduate with no clinical experience;287 its primary pedagogical 
approach (the case-dialogue method) is ineffective288 and 
demoralizing;289 its main approach to assessment remains the 
final essay exam, which reflects little about the professional 
competency of students290 and comes too late to allow self-
285. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 11-13 (explaining that law school 
programs cannot fully prepare students for law practice and should be viewed as 
only one step in the training process). 
286. See John 0. Sonsteng et al., A Legal Education Renaissance: A 
Practical Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 
335-37 (2007) (explaining that law schools often graduate unskilled students, 
who must develop practical skills outside of school and after graduation); see 
also John M. Burman, Oral Examinations as a Method of Evaluating Law 
Students, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 130, 132 (2001) ("[T]he required curriculum at 
many, if not most, American law schools virtually ignores at least half of the 
fundamental skills every lawyer should have."). 
287. See NALP, 2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS, supra note 31, at 6 (showing 30.2% of survey 
respondents had participated in at least one legal clinic, 36.2% of respondents 
had taken part in an externship, and 40% of respondents had taken three or 
more practice skills courses). 
288. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 132-41 (stating that the case 
method is encumbered with significant problems as an instructional tool, as its 
impact on students is sporadic, it fails to provide feedback to address skill 
deficiencies, and it neglects portions of the cognitive process); Bernard D. 
Meltzer, The University of Chicago Law School: Ruminations and 
Reminiscences, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 241 (2003) (arguing that the Socratic 
method is "notoriously inefficient" at teaching black letter law). 
289. See Alan A Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 
407 (1971) ("Socratic teaching has been attacked as infantilizing, demeaning, 
dehumanizing, sadistic, a tactic for promoting hostility and competition among 
students, self-serving, and destructive of positive ideological values."). 
290. See Sonsteng et al., supra note 286, at 347 ("The traditional assessment 
system creates an illusion of higher achievement when there may actually be a 
deficiency in actual lawyering skills. Professors routinely observe students excel 
in written exams, but then watch as they struggle with interviewing and 
counseling clients."). 
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improvement;291 faculty incentives promote scholarship over the 
needs of students;292 many professors (particularly the more 
recent ones) have little or even no experience practicing law and 
lack membership in the bar;293 and law school costs so 
291 .  See id. at 337-38 ("[T]he traditional law school model does not provide 
regular or relevant performance feedback, so students have little opportunity to 
improve."). 
292. See James Lindgren & Allison Nagelberg, Are Scholars Better 
Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823, 827-29 (1998) (explaining data showing 
that major scholars, despite teaching larger and more classes, are perceived as 
better teachers than less-cited scholars); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, 
Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical Exploration, 73 CHI.­
KENT L. REV. 765, 807 (1998) (showing that faculty who taught at prestigious 
universities taught fewer credit hours than faculty at less prestigious 
institutions); Fred R. Shapiro, They Published, Not Perished, But Were They 
Good Teachers?, 73 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 835, 839 (1998) (observing that "while, 
generally, praise of teaching is a nearly universal feature of tributes to law 
faculty, for the most highly cited scholars, it is often completely absent from 
their tributes, and this despite the fact that such scholars typically are accorded 
much longer tributes than is the norm"). 
293. A review of the faculty profiles at the more "elite" law schools reveals 
faculty members who have doctoral degrees in other disciplines but have no 
practice experience whatsoever, which cannot put such faculty in a strong 
position to train their students in the skills needed for practice. See Joni Hersch 
& W. Kip Viscusi, Law and Economics as a Pillar of Legal Education 2-4 
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 1 1-35, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1907760##. A 2003 study 
based on AALS data revealed that for those law professors hired between 1996 
and 2000, of those with any practice experience (86.6% of the hires), the average 
number of years of experience was 3. 7. Richard E. Redding, Where Did You Go 
to Law School? Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and its Implications for Legal 
Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 601 (2003); see also Harry T. Edwards, A 
New Vision for the Legal Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 567, 571 (1997). Edwards 
notes: 
[A] number of young lawyers flee the 'rat race' after only a short stay. 
Often, very bright young lawyers seek to move from law practice to 
law teaching as quickly as possible, with little practical knowledge or 
professional experience. This creates a conundrum whereby many of 
these smart young people who escape to academia have nothing good 
to say about practice, though they are the 'teachers' of the next 
generation of the legal profession. 
Id. ; see also Ann Juergens, Using the MacCrate Report to Strengthen Live-Client 
Clinics, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 411, 412-13 (1994) ("[An] excellent academic record 
at an 'elite' law school, law review, clerkship for an appellate judge, perhaps a 
few years at a big law firm, but relatively little first-hand knowledge of dealing 
with clients, transactions, the courtroom, real-life conflict and problem 
solving."). 
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much294 that most graduates have mammoth, mortgage-like debts 
that limit their economically viable options after graduating. 295 
This is no way to produce competent legal professionals. A closer 
look at some of the pillars of law school education-its 
curriculum, its pedagogy, its assessment methods, and its 
faculty-reveal that what is past is not only prologue, but it is 
largely our present, a fact that is problematic given the death of 
the apprenticeship and the dramatic changes in the law and legal 
practice since the time of Langdell. 
A. The Curriculum 
Contemporary law school curricula are dominated by legal 
doctrine, as was the case during the nineteenth century. 
Currently, law school is typically a three-year program (when 
pursued full-time)296 that offers roughly the same basic set of 
294. Average private law school tuition in 2009 was $35,743, while in-state 
tuition at public law schools averaged $18,472. Am. B. Ass'n, Law School 
Tuition 198fr2009, at 1, 3, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/1s_tuition. 
authcheckdam.pdf. 
295. Am. B. Ass'n, Average Amount Borrowed for Law School 2001-2010 at 
1, http://www. americanbar .org/conten ti dam/ aba/ administra tive/legal_ed uca tion_ 
and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/2001_2010_avg_a 
mt_borrowed.pdf. 
296. Northwestern offers an exception with its two-year Accelerated J.D. 
Program. See Accelerated JD, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF L., 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/ajd/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) 
(outlining the requirements of the accelerated two-year J.D. program) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The University of Dayton School of 
Law offers a two-year option as well. See Two-Year Juris Doctor Program, UNIV. 
OF DAYTON SCH. OF L., http://www.udayton.edu/learn/law/juris_doctor_two_ 
year_option.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). Part-time programs tend to run four years. See, e.g. , Full- and 
Part-Time Programs, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. L. SCH., http://www. 
law.gwu.edu/Admissions/JD/Pages/ FT_PT.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("A 
part-time student normally will take eight semesters, or four academic years, 
and one summer session [to complete the JD degree].") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Part-Time Program, GEORGETOWN UNIV. L. 
CTR., http://www.la w .georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/i d-program/ 
part-time-program/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("The part-time 
program is designed to allow part-time students to complete the J.D. degree 
requirements in eight academic semesters.") (on file with the Washington and 
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first-year doctrinal courses297-featuring traditional common law 
subjects298-and legal research and writing instruction, followed 
by electives that offer doctrinal, skills, or professional/clinical 
instruction at the election of the student, culminating with a 
major writing requirement of some kind. 299 Students generally 
are not required to take particular courses beyond the first 
year300-professional responsibility or "PR" being a typical 
exception301-nor is their course load typically organized around 
tracks or concentrations, though many schools do offer the option 
Lee Law Review). 
297. Virtually every American law school requires the following courses in 
the first year of study: contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and civil 
procedure. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, Al\,r. B. Ass'N, A 
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 25 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 SURVEY OF LAW 
SCHOOL CURRICULA]. Law schools vary in the courses they require in the first 
year beyond this basic diet, with many requiring additional doctrinal courses 
like constitutional law, administrative law, or transnational law, and some 
requiring practically-oriented courses focusing on lawyering or problem solving 
skills. See, e.g., Problem Solving Workshop, HARVARD L. SCH. (Dec. 21, 2009), 
http://www.la w .harvard.ed u/academics/registrar/winter-term/problem -solving­
workshop.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
298. The common law focus of the first-year curriculum is an inheritance 
from Langdell, who believed that the common law was the core feature of the 
American legal system, representing a coherent set of enduring principles that 
transcended politics and provided a rational guide for human behavior. See 
Rubin, supra note 101, at 624, 626. 
299. Supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text. 
300. See, e.g., Second and Third Year Curriculum, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. 
SCH. OF L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/jd/2l_31plan.htm1 (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("After first year, your educational plan is largely in your 
hands as there is only one mandatory class. You must take Legal Ethics, but all 
other courses are elective.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
The Program-Courses-Overview, STANFORD L. SCH. , http://www. law.stanford. 
edu/courses/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("During the second and third year of 
law school students are encouraged to follow an academic curriculum 
customized to their individual interests.") (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
301. The ABA Standards impose a requirement of giving students some 
legal ethics or professionalism training. 2012-2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES 
OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 28, Interpretation 
302-9 ("The substantial instruction in the history, structure, values, rules, and 
responsibilities of the legal profession and its members required by Standard 
302(a)(5) includes instruction in matters such as the law of lawyering and the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association."). 
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of · pursuing courses within a specified area of focus. 302 Although 
experiential learning is becoming something that many law 
schools are requiring students to have at least one encounter 
with, 303 few schools require extensive practical skills and clinical 
training.304 Under this traditional approach, the primary focus 
within the law school curriculum is on doctrinal courses and the 
302. Many schools offer the opportunity to pursue a concentration, which 
may or may not lead to a certification to that effect. See, e.g., Programs of Study, 
HARVARD L. SCH. (Aug. 31,  2012), http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/ 
degrees/jd/pos/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Harvard explains: 
To guide you in pursuing deepening knowledge and progression as 
you move through the three years of law school and to create a tool 
for better coordination and collaboration between faculty members, 
the faculty has developed 'programs of study.' Students do not sign up 
for any program; nor should any student feel compelled to adhere to 
one. 
Id. However, the author is unaware of any school that requires all of its 
students to organize their courses around a substantive concentration. 
303. For example, Gonzaga University School of Law imposes what they call 
an "Experiential Learning Requirement," which they describe as "a capstone 
experience" completed through a clinical course or an externship. Curriculum, 
GONZAGA UNIV. ScH. OF L., http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/Academic-Program/ 
curriculum/default.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also, e.g., Clinics, UNIV. OF CAL., IRVINE SCH. OF L., 
http://www. law.uci.edu/clinics/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("Prior to 
graduation, each student will complete at least one semester of clinical 
education . . . .  ") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); The 
Lawyering Program, NYU SCH. OF L., http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/ 
lawyeringprogram/index.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("Lawyering 
introduces first-year students to the skills and the theory of the law in use 
through two semesters of simulated exercises in legal problem solving.") (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Data from a 2004 ABA report 
indicate that at that time, only 29% of law schools responding to a survey 
required some form of skills, clinical, or simulation course for graduation. 2004 
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA, supra note 297, at 20. 
304. Exceptions, of course, do exist and were mentioned previously. See 
supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing experiential learning 
opportunities at Washington and Lee and Northeastern). Gonzaga University 
School of Law provides more practical skills training than is typical by 
supplementing its basic first-year legal research and writing courses with a 
"Litigation Skills & Professionalism Lab" (the life of a case) in the fall and a 
"Transactional Skills & Professionalism Lab" (the life of a commercial 
transaction) in the spring. Course Descriptions and Frequency, GONZAGA UNIV. 
SCH. OF LAW (Spring 2010), http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/files/course­
descriptions.pdf. 
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transmission of substantive knowledge, with experiential or 
clinical courses aimed at transmitting practice skills being 
elective offerings305 mostly taught by a separate group of faculty 
members (clinical or adjunct professors) with different titles and 
status.306 
This focus on academic instruction is a legacy of the 
importation of legal education into the traditional university and 
the desire of early reformers such as Langdell and Harvard's 
President Eliot, 307 and later the ABA and the Association of 
American Law Schools, 308 to raise the standards and status of 
legal education from its apprenticeship roots.309 One consequence 
of this doctrinal approach is that the study of law is 
conceptualized as the study of legal rules-a Langdellian 
innovation310-rather than a broader study of legal practice 
305. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 87 (''These lawyering courses 
cover a wide range, from research and legal writing in the first year, through 
trial advocacy and practice negotiation to clinical experience with actual clients. 
Typically, these are elective courses, optional for students."). 
306. See id. at 87-88 ("[T]hey are most often taught by faculty other than 
those teaching the so-called substantive or doctrinal courses of the curriculum­
a faculty that is not typically tenured and that has lower academic status."). 
307. See supra Part II.E. President Eliot once remarked that ''law is to be 
learned almost exclusively from the books in which its principles and precedents 
are recorded, digested, and explained," not from "the court or the law office." 1 
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 391-92. 
308. See infra Part III.C; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 93 
Today's standard model-the three-year curriculum, an emphasis on 
analytical training through the case-dialogue method, and work on a 
law review journal-took a long time to achieve dominance in 
preparation for legal practice. This model was promoted by the 
American Bar Association and the Association of American Law 
Schools as a way to raise standards, in order to protect the public 
and, not incidentally, to enhance the status of the profession. 
See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *33 (''The inconveniences [of an 
exclusively apprenticeship-based legal education] can never be effectually 
prevented, but by making academical education a previous step to the profession 
of the common law . . . .  "). 
309. Supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text. 
310. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (explaining Langdell's 
belief that law is most effectively taught through the study of legal principles in 
their purest form: as they appear in court opinions); see also John Henry 
Schlegel, Walt Was Right, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 599, 600 (2001) ("[W]ere Langdell 
to reflect on modern casebooks . . . he [would] recognize□ that the essential 
substance of these newfangled books was the same as in his first casebook, the 
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involving the study of legal regulation as a social phenomenon311 
and training in the full array of methods and techniques that 
legal practitioners must be able to employ. Another consequence 
of this academic, doctrinal dominance is that law faculties built to 
deliver such curricula tend not to consist of experienced 
practitioners but rather career academics focused on legal 
scholarship.312 
However, as the 2007 Carnegie Report and other reports and 
commentators have emphasized, substantive legal knowledge­
although a critical element of professional training-is not the 
sole or principal component of learning to be a practicing 
lawyer,313 nor is it realistic to expect that law school can impart 
the sum total of substantive knowledge needed for practice.314 To 
the contrary, there are several related but distinct levels of 
training that are necessary to become a competent legal 
professional: the acquisition of foundational knowledge and 
analytical abilities, the development of certain practical skills, 
and the formation of the professional values and judgment that 
define legal practice.315 The traditional law school curriculum 
one on contracts-the patient explication of legal doctrine, the rule of law as the 
law of rules."). 
311. See Rubin, supra note 101, at 640 ("[S]ocial science has taught us to 
regard law as a social practice . . . . While law . . . may be understood as 
definitive statements by authoritative sources, legal practice is the total set of 
behaviors that are prevalent among those trained professionals."). 
312. See Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: 
Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 712 (1996) ("[L]aw schools are often highly reluctant to 
hire 'the practitioner,' and . . .  particularly at elite law schools, professors often 
sneer at books and articles oriented toward practice, doctrine or (perhaps worse) 
teaching." (citation omitted)). 
313. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25-29 (describing necessary 
components of legal education that are lacking in the current system). 
314. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW 
AND ITS STUDY 93 (1930) ("No, the nature of our system of multiple jurisdictions, 
the accidental constellation of our statutes, the inductive concrete method of our 
case-materials-these make the learning of our law entire, as information, 
hopeless."(emphasis added)); see also Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer­
School?, supra note 204, at 726 ("Of course it is impossible in three years, or 
indeed in thirty-three years, to give or take courses in all the subjects into which 
the subject we call 'law' can be subdivided."). 
315. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 27 ("For the sake of their 
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does not reflect the relative importance of each of these levels of 
learning because it focuses the lion's share of attention on 
doctrinal instruction.316 Fixing that imbalance does not mean 
that law school should be entirely handed over to "vocational" or 
skills training, the reflexive critique seemingly lodged at any 
effort to make legal education more relevant to legal practice.317 
Rather, it means that the current relationship between doctrinal, 
practical, and professional instruction must become more 
integrated and balanced: Skills-based and practice-centered 
instruction and training should be a more substantial part of the 
law school experience, with substantive knowledge instruction 
serving as the foundation for and compliment to practical 
professional education. Further, to facilitate the transition from 
student to practitioner, doctrinal instruction must move more 
quickly into being taught in context from the operational 
perspective, 318 rather than more abstractly through the prism of 
judicial opinions and the case method.319 Finally, students must 
future practice, students must gain a basic mastery of specialized knowledge, 
begin acquiring competence at manipulating this knowledge under the 
constrained and uncertain conditions of practice, and identify themselves with 
the best standards and in a manner consistent with the purposes of the 
profession."); see also Lon L. Fuller, What Law Schools Can Contribute to the 
Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 190, 193-95 (1948---1949) (arguing that the 
current method of legal education is ineffective because it only focuses on one 
form of adjudication, the appellate decision, while neglecting all other forms of 
adjudication, as well as the entire legislative process). 
316. See Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for This 
Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 32 (2000) ("The analysis of 
legal doctrine as presented in appellate decisions digested in casebooks . . .  
continues to frame most classroom discourse . . . .  "). 
317. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *32 ("If practice be the whole he is 
taught, practice must also be the whole he will ever know: if he be uninstructed 
in the elements and first principles upon which the rule of practice is founded, 
the least variation from established precedents will totally distract and bewilder 
him."); see also Fuller, supra note 315, at 191 ("[A]s soon as an attempt is made 
to employ the skills-and-techniques conception as the exclusive standard for 
organizing legal education, the whole educational process is disoriented and 
cheapened."). 
318. Kristen Holmquist refers to this as "applied learning opportunities." 
Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61  J. LEGAL EDUC. 353, 357 (2012). 
319. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 99 ("Law schools cannot prepare 
students for practice until they teach doctrine, theory, and practice as part of a 
unified, coordinated program of instruction."). 
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have more opportunities to collaborate in team settings and to 
work on solving problems that blend legal and other issues in a 
single setting.320 Many law schools seem to be making moves in 
these directions, 321 though how thorough and effective these 
changes will be at each school remains to be seen. 
B. The "Signature Pedagogy" of Law School 
"[I]t is obvious that man could hardly devise a more wasteful 
method of imparting information about subject matter than 
the case-class." 
-Karl Llewellyn, 1948-1949322 
Although the case-dialogue method has been criticized and 
modified in many ways over the years, 323 it retains its basic hold 
as the fundamental framework for teaching law students legal 
doctrine and analysis to this day.324 Indeed, notwithstanding the 
320. See MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, SOPHIE SPARROW & GERALD HESS, 
TEACHING LAW BY DESIGN: ENGAGING STUDENTS FROM THE SYLLABUS TO THE 
FINAL EXAM 7 (2009) ("Students engage in crucial mental activity when they 
negotiate meaning and seek to synthesize their personal understandings. The 
hundreds of studies demonstrating the superiority of cooperative learning 
groups compared to all other teaching methods support this assertion."). 
321. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 280 (announcing that Stanford Law 
School is "transforming its traditional law degree into a multi-dimensional J.D., 
which combines the study of other disciplines with team-oriented, problem­
solving techniques together with expanded clinical training that enables 
students to represent clients and litigate cases while in law school"). 
322. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, supra note 212, at 
215. 
323. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 56--59 (describing the 
case-dialogue method as insufficiently connected with practical context and 
ethical values); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO 
"THINK LIKE A LAWYER" 190, 202 (2007) (explaining that the current methods 
used in law schools to get students "thinking like lawyers" have disparate effects 
depending on students' race and gender); REDLICH, supra note 95 (criticizing the 
case method for failing to give students a picture of the law in its entirety); 
STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 41-47, 132-34 (noting the negative impacts of 
the case-dialogue method on the students' education). 
324. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 50 ("[L]aw schools use case­
dialogue teaching almost exclusively in the first phase of doctrinal instruction."); 
see also MERTZ, supra note 323, at 41 (describing the Socratic method of 
teaching as the "discourse for which law school is famous"). Edward Rubin has 
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myriad changes in the legal profession and in our understanding 
of how people learn,325 the contemporary law school remains 
remarkably Langdellian326 in its design as a three-year system in 
which doctrinal legal knowledge and legal analytical abilities are 
transmitted to students mostly via a traditional or modified case­
dialogue approach, 327 supplemented with optional or mandatory 
experiential learning components.328 It must be acknowledged, 
however, that most professors vary from a pure Socratic method 
in their doctrinal courses,329 and that the method has virtually no 
place in experiential courses.330 Thus, it would simply be 
written that the case method has reached venerated status, making any 
critiques a threat to an esteemed tradition: 
Continuing on for another seventy years or so, [the Langdellian 
model] has ceased to be viewed as a particular approach to legal 
education-as last generation's innovation-and has become a 
venerable institution that gains gravity and prestige from its 
antiquity. As such, this approach has the remarkable capacity to 
make suggested changes seem jejune and to reduce reform initiatives 
to quixotic ventures that can be dismissed with knowing guffaws from 
its wiser, more experienced supporters. 
Rubin, supra note 101, at 613. 
325. See infra notes 350-53 and accompanying text (explaining and 
differentiating learning techniques). 
326. See LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 314, at 145 ("Our 
teaching technique we have ... carried for the most part unaltered into wholly 
changed conditions . . .. "); see also Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for 
A.nother Case Method, 60 VA..l\'D. L. REV. 597, 597 (2007) ("The plain fact is that 
American legal education, and especially its formative first year, remains 
remarkably similar to the curriculum invented at the Harvard Law School by 
Christopher Columbus Langdell over a century and a quarter ago." (citation 
omitted)). 
327. See Rubin, supra note 101, at 610 ("[T]he basic educational approach 
that law schools use remains essentially unchanged from the one that C.C. 
Langdell introduced at Harvard in the years following the Civil War."). 
328. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 34-43 (describing programs at 
NYU and CUNY designed to provide students with practical, hands-on legal 
experience during law school). 
329. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 142 (indicating that "pure" Socratic 
teaching was encountered in only one class within the study); see also id. at 
142-69 (describing variations of the Socratic teaching style as "pure" or 
"traditional," "modified," a mixed method of "dialogue, lecture, and 
conversation," and a "dialogic" lecture method). 
330. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 59 ("[C]ase-dialogue teaching is 
seldom explicitly connected with clinical teaching .. . .  "). 
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inaccurate to characterize all of law school education as merely a 
sequence of ineffectual classically Socratic experiences. That said, 
it is true that traditional doctrinal courses-which do in fact 
dominate the curricula at virtually all law schools-tend to 
involve the study of doctrine through the lens of cases and 
casebooks331-even in statutory courses332-and that professors 
typically use a mix of lecture and Socratic questioning as the 
principal means of covering the material in their courses 
throughout law school.333 
While there may be strengths to the case-dialogue method, 334 
there are several shortcomings worth noting here. It is often said 
that the virtue of the case method is the training it can impart in 
the skills of legal reasoning and analysis-"thinking like a 
lawyer"-that are critical components of professional 
331. See id. at 55 ("The legal texts that form the basis for the case-dialogue 
method are found in a unique invention of legal pedagogy-the case book."). The 
material used in a typical doctrinal law school course is some variant of a 
casebook-a text collecting edited cases organized by topic and supplemented 
with notes and questions-rather than a legal treatise or traditional textbook of 
the kind found in other disciplines such as biology, history, or accounting. The 
inclusion of such "materials" (notes, questions, article excerpts, etc.) in modern 
casebooks is what distinguishes them from the very first casebook, which was 
developed by Langdell himself and solely consisted of cases organized by the 
legal principles to which they related. See C. C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES 
ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS (Neil H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classics 
Library 1983) (1871). 
332. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN 
ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS (2009); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. 
HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2008). 
333. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 ("Law schools use Socratic 
case-dialogue instruction in the first phase of their students' legal education. 
During the second two years, most schools continue to teach, by the same 
method, a number of elective courses in legal doctrine."); see also MERTZ, supra 
note 323, at 144-69 (finding, among the classrooms contained in the study, that 
most professors used variations of the Socratic method that blended questioning 
about cases with discussion and lecture). 
334. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 326, at 598 
The Langdellian case method afforded a way to communicate 
information; to cultivate a style of reasoning and questioning that 
was intellectually respectable, yet also well-suited to the 
paradigmatic law practice of adjudication; and to engage the 
attention and interests of large numbers of students at relatively 
little expense for instruction and materials. 
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development.335 These are skills that all law students must 
acquire if they are to become fluent in the language of the law, 
jurisprudence, and the art of using cases to derive and develop 
legal principles.336 However, the ability of the case-dialogue 
method to transmit analytical skills effectively has never been 
demonstrated. Indeed, Elizabeth Mertz, in her seminal study of 
the case method, The Language of Law School, describes studies 
of teaching methods that fail to show any connection between the 
method used and the ability of students to engage in effective 
legal analysis.337 Additionally, the type of thinking promoted by 
the method is limited to certain kinds of legal analysis, neglecting 
some of the basic problem-solving skills that today's practitioners 
need to develop solutions to their clients' problems.338 
335. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 53 (describing the "deep 
structure" of the case-dialogue pedagogy as "the teaching of legal reasoning''); id. 
at 54 (indicating that the "dispositions and attitudes" modeled by the case­
dialogue pedagogy are "habits of legal thinking'' such as distancing from · 
extraneous detail to focus on points of legal argument); CRAMTON REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 13 ("The traditional 'socratic method' of legal instruction continues to 
be used in first year law classes as an extremely effective technique for 
developing analytical skills . . .. "); LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 
314, at 116 ("The first year ... aims, in the old phrase, to get you to 'thinking 
like a lawyer."'); but see Rubin, supra note 101, at 610-11 
What one sometimes hears is that the current law school curriculum 
teaches students to 'think like lawyers.' Any systematic 
demonstration that such an outdated approach to legal education 
develops skills that are central to the very different world of modern 
legal practice would be interesting to see, but no such demonstration 
has been offered. (citation omitted). 
336. See, e.g., Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 
910 ("(N]o sane person will deny that a knowledge of those rules and principles, 
of how to 'distinguish' cases, and of how to make an argument as to the true 
ratio decidendi of an opinion, is part of the indispensable equipment of the 
future lawyer."). 
337. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 28 ("(C]ontrolled experiments in which 
first-year classes were divided into separate groups, some taught Socratically 
and others not, resulted in generally similar performances." (citing Edward 
Kimball & Larry Farmer, Comparative Results of Teaching Evidence Three 
Ways, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 196, 196-212 (1979); Willard Lorenson, Concentrating 
on a Single Jurisdiction to Teach Criminal Law-An Experiment, 20 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 361, 361-65 (1968))). 
338. See Kagan, supra note 283, at 4 77 ("[W)hile the case method does a 
great job teaching students a certain type of legal reasoning, it fails to equip 
them fully to serve as active problem solvers, able to engage a range of resources 
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Another weakness of the case-dialogue method, as currently 
employed in law schools, is that whatever benefits might accrue 
from the method are difficult to achieve among large groups of 
students. When the method is used in the context of large 
classes-which is typical339-it tends to focus attention on a 
discussion between a few students and the professor.340 Although 
the students involved may benefit to some extent, the method is 
less effective in instilling legal analytical skills vicariously to 
observers not involved in the discussion,341 creating diminishing 
returns as the class grows in size.342 Relatedly, large classes 
conducted under the Socratic method involve sizeable audiences 
of peer onlookers, potentially contributing to the stress and 
anxiety of students expected to respond to the professor's 
questioning343 and creating an intimidating environment that 
and strategies to come up with creative solutions."). 
339. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 7 ("Although many law schools are now 
experimenting with smaller first-year classes, it is still common to find the bulk 
of a first-year student's time spent in larger classes of seventy to one hundred 
students."); id. at 202 (identifying patterns in her study linking "increased class 
participation and classroom presence with traditional insiders . . .  ; that is, 
white male students tend to predominate."); id. at 177 ("Use of recitation (the 
closest analogue to Socratic dialogue), with its intensely public potential for 
evaluation of responses (both by teachers and peers), tends to encourage the 
formation of entrenched, segregated groups." (citing STEVEN BOSSERT, TASKS AND 
SOCIAL RELATIONS IN CLASSROOMS: A STUDY OF INSTRUCTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND 
ITS CONSEQUENCES (1979))). 
340. See Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning 
Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 347, 351 (2001) ("[L]aw professors structure classroom 
interactions as one-on-one, professor-on-student dialogues."). 
341. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 222 ("[l]nevitably, many students 
have not participated in the dialogue; some, overwhelmed by the relief that they 
were not the one called on, have not even listened attentively." (citation 
omitted)); Schwarz, supra note 340, at 351 ("[L]aw teaching requires students to 
learn vicariously."). 
342. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 134 ("The potential value of the 
Socratic dialogue and case method is diminished, however, because we use it in 
large classroom settings . . . .  "). 
343. See Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, The Last Taboo: Breaking Law Students with 
Mental Illnesses and Disabilities Out of the Stigma Straitjacket, 79 UMKC L. 
REV. 123, 144 (2010) ("[D]ue to the nature of a legal education, such as stress, 
competition, and longstanding traditions including the Socratic Method and 
grading policies, depression and anxiety may develop."); see also Lawrence 
Silver, Comment, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1968 WIS. L. 
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may be more discouraging to women344 and students of color.345 
These dual challenges surrounding the use of the method in large 
groups indicate that law schools take what theoretically may be a 
sound pedagogical approach and dilute it, suggesting that moving 
the Socratic case-dialogue out of the large classroom into a much 
smaller setting with only a handful of students might be a 
structural alteration that would allow the approach to bear its 
fullest fruit. 
Next, the case-dialogue method is an inefficient means of 
transmitting substantive information and is limited in its ability 
to impart the full range of competencies that students need to 
become successful legal professionals.346 There have been many 
advances in learning theory and pedagogy since Langdell's time 
with which the case-dialogue method is out of step.347 Yet the 
REV. 1201, 1203-05 (describing the anxiety inducing effects of the Socratic 
method). 
344. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 190 ("Our data tend to confirm the 
findings of previous studies . . .  that male law students generally participate at 
greater rates than females."); see also LANI GUINIER, MI CHELLE FINE & JANE 
BALIN, BE COMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
49 (1997) (''The pedagogical structure of the first year-large classes, often 
constrained by limits on student participation, fierce competition, a mandatory 
grading curve, and few women faculty-produces alienation and a gender­
stratified hierarchy."). 
345. See Carol J. Buckner, Realizing Grutter v. Bollinger's "Compelling 
Educational Benefits of Diversity"-Transforming Aspirational Rhetoric in.to 
Experience, 72 UMKC L. REV. 877, 911 (2004) ("The academic achievement of 
African American students improves when teachers use cooperative rather than 
competitive learning strategies . . . .  " (citation omitted)); see also id. at 905 
Hispanic students do not like to be singled out; they function more 
effectively working in groups to achieve a common goal and are 
receptive and susceptible to thoughts and attitudes expressed by 
others. Encouragement, group work and establishing a sense of 
'belonging' all help to create a positive learning experience for 
Hispanic students. These learning preferences describe the direct 
antithesis of the typical law school environment, and explain the 
dysfunction and disparate achievement of Hispanic students. 
(citations omitted). 
346. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 58-59 ("[L]earning the law is 
an ensemble experience . . . . [T]he apprenticeships of cognition, performance, 
and identity are not freestanding . . . .  Because case-dialogue teaching is seldom 
explicitly connected with clinical teaching, few law schools achieve the full 
impact that an integrated ensemble could provide."). 
347. See Schwarz, supra note 340, at 383 
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Langdellian case-dialogue method-a relic of a bygone era 348-
persists. 349 Insights from learning theory reveal that teaching 
focused mainly on purely abstract concepts divorced from their 
context-something that fairly characterizes the case method-is 
less effective than teaching that recognizes that we experience 
information in many different ways and at different levels of 
abstraction. Edgar Dale visualized these various levels of 
encountering information with his Cone of Experience, which 
depicted "a range of experience from firsthand action to 
observation (iconic experiences) on to symbolic 
communication."35° For example, one can understand what a knot 
is directly by tying the knot (referred to by Dale as an "enactive" 
experience), visually by simply seeing a picture of a knot (an 
"iconic" experience), or abstractly by simply hearing or seeing the 
word "knot" or a verbal description of the phenomenon (a 
"symbolic" experience).351 Learning often moves from direct 
experience or iconic experience toward abstractions as words or 
symbols whose meaning we come to understand,352 although this 
All three learning theories discussed-behaviorism, cognitivism, and 
constructivism-are relevant to law school instruction, yet, for the 
most part, the legal academy has ignored these theories. Together, 
the theories suggest that instruction should cause students both to 
build their skills from base levels to the highest levels, and to move 
from simply knowledge of information to the creative problem-solving 
contemplated by the constructivist model. 
348. See Rubin, supra note 101, at 611 ("Langdell's design for legal 
education, although innovative in its own time and on its own terms, is more 
closely connected to modes of thought that prevailed in the Renaissance, the 
Middle Ages, and ancient Greece and Rome than to our current ways of 
thinking."). 
349. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 26 ("[D]espite a number of arguably 
successful attacks on the substantive underpinnings of Langdell's approach, the 
method itself appears to have outlasted its theoretical rationale."). 
350. EDGAR DALE, AUDIOVISUAL METHODS IN TEA CHING 110 (3d ed. 1969). The 
levels of the Cone, from bottom to the top, are direct purposeful experiences, 
contrived experiences, dramatized experiences, demonstrations, study trips, 
exhibits, educational television, motion pictures, recordings, radio and still 
pictures, visual symbols, and verbal symbols. See id. at 107 (illustrating the 
eleven levels of Dale's "Cone of Experience"). 
351. Id. at 108. Dale borrows these terms from JEROME S. BRUNER, TOWARD A 
THEORY OF INSTRU CTION, 10-11 (Harvard Univ. 1966). 
352. Id. at 108-09. 
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is not always the case.353 However, when learning consists solely 
of abstractions untethered from lower-order experience, problems 
can arise: 
Difficulties arise when abstractions have inadequate 
foundations. If a learner has had too little enactive or iconic 
experience in acquiring a particular summarizing idea, the 
word or formula will probably have no real meaning for him. 
Because a verbal symbol does not resemble anything the 
[student] can do or see, he may have difficulty in relating it to 
his own experience. If a symbol is to stand for something, it 
must stand on something-a firm foundation of relevant 
experience. 354 
This is not to say that enactive or iconic experiences must always 
precede abstract learning;355 rather, abstract learning can be 
enhanced by direct or visual experiences that can concretize and 
deepen the understanding of the abstract concept at issue.356 
The application of Dale's insights to legal education is clear: 
Law school learning exclusively rooted in symbolic, abstract 
experience is less likely to be effective in giving students the 
depth of understanding requisite for moving towards proficient 
legal practice. Further, to the extent that legal learning is 
exclusively at the abstract level, it becomes difficult for students 
to synthesize learning from different areas or to operationalize 
concepts for practical application and the resolution of real-world 
legal problems.357 To be clear, this is not an argument that the 
353. See id. at 128 ("Does the Cone device mean that all teaching and 
learning must move systematically from base to pinnacle? Emphatically no . . .. 
We continually shuttle back and forth among various kinds of experiences."). 
354. Id. at 109. 
355. See id. at 128-29 
In our teaching, then, we do not always begin with direct experience 
at the base of the Cone. Rather, we begin with the kind of experience 
that is most appropriate to the needs and abilities of a particular 
learner in a particular learning situation. Then, of course, we vary 
this experience with many other types of learning activities. 
356. See id. at 132 ("Even the most advanced student, therefore, can deepen 
his understanding of concepts . . .  by participating in experiences all along [the] 
Cone."). 
357. See id. at 134 
A teacher may move students so swiftly to the symbolic level of 
thought, and with so little preparation, that their concepts will lack 
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best learning occurs at the lower, more direct experience levels of 
Dale's Cone, nor is it the often misattributed notion that we 
remember more of the things that we learn from direct 
experience.358 Rather, the claim is that different types of learning 
experiences are possible and that legal teaching needs to make an 
intelligent use of a mix of these experiences to give students the 
level of understanding needed for effective learning and 
translation into practical application.359 
These deficits of the case-dialogue method become harder to 
tolerate once students have acquired the legal analytical skills 
that the method is designed to impart. 360 Indeed, there may be 
deep roots in direct experience. These rootless experiences will not 
have the generative power to produce additional concepts and will not 
enable the learner to deal with the new situations that he faces. 
358. Many have misappropriated Dale's Cone of Experience to present a 
revised pyramidal image that depicts the levels of experience with indications of 
the percent of information retained when learned through each approach. See, 
e.g., Learning Objectives, MINN. STATE UNIV. MOORHEAD, http://web.mnstate. 
edu/instrtech/SCModules/LearningObjectives/index.html (follow "Dale's Cone of 
Experience" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). Dale himself never attributed such percentages of 
retention to his Cone nor did he support the implication that experiential 
learning was necessarily superior to more abstract learning. See DALE, supra 
note 350, at 128-30; see also Michael Molenda, Cone of Experience, in 
EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 161, 164 (Ann Kovalchick & 
Kara Dawson, eds., 2003) (discussing the common misappropriation of the 
theory, noting that "[a]t some point[,] someone conflated Dale's Cone of 
Experience with a spurious chart that purports to show what percentage of 
information people remember under different learning conditions"). This 
misrepresentation of Dale's Cone was unfortunately featured in a recent article 
on legal education reform. See Sonsteng et al., supra note 286, at 309 
(attributing to Dale the idea that "the least effective methods of instruction 
include reading text and listening to lectures," notions that Dale himself 
expressly disavowed in the very work cited by Sonsteng). 
359. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 132 ("Law teachers need to be 
multi-modal in our teaching and reduce our reliance on the Socratic dialogue 
and case method. There are many tools for reaching students than one finds in 
the typical law school classroom."). 
360. Jerome Frank estimated that students could be taught the dialectical 
method of legal analysis imparted by the case-dialogue method within six 
months, after which time other more effective methods of instruction should be 
used. See Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, supra note 210, at 
726 
Intelligent men can learn that dialectical technique in about six 
months . . . .  Teach them the dialectic devices as applied to one or two 
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declining benefits associated with a continued employment of the 
case-dialogue method throughout the second and third years of 
law school.361 Thus, once this point has passed and basic 
foundational legal principles have been explored using the 
method in the first year, the pedagogy should shift toward 
alternative methods that help students acquire knowledge and 
skills in the manner and contexts that will be required of them as 
legal practitioners. 362 In other words, a thorough understanding 
of legal principles and the ability to "think like a lawyer" need to 
become the foundation for the next step in professional 
development-developing the ability to handle complex problems 
of clients in a skilled and professional manner. 
Finally,363 the case-dialogue method presents the law 
through the lens of litigation, most of which is appellate 
fields and they will have no trouble applying them to other fields. But 
in the law schools, much of the three years is squandered in applying 
that technique over and over again to a variety of subject 
matters . . . .  
See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 77 (speaking of the "diminishing 
returns " problem in legal education characterized by the "drop-off in interest 
and effort in classroom learning as students move through law school "). 
361. See, e.g., STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 140 ("Unfortunately, many 
law teachers continue to rely exclusively on the Socratic dialogue and case 
method, not just in the first year, but also in the second and third year courses 
long after students become competent in case analysis and 'thinking like a 
lawyer.' This contributes to student boredom and loss of interest in learning. "). 
This is not a new observation; Harvard students in 1935 complained that after 
the first year, the benefits of the case method were dramatically reduced. See 
STEVENS, supra note 123, at 161 ("After the first year the case method allegedly 
lost its value; the students thought it should be dropped or modified in the 
second and third years."); see also id. at 246 ("In the early 1970s, there was 
extensive evidence that outside those working on law review there was a 
dramatic falloff in energy levels and work at the end of the first year, if not in 
the first semester. " (citation omitted)). 
362. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 82 ("Practice requires not the 
distanced stance of the observer and critic but an engagement with situations. "). 
363. This term is not used here to suggest that the universe of critiques of 
the case-dialogue method have been exhausted. Quite to the contrary, extensive 
critiques of the method abound. Elizabeth Mertz's work helpfully summarizes 
the most pertinent of these and offers an extensive argument in favor of her own 
critique. See MERTZ, supra note 323. One of her most incisive observations is 
that "thinking like a lawyer " is not a superior mode of analysis but rather is a 
kind of analysis that preferences certain bases for authority, modes of 
understanding, sources of knowledge, and types of arguments over others for 
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litigation, and does so in a highly formalized and acontextual 
manner that skews students' perspective away from the realities 
and complexities of raw facts, clients, and professional 
responsibility.364 The "thinking like a lawyer" modeled by the 
case-dialogue method often strips disputes from their context and 
emphasizes formal and procedural issues over other moral or 
personal factors that might bear on reaching a more complete 
appraisal of the justice of an outcome.365 Further, by being rooted 
in court decisions, the law is learned as the product of conflict, as 
a battle among adversaries that yields legal pronouncements and 
interpretations. But law today is not developed simply or even 
largely through litigation but through legislation, regulation, and 
negotiated agreements. These aspects of law are 
underappreciated in the existing curriculum, as even the bodies 
of law that emanate from these latter sources are studied through 
the eyes of court decisions interpreting them. 
culturally driven reasons: 
The phrase "thinking like a lawyer" is often used in a way that ... 
characteriz[es] lawyers as possessors of an overarching and superior 
analytic ability rather than as experts in one profession's specialized 
way of processing relevant information. Like all professional 
epistemologies (and accompanying discourses), legal thought is 
socially and institutionally grounded in specific practices and power 
relationships. It asks some kinds of questions while neglecting others 
and makes sharp demands for proof in some places where elsewhere 
it accepts unproven assumptions. The first-year classroom is a key 
location for examining the shift to this particular professional 
language. 
Id. at 98-99; see also id. at 132 ("In converting virtually every possible event or 
conflict into a shared rhetoric, legal language generates an appearance of 
neutrality that belies its often deeply skewed institutional workings."). 
364. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 53 ("[S] tudents tend to think of 
legally relevant facts as they are presented in the appellate opinions that they 
typically read for class discussion . . .. As a first encounter with legal facts, this 
can give the misleading impression that facts are typically easy to 'discover,' 
rather than resulting from complex processes of interpretation that are shaped 
by pressures of litigation."); see also MERTZ, supra note 323, at 95 ("[P]rofessors 
are conveying a linguistic ideology centered on the crucial structuring role of 
layers of authority, discernable in the text. Emotion, morality, and social context 
are semiotically peripheralized in this process."). 
365. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 52 (summarizing Mertz's 
description of an ethos "that emphasizes the formal, procedural aspects of legal 
reasoning as the central focus, making other aspects of cases peripheral or 
ancillary"). 
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In the mid-twentieth century, a faculty committee at 
Harvard Law School described some of the benefits of the case 
method when it wrote: 
The problems most naturally raised by reading a series of 
appellate cases are: Were these cases "rightly" decided? Are 
they consistent with one another? Can a pattern of decision be 
discerned that will reconcile them, even though their language 
is in conflict? On the basis of these decisions, how would this 
hypothetical case be decided? All of these inquiries are 
eminently worthwhile, and afford a useful training for the 
lawyer.366 
This view is sound; the study of cases can be a worthy vehicle for 
learning about the law and legal analysis. However, the case 
method as practiced focuses on appellate opinions of judges, 
which do not reflect the sum total of what factored into the how 
particular cases were litigated or decided,367 including 
considerations of basic justice and fairness. 368 Omitted is any 
consideration of the underlying record, including documents, 
evidence, pleadings, trial transcripts, trial court rulings, and the 
like, or the raw client narratives and other facts that faced the 
practitioner at the pre-litigation, problem-solving phase of the 
representation, 369 in favor of a retrospective view that stymies the 
366. FULLER ET AL., Preliminary Statement, supra note 26, at 39----40. 
367. See id. at 35-36 
In generai American legal education with its emphasis on the 
appellate phase of litigation trains the lawyer in testing the validity 
of a position already taken, not in the problem of deciding what 
position to take or what course to follow . . . . Because law school 
instruction is largely based on appellate decisions, its focus is 
inevitably upon this last phase of a controversy, and the student 
receives little direct training in the choices that have to be made 
before this final phase is reached. 
368. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 236 
Too often, the Socratic method of teaching emphasizes qualities that 
have little to do with justice, fairness, and morality in daily practice. 
Students too easily gain the impression that wit, sharp responses, 
and dazzling performance are more important that the personal 
moral values that lawyers must possess and that the profession must 
espouse. 
369. See FULLER ET AL., supra note 26, at 41 ("The rapid exchange of 
intellectual repartee that has characterized some of the best case-method 
instruction in the past may be excellent training for the appellate advocate, but 
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development of the "legal imagination"370 needed to develop 
solutions to legal problems prospectively.371 A true case method, 
as Jerome Frank recognized long ago, would entail a study of the 
entire "case" rather than the edited and refined representation of 
a dispute one finds in appellate opinions.372 Such an approach 
would permit students to assess how facts, legal doctrine, and 
other factors such as arguments raised, questions asked, and 
strategic decisions made all combined to yield a given result in 
one case versus another, as well as permitting them to think 
about how they would use the facts and the law to shape an 
alternate approach to the matter that might have led it down a 
different path entirely. Additional alternative approaches to 
teaching the law have been richly covered by other critics 
including those detailed in the 2007 Best Practices Report373 as 
well as in work such as Teaching Law by Design by Professors 
Schwartz, Sparrow, and Hess.374 However, these alternatives 
have not permeated the law school culture, where the legacy of 
the Langdellian case-dialogue method retains its sway. 
it hardly furnishes the appropriate atmosphere for a discussion of the soundest 
solution for a practical problem of legal planning."). 
370. See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 326, at 602 (describing "legal 
imagination" as "the ability to generate the multiple characterizations, multiple 
versions, multiple pathways, and multiple solutions, to which [students] could 
apply their very well honed analytic skills"). 
371 .  See id. at 600 
By taking a retrospective view of facts already found and procedures 
already used by a court, the appellate decision does little to orient 
students to the reality of unfolding problems with facts still to be 
enacted, client conduct still to take place, and procedural settings still 
to be chosen and framed. 
372. See Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 916. 
373. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 105-234 (suggesting the use of 
multiple methods of instruction, including context-based instruction, to teach 
law school courses). 
374. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 320, at 107-34 (discussing a mixture of 
modeling, coaching, lecture, questioning, story-telling, visual-aids, and 
simulations to teach law school classes). 
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C. Assessment in Law School375 
"Our machinery for checking our results [of our teaching] with 
you [the students] would set an intelligent ass to braying." 
-Karl Llewellyn, 1930376 
Karl Llewellyn, who in the above quote in no uncertain terms 
said that law schools put the "ass" in "assessment," recognized 
over sixty years ago that the traditional method of assessing 
student performance in law school was an ineffective means of 
measuring student learning. More specifically, there was and still 
is a gap between the professed learning objectives of many law 
school classes-teaching students to think like lawyers and to 
master certain legal doctrines-and the dominant method of 
measuring students' attainment of that learning-the final essay 
exam, which tests more so what a student knows rather than 
what a student can do. 377 Recall that the Carnegie Report 
emphasized the multiple apprenticeships of professional legal 
education-the cognitive, the practical, and the 
professional/ethical. 378 Becoming a competent practitioner 
requires training in all three areas, though-as has been 
discussed-law school is disproportionately oriented towards the 
cognitive. Thus, the single final essay exam is typically drafted in 
a manner that requires students to display their mastery of legal 
concepts and doctrines learned during the semester through the 
analysis of various hypothetical problems drafted by the 
375. Here, I am referring to the individualized assessment of student 
learning. Supplemental to such assessment is the law school's assessment of its 
own institutional effectiveness, which can be measured in several ways. See 
2011 Proposed Draft, supra note 195, Interpretation 305-2 (listing reviewing 
individual student assessment, evaluation of student portfolios, student 
surveys, student performance in capstone courses or other skills courses, bar 
exam passage rates, and bench and bar surveys of student performance as 
acceptable methods of measuring institutional effectiveness). 
376. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 314, at 139. 
377. See David P. Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 
J. LEGAL Enuc. 479, 480 (1984) ("There is, then, a serious dissonance between 
our higher aspirations as teachers and our examination and grading practices. 
We aspire to teach mental habits that transcend substantive law but we do not 
try very hard to find out how well we are succeeding."). 
378. See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text. 
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professor. These exams will either put the student in the role of a 
judge who must resolve a particular legal question, as an 
advocate who must argue in support of a particular position or 
decide on a course of action, or sometimes in the role of a 
policymaker who must decide how the law should be designed to 
deal with a given situation. Such questions test the students' 
understanding of the law and their ability to engage in proper 
and rigorous legal analysis. 
That said, the limitations of this type of assessment are 
twofold. First, it is purely summative, in that it comes at the end 
of a course and attempts to measure learning after the course has 
been completed. In most courses, formative assessments-which 
measure student learning along the way-are underutilized or 
neglected entirely.379 But formative assessment is an important 
component of the learning process, as students need to have the 
opportunity to measure their understanding-or lack thereof-at 
a point in time when they still have the opportunity to make 
corrections and improvements. It is better to learn early on that 
one's understanding of a concept or doctrine is confused so that 
the lessons of the remainder of the semester can build on a solid 
foundation of understanding rather than simply cumulating atop 
confusion and uncertainty. Formative assessment is critical to 
coaching and guiding students through their exploration of a 
topic, taking care to notice when a lesson has not been fully 
learned and prodding them in the right direction as they proceed 
through the course. 380 Thus, law school courses should have 
multiple assessment exercises along the way-graded or 
ungraded-that permit the instructor to determine students' 
learning levels and give feedback that will permit the student to 
adapt and improve. 
Second, while typical essay exams do, to some extent, engage 
the analytical abilities needed of a judge or an advocate arguing a 
379. Recall that unlike most law school courses today, legal instruction at 
the Litchfield Law School in the early nineteenth century included regular 
examinations every Saturday. Supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
380. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 164-67 (discussing criticisms 
of summative final exams and how students, "in the absence of feedback during 
the semester, [have) no basis on which to gauge whether they [are) mastering 
the material"). 
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legal point, such skills are not the sole or principal skills required 
of most competent practitioners. In the litigation context, 
practitioners often begin with an unfiltered narrative from a 
client, which must be distilled into a coherent set of facts that can 
then be translated into potential legal claims. As an attorney 
proceeds with or responds to a claim, legal doctrine is not the only 
determinant of how the case should be litigated or of how issues 
that arise should be resolved. There are ethical and strategic 
considerations as well as intangible factors such as the profile of 
the parties and the judge, the nature of the claims, what happens 
to be at stake in the case, the relevance of issues in this case to 
other cases, or other larger policy concerns. All of these factors, 
and more, must be taken into account as an attorney decides 
what actions to take and what arguments to make. Engaging in 
this process certainly requires a good grasp of the relevant and 
applicable legal doctrine. But sensitivity to the full range of 
pertinent factors that bear on legal strategy and judicial decision­
making takes practical experience and the development of sound 
professional judgment. Traditional doctrinal courses and their 
associated final exams tend to abstract all of these things out of 
legal problems, isolating doctrinal (and perhaps policy) analysis 
as the key to how any given issue is resolved. 381 That is an 
unrealistic picture of most legal practice that hardly suffices to 
prepare a student for actual practice .  
Compounding the deficiencies of summative assessments in 
law school is the accompanying system of grading that 
characterizes most law school programs. A student's grade in a 
course is typically determined by his or her performance on a 
381. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 10 
At the end of your first semester comes exam time. Now you have a 
chance to demonstrate your newly acquired legal vision of the world. 
In exam after exam, you are asked to respond to hypotheticals, stories 
made up by your professors. These stories are often replete with 
pathos and drama. Your job is to ignore as much of the emotional 
content as you can while hunting for the details that are relevant to 
the legal tests and frames, steadfastly averting your gaze from the 
human perfidy, misery, justice, or in justice found in the story. Once 
you've done that, if you're very careful, you can throw in a little 
discussion of fairness, disguised as a "policy'' argument, and 
sometimes get some extra points. 
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single final exam (perhaps with some credit or demerit for class 
participation), and that grade is constrained by grade 
normalization policies: Law schools enforce a grade distribution 
around a predetermined course mean (the curve). The forced 
distribution converts grading from an evaluation of the students' 
achievement to a system of ranking among course peers. The set 
mean-typically a B+ or 3 .3 at most elite law schools382-
determines the label used to signal an average performance, 
divorcing traditional A through F letter grades from their 
essentialist identities (that is, A is excellent, B is good, C is 
average, D is below average, and F is a failure) and creating an 
alternative, discordant world in which high letter grades are used 
to give a faux sense of achievement that would be absent were the 
traditional labels for excellent, average, and below average used. 
This is quintessential grade inflation. 383 Indeed, the forced mean 
all but guarantees that the grades for all students will hover 
around the upper echelon; actual failures will be rare or 
· nonexistent,384 even if a student's performance in truth reflects a 
failure to demonstrate proficiency with reference to the desired 
learning objectives for the course. 
What are the problems with such an approach to grading? 
The principal problem is that what starts off as a poor 
assessment of the knowledge, skills, and values that an attorney 
must have to perform competently in any given situation becomes 
not even that; in reality the assessment is one of relative merit, 385 
382. See, e.g., Grading Policy, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME L. SCH., 
http://law.nd.edu/careers/employers/policies/grading-policy/ Oast visited Sept. 1, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also List of Law 
School GPA Curves, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_law_school_ 
GPA_curves Oast visited Sept. 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
383. See Catherine Rampell, In Law Schools, Grades Go Up, Just Like That, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at Al (describing how several law schools have 
retroactively increased the mean G.P.A. in an effort to improve the students' 
chances with employers and the schools' reputation). 
384. When there is a forced B+ mean, giving failing grades or D grades 
create such a drag on the course mean that more top grades have to be given to 
more people, weakening the distinction between top performers and above­
average or mediocre performers. 
385. Are there good reasons to measure relative merit from an institutional 
perspective? If there is a system of rewards the distribution of which depends on 
THE LAW SCHOOL CRITIQUE 2043 
not of learning or achievement.386 That is, in a B+ curve grading 
system, an A- does not represent any particular level of 
competence or understanding but rather is a mere indication that 
the student outperformed her average peers but was not among 
the very top performers in the class. Indeed, such a student may 
have been deficient in many respects in her performance on the 
exam, but so long as most students were even more deficient, she 
is able to earn the label given to those who moderately 
outperform, an A-. This grade tells an observer nothing about the 
student's mastery or competence in a given topical area, a fact 
that is dissonant with our essentialist notions of the level of 
quality that an A- label represents. The result is that legal 
educator&--and prospective employer&--lack any true measure of 
the learning or capabilities of their students. 
Proper assessment is about evaluating a student's 
attainment of specified learning objectives. 387 It involves the 
setting of clear goals regarding what students are supposed to 
learn and know how to do after completing a course, followed by 
the administration of an instrument that measures their 
performance against those stated objectives. For example, in a 
civil procedure course, a learning objective might be that a 
student is able to determine whether a federal court would have 
subject matter jurisdiction over various claims that are asserted 
in an action. The assessment tool could describe the nature of 
certain claims asserted by a set of fictitious parties and ask for an 
analysis of each claim, or the exam might ask a student to take a 
certain factual situation and make a determination of where to 
assert the claims and how to respond to any ensumg 
relative merit, the answer is yes. However, facilitating a reward system­
whether it be for the allocation of law journal positions or of jobs after 
graduation-should not yield a grading system that completely supplants a 
rationalized and appropriate system of assessment, the proper purpose of which 
is to measure achievement of learning objectives and teaching outcomes, not 
mere class standing. 
386. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 237 (''The scaled grading system 
allows law schools to sort students for legal employers, but it impedes learning, 
community building, and moral development."). 
387. See id. at 235 (''The main purpose of assessments in educational 
institutions is to discover if students have achieved the learning outcomes of the 
course studied." (citation omitted)). 
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jurisdictional challenges. If the student were able to engage in 
that analysis or make those determinations correctly, the student 
would be entitled to be judged proficient in that area, having 
achieved the learning objective. A standard would have to be set 
for what level of success the student must achieve to warrant a 
conclusion that he or she was proficient in the area-perhaps 
based on a certain percentage of correct responses or, if the 
assessment instrument is more oriented toward performance, 
there might need to be a more qualitative standard for 
proficiency. With each topic or subject matter, professors would 
have to make ex ante determinations of what a minimum 
acceptable level of performance would be in any given situation; 
after such line-drawing, the instructor's task would be to 
determine whether that level was achieved or not. 
Ultimately, then, what we know about proper assessment­
that it must be focused on measuring performance against clear 
learning objectives-points towards the development of a series of 
such objectives within each course, the development of formative 
and summative assessment measures that permit students to 
demonstrate their attainment of those goals, and the use of 
something approaching a binary or three-level388 pass-fail system 
that reflects achievement rather than relative merit,389 where 
388. The Appalachian School of Law uses a pass-fail system that consists of 
the designations of "Proficient," "Not Proficient, " and "Fail. " Clinton W. Shinn, 
Lessening Stress of the JL Year: Implementing an Alternative to Traditional 
Grading, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 355, 368 (2010). The problem with that approach is 
that the "Not Proficient" category is treated as a passing grade, even though the 
student is only marginally competent. Id. Further, this category is hardly a 
grade that will put the student in good stead with prospective employers. I 
would thus label not-proficient performers as failures; if distinguishing among 
passers is desired, "Proficient" and "Highly Proficient " categories might better 
serve the students. 
389. There are risks to moving to a pass-fail system-particularly for non­
elite law schools-which include the muddled signals employers receive about 
students' ability without grades. One possibility if a school is committed to using 
letter grades as a proxy for the pass-fail categories would be to simplify the 
grading system by having only A, B+, and B- grades to reflect exemplary, 
proficient, and marginal performances, reserving a C for failures. But it is also 
critical that there are ways beyond grades that students are able to demonstrate 
their value to prospective employers, such as with portfolios that include work 
done by the student and more meaningful faculty evaluations and 
recommendations. Of course, evaluating such qualitative materials will take 
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failure is a real possibility for substandard performances. 390 
Rather than a single final essay exam, doctrinal courses should 
be characterized by a series of opportunities for formative 
assessment-graded or ungraded-<:onsummated by a summative 
evaluation designed to mirror more closely what will be expected 
of a student once he enters practice and confronts such 
situations.391 That means that not only is analytical ability and 
facility with doctrine assessed, but also students' ability to 
gather, interpret, and present facts or to assess a situation to 
determine what action should be taken to achieve a particular 
goal for one's client. Quizzes, problems, and other meaningful 
more effort and commitment on the part of employers who may be accustomed 
to relying on grades as simple proxies for merit. 
390. See Shinn, supra note 388, at 369 (explaining that at least 15% of 
students in lL classes at Appalachian School of Law must receive grades of "Not 
Proficient" or "Fail," but that professors are not required to give any grades of 
"Fail"). Therefore, for this system to be meaningful, a "Fail" or "Not Proficient" 
grade would have to be real, meaning that professors were willing and able to 
assign that grade to students whose performance fell short of a predetermined 
level of sufficiency. Although other disciplines such as medicine exhibit less 
hesitation in awarding failing grades to students, law schools are institutionally 
averse to failures, which is likely for at least three reasons. 
First, it may be that an F grade is seen as deserved only for a complete lack 
of knowledge or competence-scoring near zero percent correct if you will­
rather than as being appropriate for poor performances that include instances of 
lucidity-let us say a 60% or 50% performance. 
Second, because of the forced mean, if an F grade is given to a student, 
many very high grades must be given to offset the downward pull such a grade 
has on the class average. For example, in a class of ten students, it would be 
mathematically impossible to give more than one student an F grade if the 
required mean were B+ or a 3.33; even if eight students were given A grades, 
giving the remaining two students F grades would result in a mean of 3.2 [(8 x 
4.0 + 2 X 0)/10 = 3.2]. 
Finally, failures mean that courses must be repeated, a consequence that 
law schools are not designed to accommodate in large numbers. Further, were 
students to regularly be subjected to failing grades across courses, they would 
have to leave the law school. Such attrition, were it to be of a significant number 
of students, would not be consistent with the business model of most law 
schools, which rely on maintaining a certain level of enrollment to support their 
budgets. 
391. See 2011 Proposed Draft, supra note 195, Standard 304 (showing that a 
revision to the American Bar Association Standards recently under 
consideration would require law schools to "apply a variety of formative and 
summative assessment methods across the curriculum to provide meaningful 
feedback to students"). 
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assignments along the way will help the professor gauge 
students' understanding and progress throughout the term. 392 
Although achievement-based assessment and grading is 
preferred, enforced means are an important tool for equalizing 
grades across courses taught by different professors who may 
have varying views of what level of performance deserves a given 
grade. A similar problem could arise under a pass-fail system, 
where different professors reach different judgments about what 
level of performance is necessary to demonstrate proficiency in a 
topical area. However, enforcing a mean across all courses is not 
the solution to this problem because of the impact such means 
have on moving assessment away from being an evaluation of 
achievement against learning goals towards a system that signals 
relative merit. A more appropriate solution would be to have 
learning objectives and determinations of proficiency levels 
centrally or collectively determined. 393 That is, a law school 
would-either through a group of professors394 who teach the 
same subjects or collaboratively among relevant professors and 
administrators-be responsible for setting and/or scrutinizing the 
learning objectives identified by professors and for setting or 
approving of the standards for proficiency and distinctiveness 
applied to all assessment instruments, rather than leaving such 
determinations solely to the discretion of the individual professor. 
The professor would certainly be the originator of these standards 
and should have a say in their ultimate form. However, there 
must be collective agreement across the faculty regarding these 
matters to ensure that a performance that earns a "pass" in one 
course would not earn a "fail" in another course. As setting such 
standards for achievement is an inherently subjective process, 
392. For a fuller discussion of more effective assessment methods in legal 
education, see SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 320, at 135-63; STUCKEY ET AL., 
supra note 30, at 235-63. 
393. See 2011 Proposed Draft, supra note 195, Standard 302 (showing that a 
revision to the American Bar Association Standards recently under 
consideration would require law schools to "apply a variety of formative and 
summative assessment methods across the curriculum to provide meaningful 
feedback to students"). 
394. If this would not be the province of any existing law faculty committee, 
perhaps a new "assessment" or "institutional standards" committee could be 
established. 
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doing so collectively across different types of courses will be 
challenging. 395 But such an approach is superior to the blunt 
instrument of an enforced curve because it makes assessment 
and grading a measure of substantive versus relative 
achievement, something that is much more meaningful and the 
true mark of quality assessment in education. 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that forced means also are 
a bulwark against substandard professor instruction, which 
might result in many students being deficient in their knowledge 
in part due to the failures of the professor. If a modified pass-fail 
or simplified letter-grade system is pursued, professors would 
have to use more formative assessments with feedback to make 
sure that their students were learning and progressing along the 
way. They would also need to make sure that the final 
assessment is properly calibrated to measure what was 
successfully taught and learned during the course. That said, 
there would be no guarantee that student performance would 
collectively rise to the proficient level. Under such circumstances, 
the professor's teaching abilities would have to be evaluated but 
so too would the content and pace of the educational program 
being delivered to the students to make sure that it is 
commensurate with their aptitude to learn. 
D. Law School Faculty 
"How can we expect law students to become competent 
practitioners if the core of fuii-time law faculties, 
notwithstanding its scholarly prowess, does not itself possess 
even the basic skills required to practice the type of law about 
which it teaches and writes?" 
-Brent E. Newton, 2010396 
395. Within a particular subject, one could imagine the possibility of having 
school-wide, standardized exams for the basic required courses that are graded 
by a common rubric. This would make grade normalization more rational across 
different sections. However, such an approach would require each professor to 
cover the same material in the same courses, which would impinge on individual 
professors' freedom to select areas of emphasis. 
396. Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don't Practice: Why Law 
Faculties' Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of 
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As we have seen, Langdell introduced the idea that full-time 
academics with little or no experience were to be preferred when 
staffing a law school faculty.397 More or less true to this vision, 
contemporary law school faculties are dominated by tenured and 
tenure-track professors who are less experienced practitioners 
than they are highly credentialed legal scholars. 398 Traditional 
doctrinal law faculty currently maintain an obligation to 
contribute in the areas of teaching, scholarship, and service, 399 
carrying a typical teaching load of three to four courses per 
year400 and being expected to produce scholarly publications on a 
regular basis.401 In return, this category of professors is highly 
compensated,402 m an effort to attract the most highly 
Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 
105, 147-48 (2010). 
397. Supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text. 
398. See infra note 407 and accompanying text (providing data on the 
average practice experience of law professors). 
399. See, e.g., Lewis & Clark College Faculty Handbook, LEWIS & CLARK 
COLL., 50 http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/10303-faculty-handbook-section-1--5 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (''To receive tenure, a faculty member must 
demonstrate excellence in teaching, scholarship, and service . . . .  ") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
400. In 2006, Jennifer Collins, at Wake Forest University School of Law, 
posted a request regarding teaching loads at law schools, to which there have 
been multiple comments suggesting loads in the three to four course range, also 
articulated in credit hours per year as anywhere from nine to twelve credit 
hours. Jennifer Collins, Teaching Loads, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 11, 2006), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/12/teaching_loads.html (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see 
also Gordon Smith, Law Professor Teaching Loads, THE CONGLOMERATE, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/04/la w _professor_ t.html (last visited Sept. 
2, 2012) (providing information on teaching loads from 2005) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
401. See, e.g., University of Richmond Faculty Handbook, at Appendix: The 
T.C. Williams School of Law Personnel Policies and Procedures, Standards and 
Procedures for Reappointment, Promotion, and Tenure, UNIV. OF RICHMOND, 
http://facultyhandbook.richmond.edu/Ch_ VI/law.html#tenure (last visited Sept. 
3, 2012) ("As part of the application for promotion from Associate Professor to 
Professor and for the award of tenure, the applicant must submit at least four 
published scholarly works of high quality.") (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
402. The Chronicle of Higher Education reports that for the 2010-2011 
school year law professor salaries were the highest of all disciplines, varying 
positively 59.5% above the average full-time professor of English language and 
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credentialed and most capable scholars to a school. Why is hiring 
expensive, inexperienced high-quality legal scholars important to 
the modern American law school? As the Carnegie Report 
explains: 
Within academic circles, legitimacy and respectability accrued 
to whatever could be assimilated to the model of formal, 
science-like discourse . . . .  Since the coin of that realm is 
productivity in scholarship and research, it is not surprising 
that law schools have increasingly emphasized this dimension 
of their faculties' work and identity. 403 
Certainly, hiring in this manner is instrumental to achieving a 
mission oriented toward producing legal scholarship, which 
literature, compared with a 50.9% figure for business school professors and 
41.2% for economics professors, the next two highest paid disciplines. Faculty 
Salaries Vary by Institution Type, Discipline, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (Apr. 11, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Faculty-Salaries-Vary­
by/127073 (last visited Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Although information about salaries at private law schools is difficult 
to obtain, salary information for several public law schools is available online. 
Salaries at these schools vary widely, from $90,000 to over $300,000. See, e.g., 
Paul L. Caron, Public Law School Faculty Salaries, TAXPROF BLOG (Aug. 19, 
2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/08/public-law.html (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Dean 
Erwin Chemerinsky noted that when he was being recruited to become the Dean 
of the newly created University of California, Irvine School of Law, he initially 
rejected the proposed salaries for the Dean and the faculty, explaining as 
follows: 
[T)heir proposed dean's salary was about half of what I was earning 
as a professor at Duke Law School, and . . .  their top faculty salaries 
were about at the level of entry-level faculty hires. I was clear that I 
would not be interested in the position if that were the level of 
funding. I was candid that the law school could not be very good on 
the proposed budget. 
Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1. Chemerinsky was ultimately hired at a salary 
of $350,000. See Comm. on Compensation, Appointment Salary for Erwin 
Chemerinsky as Dean, DONALD BREN SCH. OF L., IRVINE CAMPUS, 
http://www. uni versityofcalifornia.edu/news/compensation/chemerinsky0907. pdf. 
Faculty salaries at U.C. Irvine School of Law were reported as ranging from 
$131,200 to $199,300 in 2009, with summer research grants amounting to one­
ninth of one's salary. Univ. of Cal., Irvine, Professor Series-Law School 
Academic Year Rates (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.ap.uci.edu/salary/CurrentScales/ 
prof-Law .pdf. 
403. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6-8. 
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many, if not most, law schools embrace.404 More cynically but no 
less verily, the U.S. News & World Report ranking system,405 
with its heavy emphasis on peer reputation,406 makes it critical 
that law schools attract and retain a faculty regarded as 
productive of high quality scholarship if they wish to maintain or 
enhance their position in these standings. 
Are law faculties--as currently constituted-up to the task of 
delivering the balanced, integrated curriculum suggested by the 
2007 Carnegie Report? Unfortunately, there are two main 
problems with relying on traditional law professors of this mold 
to deliver a revised curriculum. First, as just mentioned, 
traditional doctrinal professors are not typically hired for their 
practice experience, of which they tend to have little407 or 
40 4. See, e.g., Mission of the Law School, UNIV. OF CHICAGO SCH. OF L., 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/school/mission (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) ("Since 
its founding in 1902, a major component of the University of Chicago Law 
School's mission has been to develop and disseminate knowledge through 
scholarly research that critically analyzes the development of the law and 
related disciplines.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Mission and Vision, UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS SCH. OF L., http://www. 
stthomas.edu/law/missionvision/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) ("The law school 
will . . . participate in the improvement of legal institutions and other 
organizations through recruitment and development of a faculty of outstanding 
teachers and scholars, sponsorship of academic lectures and interdisciplinary 
research activity, and establishment of a strong law library collection and 
staff.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
405. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, BEST GRAD SCHOOLS 70-76 (2013), 
available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate­
schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (providing rankings and general 
information on law schools in the United States). 
406. Under the methodology used by U.S. News & World Report, "peer 
assessment score"-a rating by key figures at other law schools of the quality of 
the school in question-accounts for 25% of a school's overall score. Robert 
Morse & Sam Flanigan, U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings 
Methodology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://www.usnews.com/education/ 
best-graduate-schools/articles/2011/03/1 4/law-school-rankings-methodology-
2012 (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
407. See Redding, supra note 293, at 601 (showing that for those law 
professors hired between 1996 and 2000, of those with any practice experience 
(86.6% of the hires), the average number of years of experience was 3. 7). A 1991 
study found that all law professors at that time had an average of 4.3 years of 
practice experience, with the experience of hires at law schools ranked in the top 
25 being only 1. 4 years. See Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, 
Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law 
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none.408 Rather, law professors are hired mostly based on their 
academic credentials and their promise as legal scholars.409 A 
corps of instructors thusly qualified is not ideally suited for 
delivering a curriculum of expanded practical experiential 
learning,410 and arguably is not optimal for practice-oriented, 
doctrinal instruction,411 meaning that adjuncts or differently 
Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 218 (1991). One commentator's 
informal study of law professors hired between 2000 and 2009 revealed an 
average of 1. 79 years at U.S. News & World Report-ranked tier one schools but 7 
years at tier four schools. See Newton, supra note 396, at 130. 
408. See Newton, supra note 396, at 130 ("45.6% of entry-level, tenure-track 
professors hired by [tier 1] schools since 2000 had no prior practical 
experience."); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between 
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 37 (1992) ("The 
situation is even worse now . .. because now we see 'law professors' hired from 
graduate schools, wholly lacking in legal experience or training ... . "). It is not 
unusual for elite law schools to hire law professors with no practice experience, 
although such hires tend to have doctorates in another field in addition to their 
law degrees. See, e.g., Northwestern Law Faculty Research & Achievement, 
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/ (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2012) ("Together, our faculty members combine to form what is, 
we believe, the most eclectic and balanced mix of legal scholars among our 
nation's law schools.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Indeed, Northwestern University School of Law touts having the highest 
percentage of PhD-trained full-time faculty members (4 7%) of all American law 
schools. Id. 
409. Columbia Law School advises its students interested in an academic 
career as a law professor as follows: 
[G]etting excellent grades at a distinguished law school, being a law 
review member or (preferably) officer, and having a prestigious 
clerkship after graduation have been the most important factors [that 
make one a good candidate for a teaching job], especially at the top 
schools. In recent years, however, scholarly achievement-not just 
potential-is increasingly required ... . Most law faculties still value 
candidates who have practiced law, so a few years of experience . . .  
can be useful. 
Almost Everything You Need to Know About Law Teaching, COLUMBIA L. SCH., 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/careers/la w _teaching/Everything (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
410. See Newton, supra note 396, at 1 47 ("Because practical skills . .. are 
honed by significant practical experience, it is highly unlikely that most tenure­
track professors-particularly the new breed of interdisciplinary theoreticians­
could effectively teach such a course."). 
411. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 196 ("Both doctrinal and 
practical courses are likely to be most effective if faculty who teach them have 
some significant experience with the complementary area."). 
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viewed clinical faculty have to pick up the slack. Second, 
traditional law faculty members are expensive from the 
perspective of the law school, as their salaries account for a large 
share of a law school's budget412 and tend to be impervious to 
dramatic reductions.413 Transforming law school to a system that 
involves much greater skills training and a decrease in courses 
taught through the large-class Socratic case-dialogue method 
would require much smaller faculty-student ratios, a proposition 
that would be quite expensive if the hiring of additional 
traditional faculty were the means undertaken to achieve that 
goal. 
How, then, can law school faculties hope to offer an improved 
curriculum? Some schools might favor relying on the heavy use of 
adjunct professors for practice-oriented courses, given the meager 
wages generally paid to such instructors.414 This is a sub-optimal 
412. See Jack Crittenden, How Legal Education Is Changing, Albeit Slowly, 
THE NAT'L JURIST (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/how­
legal-education-changing-albeit-slowly (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) ("[T]he single 
biggest cost in legal education is ourselves. When will salaries do [sic] down and 
tenure [be] abolished?" (quoting Dean Jim Chen of the University of Louisville 
Brandeis School of Law)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
413. See, e.g., Jon Ralston, UNLV President Presents Cuts, Says They Are "A 
Tragic Loss and a Giant Step Backward for Nevada, "  LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 8, 
2011, http://www.lasvegassun.com/blogs/ralstons-flash/2011/mar/08/unlv-president­
presents-cuts-says-they-are-tragic-/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (sharing a 
spreadsheet showing that out of over $4 7.5 million in budget cuts, zero was to be 
cut from law school salaries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas's law school intended to cover these budget 
cuts with tuition increases instead of faculty cuts. See Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Invest in Higher Education, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2010, http://articles. 
la times.com/201 0/dec/27 /opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky -uc-tuition-20101221 (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2012) (discussing that by "[p]aying significantly less than other 
schools . . .  the best faculty will leave and those with other choices will not come. 
The quality of teaching and research will steadily decrease [making it] ever 
harder to attract excellent students and faculty") (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Univ. of Nev., Board of Regents Briefing Paper, 1 
(June 16-17, 2011), http://www.scs.nevada.edu/tasks/sites/Nshe/assets/File/ 
BoardOfRegents/Agendas/11/june/main/BOR-10.pdf (requesting 19.5% and 4.5% 
increases to resident and non-resident law student tuition, respectively). 
414. Adjunct professors at law schools tend to earn "a four-figure stipend" 
for teaching a class. Katherine Rosman, The Ultimate Power Hobby, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 30, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527 4870411600457552 
1800478591046.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_lifestyle (last visited Sept. 2, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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solution, however, because adjuncts are typically unable to give 
the time and attention necessary to provide high quality 
experiential instruction to students compared with properly 
qualified full-time instructors dedicated to such courses.415 
Further, the ABA Standards strongly discourage the use of 
adjuncts in the first-year curriculum and provide that "full-time 
faculty shall teach the major portion of the law school's 
curriculum,"416 while also requiring that full-time law school 
employees be the supervisors of all clinics.417 That said, adjuncts 
can and must have some role in delivering experiential learning 
given the reality of limited resources; the perfect scenario (using 
all full-time faculty) should not be made the enemy of the good 
scenario (using adjuncts), and the ABA standards should be 
revised to permit a greater role for part-time faculty or adjunct 
instructors. Another possibility would be to expand the ranks of 
clinical faculty in proportion to the rest of the faculty. Their 
salaries typically are lower than traditional doctrinal faculty,418 
but their reach in terms of numbers of students is more limited 
given the small size that clinics must be to be effective. 
Ultimately, schools interested in moving their curriculum in 
a more practice-oriented direction will have to give serious 
thought to revising their hiring patterns to identify experienced 
415. This differential flows largely from the fact that adjuncts will have 
other full-time employment that will not necessarily accommodate the need to 
dedicate large amounts of time to supervising law students and they are not 
physically located at the law school where they would be more readily accessible 
to their students. See id. Adjuncts may also be less experienced in teaching than 
full-time faculty and, thus, may do a poorer job, although this is hardly a 
universally true. Full-time faculty members are not necessarily outstanding 
classroom teachers guided by the latest research on effective pedagogy nor may 
they be qualified to guide students through simulations of practice scenarios 
they have not themselves experienced. 
416. 2012-2013, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF 
LAw SCHOOLS, supra note 28, Standard 403(a). 
417. Id. Standard 304, Interpretation 304-3(e). 
418. For example, the highest-paid clinical faculty person at the University 
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill School of Law had a salary of $ 101,000 in 2011, 
lower than the $110,500 salary paid to several Assistant Professors. University 
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Public Salaries, COLLEGIATE TIMES, 
http://www.collegiatetimes.com/databases/salaries/university-of-north-carolina­
chapel-hill-2010?dept=Law (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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practitioners who have the potential to be great classroom 
teachers.419 Although scholarly potential could remain a factor, 
exalting that above the ability to deliver practice-relevant 
training and experiences to students would not be sensible if this 
type of curricular reform were the goal. To be clear, this is not a 
goal all law schools may want to embrace; law schools should be 
free to pursue a variety of missions, including serving as a 
preeminent center of scholarly research on the law. But for those 
schools wishing to emphasize a mission of preparing students for 
practice, hiring differently-meaning a shift toward more 
experienced lawyers-will have to be part of the equation.420 
V The Next Century in Legal Education 
What have we learned? The four pillars of law school 
education-its curriculum, its pedagogy, its mode of assessment, 
and its faculty-all have roots in the Langdellian reforms of the 
late nineteenth century. The justification for the design of the 
Langdellian law school-that law is a science best learned from 
studying "original sources" at the feet of masters of learning 
rather than masters of practice-has been called into question 
ever since that time, but the basic model has endured. Its 
resilience seems to be linked to a variety of factors: The 
consonance of the Langdellian model with faculty backgrounds 
and aspirations makes it fairly self-perpetuating; the economics 
of the approach have been heretofore unquestionably superior to 
more effective alternatives; students and employers have 
historically been unresponsive to law school curricular reform as 
419. A 1980 report of the ABA Special Committee for a Study of Legal 
Education recommended "the law school recruitment process for full-time 
faculty increasingly look to the practicing segment of the profession for its 
potential faculty members." AM. BAR AsS'N SPECIAL COMM. FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL 
Eouc. supra note 165, at 105. 
420. Jerome Frank made a similar proposal to expand practice-experienced 
faculty many years ago. See Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra 
note 204, at 914 ("A considerable proportion of law teachers in any law school 
should be men with not less than five to ten years of varied experience in the 
actual practice of law."). 
THE LAW SCHOOL CRITIQUE 2055 
they continue to prioritize school prestige421-not the quality of 
training-in making enrollment and hiring decisions;422 and the 
deficiencies of the approach were less consequential in a world in 
which the bar understood and fulfilled its duty to complete the 
training of lawyers during their first couple years of practice. 
Unfortunately, the fraying of the foundation for the 
justification and perpetuation of the Langdellian model is not 
likely to usher in fundamental change with ease. Law faculty 
benefit from the current structure of the course delivery system 
and may be loath to take on work that will compromise time for 
other pursuits or impose burdens without increasing 
compensation.423 Further, the profile of current law faculty-
421. See NALP, AFTER THE JD, supra note 5, at 79 (reporting survey results 
that "indicated that two credentials are crucial to finding the first job after law 
school: the reputation of the school and law school grades"); see also Sloan, 
supra note 9 ("The most prestigious law schools still dominate when it comes to 
placing graduates."); Leichter, supra note 17, (''Why aren't California's more 
price-sensitive firms hiring grads directly from the People's College of Law in 
Los Angeles rather than from UCLA . .. ? Firms could do this but instead, they 
prefer ABA grads from highly regarded law schools."). 
422. See, e.g. , MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6-7 ("[F]ew employers 
appear interested in whether students have enrolled in [skills] courses or how 
they perform in them."); id. at 7 n.2 ("The American Bar Foundation survey of 
hiring partners found . . .  that this selection of particular courses has little or no 
impact on hiring decisions."). This stubborn fact, that legal employers complain 
about the quality of legal education but do not alter their hiring patterns in 
response to law school reforms, is a major contributor to the complacency among 
many legal academics, particularly at elite schools. This commitment to 
credentials-law school ranking and class ranking-as the determiners of hiring 
decisions means that doing a better job of training lawyers for practice receives 
little reward, at least in the short term. As a result, there is less incentive to 
pursue such reforms, at least among top-tier schools, particularly to the extent 
they raise the cost of legal education or place cherished school rankings at risk. 
That said, the competition for students among such schools is fierce, particularly 
in an environment of declining Law School Admission Test (LSAT) takers. See 
David Segal, For 2nd Year, a Sharp Drop in Law School Entrance Tests, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at Bl ("In all, the number of test takers has fallen by 
nearly 25 percent in the last two years."). To the extent that curricular and 
other reforms can attract more and better students to one's school, an increasing 
number of elite schools may begin to pursue reforms over time. 
423. As Upton Sinclair once observed, "It is difficult to get a man to 
understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!" 
UPTON SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND How I GOT LICKED 109 (Univ. 
of Cal. Press ed. 1 994); see also David Segal, What They Don't Teach Law 
Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at Al ("Professor Rubin failed 
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having been educated under the Langdellian system and having 
had little to no practice experience-renders them less 
sympathetic to the urge toward practice-relevance and less 
competent to devise and deliver a program with such an 
orientation.424 This point was apparent to Jerome Frank, who 
long ago lamented that inexperienced teachers who learned only 
the law in books-the so-called ''book lawyer" or "library-law 
teacher"-controlled law schools and, thus, could thwart the 
reform process: 
Unfortunately, attempted reform of legal pedagogy is 
frequently in the hands of the ''library-law" teacher. With the 
best will in the world, such a teacher often finds it almost 
impossible to warp over the old so-called case-system so as to 
adapt it to the needs of the future practicing lawyer. For, as 
above noted, that system is centered in books. So long as 
teachers who know nothing except what they learned from 
books under the old case-system are in control of a law school, 
the actualities of the lawyer's life are likely in that school to be 
considered peripheral and as of secondary importance.425 
Perhaps focusing on the "law in books" was appropriate in a time 
when students would go on to learn the "law in action" during the 
first years of practice; academic legal education was originally 
meant to precede and supplement law office training, not 
supplant it.426 Because that tandem relationship between the two 
spheres has shifted-from formal, to informal, to optional, to 
nonexistent-law schools must reform the Langdellian model to 
fill the void. 
to sell his faculty members on a retooled first-year Contracts class. 'Some 
members of the faculty got a little overstressed by all the change."'). 
42 4. See John Lande & Jean R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of 
ADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law Students for Real World 
Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 2 47, 27 4 (2009) 
[M]any law faculty members tend to have "conservative" attitudes 
about reform. Law professors often value tradition. It is not unusual 
for faculty to believe that the law school curriculum worked well for 
them when they were law students and that it should work well for 
current law students as well. 
425. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 20 4, at 915. 
426. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. 
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What should that reform look like? I have sketched out some 
thoughts above-that schools should give some consideration to 
expanding practical skills training, 427 diversifying pedagogical 
methods, developing more meaningful assessment techniques, 
and considering the benefit that more experienced practitioners 
could bring to a law school faculty-:-but these and other ideas 
require much more thorough treatment than I have given them 
here and will have to await future work.428 Further, beyond law 
school, there are other improvements that need to be made in the 
areas of pre-law education,429 bar admissions standards,430 and 
continuing legal education while in practice. 
427. A survey of judges by Judge Richard Posner and Professor Albert Yoon 
revealed the opinion that ''law schools should provide more course work oriented 
to instilling practice-oriented skills." Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What 
Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 338 
(2010-2011). 
428. That said, the work of the Best Practices Report, the Carnegie Report, 
and those focusing on pedagogy such as Professors Schwartz, Sparrow, and Hess 
in Teaching Law By Design, provide a solid vision of the direction legal 
education needs to take going forward. See generally SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra 
note 320; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22; STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30. 
Washington University law professor Brian Tamanaha has also offered some 
suggestions for the future, including giving schools the flexibility to pursue 
differing objectives, such as a research-orientation or a practice-orientation, 
which will result in their faculties having different backgrounds. See BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOO� 173-80 (2012). 
429. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 127 (''Many of the problems of legal 
education owe their being to deficiencies · in the pre-legal period."); see also 
MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 230 (''Most prelaw counseling takes place 
only after individuals have already decided to become lawyers . . . .  The need for 
advice at an earlier time in the decision-making process is apparent."). 
430. See, e.g., HARNO, supra note 23, at 155 ("[T]he bar examiners [should] 
introduce examinations, in addition to those they now give, to test applicants for 
admission on their proficiency in the simpler skills of the profession."); see also 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FuTuRE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 
21, at 68-69 (recommending that "the New York State Board of Bar Examiners 
begin assessing professional skills"). California has long had a practice 
component to its bar exam. See Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar 
Exam Box: A Proposal to "Macerate" Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. REV. 
343, 410-11 (2003) (detailing the parts of the 1980 California Bar Experiment 
that were adopted as part of the California bar exam). More recently, a 
Multistate Performance Test (MPT) has been developed as part of the Uniform 
Bar Exam (UBE), in an effort to universalize performance evaluation in the bar 
admissions process. See Uniform Bar Examination (UBE), NAT'L CONF. OF B. 
EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/ube/ (last visited Sept. 9, 
2058 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949 (2012) 
But our concern here has been the Langdellian model of law 
school education. If that model is fundamentally broken-a 
question that will likely remain the subject of great debate431-
then only fundamental change will do, rather than the 
incremental change we have seen over the past 130 years. 
Fundamental change means rethinking our categorization of 
doctrinal subjects and commitment to them as the dominant 
component of training for legal practice. 432 It means 
acknowledging what other disciplines seem to know about how 
people learn, and giving in to the need to bring that knowledge 
into our own classrooms.433 It means going beyond traditional 
classroom dynamics and physical libraries to approaches that 
leverage technology to deliver content while focusing face time on 
meaningful discussions and problem solving.434 It means making 
the effort to evaluate students against learning objectives in a 
way that measures and supports their growth and development. 
It means opening our minds to the notion that using experienced 
lawyers to educate novice lawyers-in-training is not some radical 
proposition, but an approach that bears a greater promise of 
2012) (describing the different elements of the Uniform Bar Examination) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
431. Although there may be clear deficits with contemporary approaches to 
legal education, the question is whether these fundamental problems adversely 
affect law school graduates in an enduring manner or do the deficits simply 
wear off over time as graduates gain experience through legal practice. If the 
latter is the case, one could argue that this is a short-term problem for each 
individual that does not warrant an overhaul of how we train lawyers. 
432. For example, should we continue to teach contracts, property, torts, 
criminal law, and civil procedure in the first year or should we be teaching 
American legal system, introduction to the common law, transactional law, 
business law concepts, American public law, transnational law, constitutional 
rights, and civil litigation? 
433. For example, having students learn by doing, in context, more so than 
learning by reading and hearing alone. 
434. See generally THOMSON, supra note 7 (discussing how technology can be 
leveraged to improve legal education); see also Robert Talbert, Thoughts on the 
Culture of an Inverted Classroom, CASTING OUT NINES (May 25, 2011, 8:23 AM), 
http://chronicle.com/blognetwork/castingoutnines/2011/05/25/thoughts-on-the­
culture-of-an-inverted-classroom/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2012) (discussing 
"inverted classrooms," in which lectures are offered online and classroom time is 
used for discussion, working on problems, and helping individual students) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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inculcating students with the tools they need for practice. It 
means freeing law schools to focus on their respective missions 
and areas of strength, rather than playing to a unitary, Harvard­
based model of legal education.435 And it means that legal 
employers-who complain incessantly about the quality of legal 
education-will have to start putting their jobs where their 
mouths are, hire based more on the quality of training received 
than on one's class rank and school prestige,436 and reclaim some 
responsibility for the continuing education of their new hires.437 
435. This was one of the key observations of Alfred Reed in his 1921 
Carnegie Foundation report on law school. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 
417-18 ("Attempts by each type of law school to carry the entire burden of legal 
education produce such unsuccessful results as to bring the entire body of 
practitioners into disrepute. "). Of course, to realize this end, some reform would 
have to take place in the U.S. News & World Report ranking system, which 
ranks all law schools along a single scale. Perhaps moving toward the approach 
U.S. News takes with undergraduate rankings-categorizing them as national 
universities, national liberal arts colleges, regional universities, and regional 
colleges-would be something that could be tried for law schools. Unfortunately, 
no law school is likely to embrace the label "regional law school" or ''local 
teaching law school." 
436. A promising area for future research would be to examine the hiring 
patterns of employers across and within law schools over time to see if there has 
been any migration towards job applicants with more extensive practical 
training; if not, the question of what they truly value in a potential hire-versus 
what they say they value-arises. 
437. Something else employers could consider would be to hire new 
associates at dramatically reduced pay and offer them extensive practical 
training experiences, akin to the apprenticeship model used in other countries 
such as Canada ("articling'') and England ("pupilages" for barristers). See supra 
notes 195--96 and accompanying text. Some American law firms have 
experimented with this approach, although the model has not become 
widespread. See Elie Mystal, Howrey First Years to $100K, .ABOVE THE LAW 
(June 22, 2009, 3:26 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/06/howrey-first-years-to-
100k/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) ("[Howrey] is moving to more of an 
apprenticeship model. New Howrey associates will receive an emphasis on 
training and take a significant reduction in salary.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Elie Mystal, Salary Cut Watch: 
Drinker Biddle Cuts Salaries AND Rates, .ABOVE THE LAW (May 11, 2009, 4:22 
PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/05/salary-cut-watch-drinker-biddle-cuts-salaries­
and-rates/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (''Rather than immediately assign the 
incoming lawyers to client matters, [Drinker Biddle] will enroll its hires in a 
new training program that will provide courses on taking depositions, writing 
briefs, and meeting client needs.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Howrey was dissolved on March 15, 2011. See Brian Baxter, Howrey to 
Dissolve Effective March 15, AMLAw DAILY (Mar. 9, 2011, 5:45 PM), 
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Many readers will want a bit more specific advice regarding 
legal education reform than I have given here. I will thus offer 
some reforms that a law school wanting to do a better job of 
preparing its students to become practitioners could undertake: 
• .Modernize the first year to include an introductory 
overview of the legal system and the legal profession, 
as well as subjects more pertinent to contemporary 
legal practice such as transnational law and 
administrative law; 
• Impose a live-client experience requirement, having all 
students participate in either a clinical course or an 
externship; 
• Extend legal research and writing education into the 
second year, featuring more extensive simulation 
training focused on certain areas such as litigation and 
transactional skills; 
• Redesign the content -of traditional courses away from 
an emphasis on cases toward more source material and 
practice documents, while redesigning the delivery of 
courses around more group work and problem-solving 
exercises in the lawyer role _during class meetings; 
• Hire full-time, part-time, and adjunct faculty who can 
bring more extensive and contemporary practice 
experience to bear on the design and delivery of the 
curriculum; 
• Develop capstone courses that enable third-year law 
students to synthesize their learning across courses 
and apply it in practice settings. 
These are not steps that all law schools must take. Rather, these 
are simply some possibilities that some schools could consider; 
there are surely other ways to improve the ability of legal 
education to prepare students, and schools should be free to 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/03/howrey-partners-vote.html 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Drinker Biddle carries on with its program. See First Year Associate 
Development Program, DRINKER BIDDLE, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/ 
careers/Summer%20Associates/First-Years (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (outlining 
the details of their first year associate development program) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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pursue them. Further, while the above reforms may be 
worthwhile improvements, work remains to be done that can 
demonstrate their efficacy in better preparing students for 
practice, at least sufficiently to justify the cost and potential 
disruption that might accompany some of these efforts. 
Unfortunately, several external constraints facing law 
schools make fundamental reforms difficult to embrace: ABA 
standards limit the ability to use active practitioners as part-time 
faculty, require the commitment of extensive resources to 
physical libraries, and limit the amount of distance eduGation 
that students can apply toward their degrees; the U.S. News 
rankings lump all schools into a unitary system that rewards 
things like expenditures per student, faculty scholarship and 
prestige, and LSAT scores rather than qualities that relate more 
directly to a school's ability to prepare its students for practice; 
and bar exams continue to focus almost exclusively on 
substantive knowledge rather than practice competency, a focus 
that law schools must mirror to some extent if their graduates 
are to be able to pass the bar. Hopefully over time these and other 
external factors will evolve in ways that facilitate the more 
effective legal education that reformers have been urging for the 
past century. 
VI. Conclusion 
Traditional legal education remains bound up with many of 
the fundamental attributes designed by Langdell at Harvard Law 
School more than a century ago. It is a decidedly academic, or 
cognitive, model of legal education--centered on legal doctrine 
and case law-with varying degrees of elective opportunities to 
attain practical and professional competence. To be truly 
effective, however, professional legal education must give more 
attention to transmitting the skills and values that are essential 
compliments to doctrinal instruction. Mastering the cognitive, 
practical, and ethical dimensions of legal practice are what 
professional legal education must be about; focusing largely on 
the law in books cannot do the job. Perhaps the late (and great) 
Derrick Bell said it best when he wrote the following: 
2062 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1949 (2012) 
By . . . givmg priority to "learning by doing'' simulations, 
students mimic the kind of process that an attorney, 
researching an unfamiliar area of law, might utilize to 
investigate prior decisions. In practice, lawyers are called to 
research and to write; to comprehend legal arguments; to 
guess at the probable effect of and interaction between 
judicial, statutory, legal and policy arguments in court; to 
argue, persuade and debate; to work cooperatively with 
colleagues; and for some, to judge those arguments and decide 
cases and issues of law. This is as true in the practice of 
constitutional law as in any other. Once their research skills 
are in place, most students are aware that they have the 
capacity to learn, relatively quickly, whatever they need or 
want to know regarding any legal question.438 
This full range of abilities gained through experiential learning is 
what law schools should strive to deliver if their goal is to 
produce competent attorneys. Students need to learn how to 
"work like a lawyer," not just how to "think like a lawyer."439 
This has been understood by many since the time of 
Langdell, as evidenced by the continual criticism emanating from 
the ABA, the Carnegie Foundation, and legal commentators since 
the late nineteenth century. What makes change possible now is 
that the unprecedented confluence of disintermediation440 in the 
legal profession, the stagnation of incomes in the legal job 
market, a bubble in law school tuition and attendant student 
borrowing, and the prospect of a decline in law school 
applications and enrollments that will require all but perhaps the 
most elite and secure law schools to innovate or die. I have no 
doubt that many law professors will react to these admonitions 
much as most law professors have reacted to previous efforts to 
438. Derrick Bell, Constitutional Confl,icts, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1039, 
1044-45 (1998). 
439. Zandt, supra note 31, at 1133-34 
The excellent legal analysis and advocacy skills that are the hallmark 
of law school programs must remain an essential element of legal 
education, but today's law students also need a much more 
sophisticated understanding of what it means to work as well as 
think like lawyers in their multi-job careers. 
440. See SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 6 ("Lawyers, like the rest of humanity, 
face the threat of disintermediation (broadly, being cut out of some supply 
chain) by advanced systems . . . . "). 
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improve legal education-with denial or sighs of impossibility or 
indifference-given the many obstacles to reform.441 It may 
require bold leadership from deans to make the case for a new 
vision of legal education and an insistence on the adoption of 
certain measures, perhaps as a condition of their taking on or 
continuing to serve in the dean role.442 Certainly, there may be 
faculties that take the lead in responding to the need for 
significant change. However we get there, it is clear that we need 
to get beyond the Langdellian model toward a truly twenty-first 
century program of professional legal education that prepares 
graduates for practice; the time is ripe for getting there if we can 
all collectively muster the will to take the first steps. 
441. See Schwartz, supra note 340, at 360 ("The legal academy's policies 
regarding law school hiring, promotion, and tenure practices, law school 
textbooks, law school accreditation practice, and law school economics have 
created an environment in which change is very unlikely to occur."). 
442. Brian Tamanaha has suggested just such an approach in his "Dean's 
Vision" speech, in which he announces pay cuts and increased course loads as 
norms that would characterize his deanship if hired. See Brian Tamanaha, My 
"Dean's Vision" Speech, Balkinization, (Nov. 16, 2010), http://balkin.blogspot. 
com/2010/11/my-deans-vision-speech.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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